CVE-2026-33397: Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR
Affects @angular/ssrSource GCVE Database
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 22.0.0-next.2 when convenient.
Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 22.0.0-next.2, 21.2.3, 20.3.21
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 26 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade @angular/ssr to 22.0.0-next.2; @angular/ssr to 21.2.3; @angular/ssr to 20.3.21.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npm@angular/ssr | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| npm@angular/ssr | Affected
| Fixed in
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| npm@angular/ssr | Affected
| Fixed in
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Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in `@angular/ssr` due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., `///`), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (`\`) bypass. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header: - An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., `\evil.com`). - The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid. - The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a `Location` header containing `/\evil.com`. - Modern browsers interpret the `/\` sequence as `//`, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain. Furthermore, the response lacks the `Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning). ### Impact This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking: - **Scale**: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires. - **SEO Poisoning**: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains. - **Trust**: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious. ### Patches - 22.0.0-next.2 - 21.2.3 - 20.3.21 ### Workarounds If you cannot patch yet, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their `server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request: ```ts app.use((req, res, next) => { const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']; if (typeof prefix === 'string') { // Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/'); } next(); }); ``` ### References - Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32771 - Original CVE: CVE-2026-27738
References
- github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-vfx2-hv2g-xj5f (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33397 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32771 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/angular/angular-cli (opens in a new tab)