Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-42080: PPTAgent · Arbitrary File Write via `save_generated_slides`

Affects pptagentSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-42080· Medium 4.6

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.6 Medium : upgrade to 1.1.36 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.6Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.1.36
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 4 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade pptagent to 1.1.36.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
PyPIpptagentAffected
  • <1.1.36
Fixed in
  • 1.1.36

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary > This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00. The `save_generated_slides` MCP tool accepts a pptx_path argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation: ```python # pptagent/mcp_server.py:288-300 async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str): """Save the generated slides to a PowerPoint file. Args: pptx_path: The path to save the PowerPoint file """ pptx = Path(pptx_path) assert len(self.slides), ( "No slides generated, please call `generate_slide` first" ) pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ← creates arbitrary directories self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path) # ← writes to arbitrary path ``` The call to `pptx.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates any intermediate directories, and `self.empty_prs.save(pptx_path)` writes a valid PPTX binary (ZIP archive) to the specified path. No is_relative_to(workspace) check is performed — contrast with download_file in deeppresenter/tools/search.py:290, which correctly enforces workspace confinement. The server changes directory to WORKSPACE (if set) on startup, so relative paths land in the workspace. Absolute paths, however, reach any filesystem location accessible to the server process. ## Impact The concrete attack scenarios include 1. Cron persistence (root-running server): `pptx_path = "/etc/cron.d/backdoor"` → writes a PPTX ZIP to a path the cron daemon reads; if the ZIP header is misinterpreted, this may corrupt cron or be exploitable depending on parser behaviour. 2. Dot-file overwrite: `pptx_path = "/home/user/.bashrc"` → overwrites shell init file with a binary blob containing arbitrary content in the PPTX's embedded comments/custom properties. 3. Directory traversal from workspace: `pptx_path = "../../.ssh/known_hosts.pptx"` → escapes workspace entirely. 4. Denial of service: `pptx_path = "/dev/sda"` writes to a raw device. ## Remediation The potential fix is something like: ```python async def save_generated_slides(pptx_path: str): workspace = Path(os.getcwd()).resolve() target = Path(pptx_path).resolve() if not target.is_relative_to(workspace): raise ValueError(f"Access denied: path outside workspace: {target}") target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) self.empty_prs.save(str(target)) ```

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…