VulnerabilityPublished 13 Aug 2026Updated 26 Oct 2026

CVE-2026-55697: pnpm · Repository-controlled configDependencies can select a pacquet native install engine

Affects pnpm@10Source GCVE Database

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 10.34.2 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 10.34.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: High
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: High: A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected. For example, a successful attack may require an attacker to: gather knowledge about the environment in which the vulnerable target/component exists; prepare the target environment to improve exploit reliability; or inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim in order to read and/or modify network communications (e.g., a man in the middle attack).
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade pnpm@10 to 10.34.2.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewpnpm@10`pkg:brew/pnpm%4010`Other threats	Affected >=10.33.2 <10.34.2	Fixed in 10.34.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Maintainer Action Plan This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path. - Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-097` / `GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x` - Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x - Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1 - Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09` - Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22` - Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec` - Maintainer priority: `start-here` - Component: `pnpm configDependencies / pacquet delegation` - Patch area: pacquet/configDependency lifecycle execution is not used as install engine without trust - Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/config.reader`, `npm:@pnpm/installing.commands` - CWE IDs: `CWE-829`, `CWE-78`, `CWE-494` - Conservative CVSS: `7.5` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` - Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory. ### Expected Patched Behavior config-dependency pacquet install engines are not selected unless the trusted allowlist is set outside the repository; the marker file is not created. ### Files And Tests To Review - `config/reader/src/Config.ts` - `config/reader/src/types.ts` - `config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts` - `config/reader/src/index.ts` - `config/reader/test/index.ts` - `installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts` - `installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts` - `pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts` - `.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md` ### Focused Validation Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed. ```bash ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/commands/tsconfig.json ./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/runPacquet.ts --runInBand NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t "config dependency code allowlists|user-level preference settings" --runInBand ./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/Config.ts config/reader/src/types.ts config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts config/reader/src/index.ts config/reader/test/index.ts installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts git diff --check ``` The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-097-patched-result.json`.  ### Summary pnpm can install `configDependencies` declared in `pnpm-workspace.yaml` before command dispatch. Before the patch, a repository could declare `pacquet` or `@pnpm/pacquet` as a config dependency and pnpm treated that repository-controlled dependency as an install-engine opt-in. During install, pnpm resolved a platform-specific `@pacquet/<platform>-<arch>/pacquet` binary from `node_modules/.pnpm-config/<packageName>` and spawned it as the developer or CI user. ### Details The vulnerable source-to-sink path was: - `config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts` copies repository `pnpm-workspace.yaml` `configDependencies` into config. - `pnpm/src/getConfig.ts` installs config dependencies before command dispatch. - `installing/env-installer/src/resolveAndInstallConfigDeps.ts` resolves the repository-declared dependency and its optional platform subdependencies. - `installing/env-installer/src/installConfigDeps.ts` fetches, imports, and symlinks the config dependency tree under `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. - `installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts` selected pacquet delegation whenever `configDependencies` contained `pacquet` or `@pnpm/pacquet`. - `installing/deps-installer/src/install/index.ts` called `opts.runPacquet` from frozen and materialization paths. - `installing/commands/src/runPacquet.ts` resolved `@pacquet/${process.platform}-${process.arch}/pacquet` from the installed config dependency package and executed it with `spawn()`. Exact-version, integrity, and platform filters only proved which bytes package resolution selected; they did not establish that the repository was trusted to choose a native install engine. ### PoC Standalone PoC and verification script: Repository fixture: ```yaml packages: - . configDependencies: pacquet: 0.2.2 ``` Registry package shape: ```json { "name": "pacquet", "version": "0.2.2", "optionalDependencies": { "@pacquet/darwin-arm64": "0.2.2" } } ``` Platfo

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