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CVE-2026-49284VulnerabilityPublished

simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp · SimpleSAMLphp SP accepts a response from an unexpected IdP when unsigned `Response/InResponseTo` is combined with a

Affects simplesamlphp/simplesamlphpSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 2.5.2 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 12% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.5.2, 2.4.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp to 2.5.2; simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp to 2.4.7.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Packagistsimplesamlphp/simplesamlphpAffected
  • >=2.5.0 <2.5.2
Fixed in
  • 2.5.2
Packagistsimplesamlphp/simplesamlphpAffected
  • <2.4.7
Fixed in
  • 2.4.7

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary SimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response. That behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP. ## Impact In a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins. The impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentication/authorization bypass candidate. Impact strongly depends on whether an attacker can obtain a signed IdP-initiated assertion from a lower-trust trusted IdP and whether the downstream application maps identifiers globally.

References

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