CVE-2026-49283: Saml2 · SimpleSAMLphp HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass
Affects simplesamlphp/saml2Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 6.2.1 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 40% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 6.2.1, 5.0.6, 4.20.2 +1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2 | Affected
| Fixed in
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| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2 | Affected
| Fixed in
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| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2 | Affected
| Fixed in
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| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2-legacy | Affected
| Fixed in
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| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2 | Affected
| Fixed in
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| Packagistsimplesamlphp/saml2-legacy | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
## Summary SimpleSAMLphp's HTTP-Artifact receive path can treat an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` as cryptographically valid for the wrong IdP. In the `HTTPArtifact::receive()` flow, the SOAP `ArtifactResponse` receives a TLS-based validator from `SOAPClient::addSSLValidator()`. The embedded SAML `Response` then receives a validator that delegates signature validation to that outer `ArtifactResponse`. Later, the SP validates the embedded `Response` against metadata selected from the embedded response issuer, not necessarily the artifact issuer. The critical issue is that `SOAPClient::validateSSL()` returns normally when the TLS public key does not match the key currently being validated. `SAML2\Message::validate()` treats any validator call that does not throw an exception as successful. As a result, an `ArtifactResponse` obtained from one IdP can validate an unsigned embedded SAML `Response` that claims to be issued by a different IdP. In a multi-IdP/federation deployment where a malicious or lower-trust IdP can issue an HTTP-Artifact response to an SP, this can allow the attacker to authenticate to the SP as arbitrary users from a higher-trust victim IdP. ## Impact A malicious or lower-trust IdP in the same SP/federation trust set can authenticate to the SP as users from another IdP when HTTP-Artifact is used. The attacker can choose assertion attributes, `NameID`, and session data in the forged unsigned assertion. This is an authentication bypass and identity-provider impersonation issue. In realistic federations, the security boundary between IdPs matters: a compromised or low-assurance IdP should not be able to mint identities for a high-assurance IdP.