@openeudi/openid4vp · OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without
Affects @openeudi/openid4vpSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 0.8.1 soon.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 01:23 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 7.5 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 19 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade @openeudi/openid4vp to 0.8.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npm@openeudi/openid4vp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to @openeudi/openid4vp version 0.8.1 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed by enforcing strict byte-identical matching of the terminating certificate to the trust anchor and improving anchor selection logic. No workarounds are available. Applying this official fix is the only recommended mitigation.
Description
The @openeudi/openid4vp library versions prior to 0.8.1 contain a vulnerability in the X.509 certificate chain validation process. The ChainBuilder component incorrectly accepts a certificate as a trust anchor if its Subject Distinguished Name (DN) string matches that of a trusted anchor, without verifying the certificate's signature against the anchor's public key. This flaw allows an attacker to create a self-signed certificate with a forged Subject DN matching a trusted anchor, causing forged credentials signed by the attacker to be accepted as genuine. The vulnerability affects OpenID4VP presentations verification, potentially enabling impersonation of trusted issuers in identity verification deployments. The issue is fixed in version 0.8.1 by enforcing byte-identical matching of the terminating certificate to the trust anchor and improving anchor selection logic.
References
- github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/security/advisories/GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75522 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/pull/25 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/commit/a3ffd435aadd61aff1f75ec4b2e1a0f44ffabf16 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openeudi/openid4vp (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/openeudi/openid4vp/releases/tag/v0.8.1 (opens in a new tab)