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VulnerabilityPublished

OpenClaw's gateway config mutation guard allowed unsafe model-driven config writes

Affects openclawSource GCVE Database

0

CVSS 8.8 High : upgrade to 2026.4.23 soon.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2026.4.23
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What to do

Upgrade openclaw to 2026.4.23.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npmopenclawAffected
  • <2026.4.23
Fixed in
  • 2026.4.23

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Description

## Summary The agent-facing `gateway` tool protects `config.apply` and `config.patch` with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations. ## Impact A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only `gateway` tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23` ## Fix OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven `gateway config.apply` and `gateway config.patch` now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked. ## Fix Commit(s) - `bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec` (`fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits`) ## Severity Severity remains `high`. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.

References

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