CVE-2026-39821VulnerabilityPublished 26 Aug 2026Updated 10 Nov 2026

SUSE · Security update for gh

Affects SUSESource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-39821· Critical 9.6

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.6 Critical · fixed in SUSE package updates : patch SUSE http as a priority.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 20:06 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

9.6Critical

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 1.27.0-rc.3, 1.26.6, 1.25.13 +1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Changed: An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 22 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade net/http and net/http/internal/http2 to 1.27.0-rc.3, 1.26.6 or 1.25.13; golang.org/x/net/idna to 0.55.0.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Go standard librarynet/http	Affected >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.0-rc.3	Fixed in 1.27.0-rc.3
Go standard librarynet/http	Affected >=1.26.0-0 <1.26.6	Fixed in 1.26.6
Go standard librarynet/http	Affected <1.25.13	Fixed in 1.25.13
Go standard librarynet/http/internal/http2	Affected >=1.27.0-0 <1.27.0-rc.3	Fixed in 1.27.0-rc.3
Go standard librarynet/http/internal/http2	Affected >=1.26.0-0 <1.26.6	Fixed in 1.26.6
Go standard librarynet/http/internal/http2	Affected <1.25.13	Fixed in 1.25.13

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

This update for gh fixes the following issues: Changes in gh: - Update to version 2.98.0: * chore: fix extra whitespace * Default Codespaces port forwarding to loopback * Bump gh-aw-actions to v0.87.1 and recompile workflows * Fix issue triage action compatibility * chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/crypto from 0.54.0 to 0.55.0 * chore: bump go to 1.26.7 (#14205) * chore(deps): bump the codeql-actions group across 1 directory with 3 updates * chore(deps): bump github.com/stretchr/testify from 1.11.1 to 1.12.1 * Revert "ci: add temporary step to verify Linux repo signing keys" * ci: add temporary step to verify Linux repo signing keys * Accept pre-release tags in deployment validation (#14193) * chore: sign APT repositories with both keys * chore(deps): bump charm.land/lipgloss/v2 from 2.0.5 to 2.0.6 * chore(deps): bump the aw-actions group with 2 updates * chore(deps): bump github.com/klauspost/compress from 1.19.1 to 1.19.2 * Bump Go to 1.26.6 * Upgrade gh-aw workflows to v0.85.4 * chore(deps): bump github.com/google/go-containerregistry * chore(deps): bump google.golang.org/protobuf from 1.36.11 to 1.36.12 * Address review: drop cleanup markers, document search-type in skill * Reconcile feature detection cleanup comment rules in AGENTS.md * Update AGENTS.md with cleanup comment guidance * Address review feedback * Add --search-type flag for semantic and hybrid issue search * Rename config mock constructors to match repo convention * Document when to use the config mock or the isolated config * Accept config content in NewIsolatedTestConfig * Clear auth environment variables in isolated test config * Isolate git config in tests that shell out to git * Rename config stub file to test.go * chore(deps): bump the aw-actions group with 2 updates * Add aw-actions group to dependabot configuration * Rename cli-code-reviewer skill to code-review (#14116) * chore(deps): bump github/gh-aw-actions/setup-cli from 0.83.4 to 0.85.4 * Reduce item-add test diff * Isolate item-add test mocks * Test item-add output through command path * Run lint workflow when the lint workflow changes * Bump golangci-lint in CI to v2.12.2 * Clarify PR testing section expectations * chore(deps): bump the codeql-actions group across 1 directory with 3 updates * chore(deps): bump azure/login from 3.0.0 to 3.0.1 * chore(deps): bump actions/attest from 4.2.1 to 4.2.2 * Use reflect.Pointer instead of deprecated reflect.Ptr * Add a scheduled tech debt burndown skill (#14095) * Restore automatic spam issue closure (#14088) * Give Dependabot triage a real reachability check (#14087) * Route release deletions through api.Client (#14077) * chore(deps): bump google.golang.org/grpc from 1.82.1 to 1.83.0 * chore(deps): bump github.com/google/go-containerregistry * Grant the gate the scopes its CI read needs * Keep pre-flight dedup out of the integrity proxy * Key direct/indirect off the // indirect comment * Gate triager confidence on required evidence * Gate Dependabot triage on deterministic pre-flight check * Set GH_EXTENSION=1 when gh invokes an extension * Tell agents to use the PR template in AGENTS.md * Merge pull request #14062 from cli/williammartin-wp-08-release-create * Route extension requests through api.Client (#14059) * Route autolink requests through api.Client (#14013) * chore(deps): bump the codeql-actions group across 1 directory with 3 updates * fix(release create): trim spaces when parsing X-Oauth-Scopes * Match worktree rev-parse stub against absolute path on Windows * fix(pr/checkout): pass -- before worktree path so dash paths work * docs(pr/checkout): add worktree usage example to help text * docs(skills): mention pr checkout worktree support * chore(pr checkout): polish worktree related tests * Route gpg key requests through api.Client (#13997) * Use generated key in ssh-key acceptance test * Route ssh key requests through api.Client * Fix item-add output for non-TTY * test(pr/checkout): add acceptance tests for worktree checkout * chore(deps): bump actions/attest from 4.2.0 to 4.2.1 * chore(deps): bump github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go from 1.2.2 to 1.3.0 * Generate unique acceptance SSH keys * Route deploy key requests through api.Client * Collapse spam triage into the agentic issue-triage workflow (#14027) * Run Dependabot triage hourly * chore(deps): bump github.com/yuin/goldmark from 1.8.4 to 1.8.5 * Require explicit PR review ownership (#14028) * Slim down dependabot triage comments (#14019) * Wrap RESTWithNext errors as api.HTTPError * Bail out early on unusable --worktree paths * Clarify current-worktree rejection message * Return ok bool from revParseFacts to satisfy nilerr * Drop docs on self-explanatory worktree helpers * Trim redundant comments and clarify worktree field names * Resolve worktree target once instead of re-querying git * Fix work

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