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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-33397: Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass in Angular SSR

Affects @angular/ssrSource GCVE Database

0

Mentioned vulnerabilities

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-33397· Medium 6.9

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 22.0.0-next.2 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 22.0.0-next.2, 21.2.3, 20.3.21
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 Mar 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade @angular/ssr to 22.0.0-next.2; @angular/ssr to 21.2.3; @angular/ssr to 20.3.21.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npm@angular/ssrAffected
  • >=22.0.0-next.0 <22.0.0-next.2
Fixed in
  • 22.0.0-next.2
npm@angular/ssrAffected
  • >=21.0.0-next.0 <21.2.3
Fixed in
  • 21.2.3
npm@angular/ssrAffected
  • >=20.0.0-next.0 <20.3.21
Fixed in
  • 20.3.21

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in `@angular/ssr` due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., `///`), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (`\`) bypass. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header: - An attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash (e.g., `\evil.com`). - The internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid. - The application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a `Location` header containing `/\evil.com`. - Modern browsers interpret the `/\` sequence as `//`, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain. Furthermore, the response lacks the `Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning). ### Impact This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking: - **Scale**: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires. - **SEO Poisoning**: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains. - **Trust**: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious. ### Patches - 22.0.0-next.2 - 21.2.3 - 20.3.21 ### Workarounds If you cannot patch yet, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their `server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request: ```ts app.use((req, res, next) => { const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']; if (typeof prefix === 'string') { // Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/'); } next(); }); ``` ### References - Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32771 - Original CVE: CVE-2026-27738

References

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