VulnerabilityPublished 8 May 2026

`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass

Affects potato-annotationSource GCVE Database

CVSS 5.1 Medium : upgrade to 2.4.5 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

5.1Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 2.4.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack Vector: Local
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: Low
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Local: The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Either: the attacker exploits the vulnerability by accessing the target system locally (e.g., keyboard, console), or remotely (e.g., SSH); or the attacker relies on User Interaction by another person to perform actions required to exploit the vulnerability (e.g., tricking a legitimate user into opening a malicious document).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
Integrity: Low: Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

What to do

Upgrade potato-annotation to 2.4.5.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
PyPIpotato-annotation	Affected >=2.0.0 <2.4.5	Fixed in 2.4.5

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Description

## Summary `validate_path_security` uses string-prefix containment (`startswith`) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are **outside** the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., `/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/...` vs `/tmp/potato_proj_demo`) to be accepted. ## Details ### Affected source location (root cause) **File:** `potato/server_utils/config_module.py` **Snippet (lines 370–373):** ```python real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path) real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir) if not real_path.startswith(real_base): raise ConfigSecurityError(...) ``` **Snippet (lines 384–389):** ```python real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path) check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir) if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir): raise ConfigSecurityError(...) ``` `startswith()` is string-based, so `/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/...` passes when checked against `/tmp/potato_proj_demo`. ### Confirmed affected call sites **File:** `potato/server_utils/config_module.py` 1) `validate_file_paths` task_dir branch (line 2113) ```python validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir) ``` 2) `validate_file_paths` data_files branch (line 2151) ```python validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir) ``` 3) `validate_training_config` training.data_file branch (line 2286) ```python validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir) ``` ## PoC ```python from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo' vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt' try: print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base)) except Exception as e: print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e) try: validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base) except Exception as e: print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e) print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base)) ``` ## Impact - Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary. - Can affect read paths (`data_files`, `training.data_file`, `base_css`, `header_logo`) and output/path placement depending on configuration.

CWE-22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #6OWASP Top 10 A01:2025: Broken Access Control (opens in a new tab)
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Implementation · Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks…
Implementation · Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174).
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Authorization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V12.3.1 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
Path Traversal (opens in a new tab)
Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic (opens in a new tab)
Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls (opens in a new tab)
Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (opens in a new tab)
Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

References

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What to do

Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-22

Technical details

References

Community reviews

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