CVE-2026-123596: Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)
Affects hickory-protoSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 0.26.0-beta.1 soon.
Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 13:17 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 4.0 | 8.7 |
|---|---|---|
| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 3.1 | 8.8 |
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.26.0-beta.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade hickory-proto to 0.26.0-beta.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
crates.iohickory-protopkg:cargo/hickory-protoOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in hickory-net version 0.26.2 and later. Users of hickory-proto DNSSEC validation functionality, either directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor, should upgrade to hickory-net 0.26.2 or later. Hickory-proto releases starting from 0.26.0-beta.1 use hickory-net for DNSSEC validation and do not contain this vulnerability. No other mitigation is indicated.
Description
A DNSSEC validation flaw in hickory-proto up to version 0.26.0-alpha.1 allowed acceptance of a parent zone's NSEC record at a zone cut as proof of nonexistence for names below the cut or other types at the cut. This is incorrect because such NSEC records only prove the absence of DS records, not the absence of names or other types. An attacker capable of modifying DNS responses could replay these signed parent records to cause denial of existing names in the child zone to be accepted as secure. The issue was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2, with DNSSEC validation moved to hickory-net starting from hickory-proto 0.26.0-beta.1.