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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-53832: OpenClaw · Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers

Affects openclawSource GCVE Database

0

Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVSS 7.7 High : upgrade to 2026.5.18 soon.

Data as of 28 Aug 2026, 17:08 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2026.5.18
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

What to do

Upgrade openclaw to 2026.5.18.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npmopenclawAffected
  • <2026.5.18
Fixed in
  • 2026.5.18

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A fix is available in OpenClaw version 2026.5.18. Users should upgrade to this version to remediate the vulnerability. Until then, restrict access to the trusted-proxy ingress by binding it behind the actual proxy and firewall to prevent direct same-host access. Additionally, narrow channel and tool allowlists, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Description

### Summary Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`. ### Mitigations bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

References

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