TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Activity Through 2026-05-24, (Mon, May 25th)
The TeamPCP supply chain campaign is an ongoing multi-ecosystem malware operation active through May 24, 2026. It compromised multiple package ecosystems including npm, PyPI, and Visual Studio Marketplace, trojanizing an officially Microsoft-published Python SDK and a popular VS Code extension. The campaign exfiltrated thousands of internal GitHub repositories and targeted developer and CI/CD credentials, cloud environment secrets, and local password vaults. The malicious packages carried payloads including credential stealers, worms propagating in cloud environments, and a Linux disk wiper. The operator also publicly released the attack framework source code on GitHub, increasing risk of copycat attacks. Despite the severity, no official patch or advisory from CISA has been issued for the main tracked CVE. Microsoft has publicly acknowledged and responded to parts of the campaign. Defenders are urged to inventory affected package versions, rotate exposed credentials, and not rely on publisher verification badges as safety indicators.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
TeamPCP is a sophisticated supply chain malware campaign active across three package ecosystems: npm (@antv), PyPI (Microsoft's durabletask SDK), and Visual Studio Marketplace (Nx Console VS Code extension). The campaign used harvested credentials to publish trojanized packages that executed malicious payloads upon import or install, including credential theft, lateral movement inside GitHub, and destructive Linux disk wiping. The campaign exfiltrated approximately 3,800 GitHub internal repositories and impacted downstream victims such as OpenAI, Grafana Labs, and Mistral AI. The malicious durabletask SDK versions 1.4.1 to 1.4.3 were live briefly on PyPI and contained a payload that steals cloud credentials and propagates via AWS SSM and Kubernetes exec. The npm wave involved 639 malicious package versions across 323 packages, some displaying forged Sigstore verification badges. The operator released the Shai-Hulud framework source code publicly, enabling copycat attacks and complicating detection. Microsoft has publicly responded, but CISA has not added the main CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Defenders should audit installs, rotate credentials, and avoid trusting publisher badges alone.
Potential Impact
The campaign resulted in significant exfiltration of internal GitHub repositories and compromise of developer and CI/CD credentials. It affected major organizations downstream, including OpenAI, Grafana Labs, and Mistral AI. The trojanized Microsoft durabletask SDK introduced a Linux disk wiper payload, extending the campaign's destructive capabilities. The npm ecosystem compromise harvested a wide range of credentials including cloud provider tokens, SSH keys, and password vaults. The public release of the attack framework source code increases the risk of further attacks by copycat operators. The campaign undermines trust in verified-publisher badges and package provenance mechanisms.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or advisory from CISA is currently available for the main CVE-2026-45321; patch status is not yet confirmed—check vendor advisories for updates. Microsoft has publicly acknowledged the campaign and removed trojanized package versions from PyPI and Visual Studio Marketplace. Defenders should inventory and remove Nx Console VS Code extension v18.95.0 installed during the May 18, 2026 window, durabletask SDK versions 1.4.1 through 1.4.3 installed on May 19, 2026, and @antv npm packages from the May 19 wave. Rotate all exposed developer, CI/CD, and cloud credentials including GitHub PATs, npm tokens, AWS, GCP, Azure keys, and password vault credentials. Do not rely on Visual Studio Marketplace verified-publisher badges or npm Sigstore verification badges as safety signals. Pin exact package versions and verify lockfile hashes against known-good baselines. Inspect developer endpoints for persistence artifacts in ~/.claude/settings.json and .vscode/tasks.json. Audit Kubernetes and AWS SSM session histories for anomalous activity related to affected packages. Monitor for official advisories or updates from Microsoft, GitHub, and security agencies.
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Activity Through 2026-05-24, (Mon, May 25th)
Description
The TeamPCP supply chain campaign is an ongoing multi-ecosystem malware operation active through May 24, 2026. It compromised multiple package ecosystems including npm, PyPI, and Visual Studio Marketplace, trojanizing an officially Microsoft-published Python SDK and a popular VS Code extension. The campaign exfiltrated thousands of internal GitHub repositories and targeted developer and CI/CD credentials, cloud environment secrets, and local password vaults. The malicious packages carried payloads including credential stealers, worms propagating in cloud environments, and a Linux disk wiper. The operator also publicly released the attack framework source code on GitHub, increasing risk of copycat attacks. Despite the severity, no official patch or advisory from CISA has been issued for the main tracked CVE. Microsoft has publicly acknowledged and responded to parts of the campaign. Defenders are urged to inventory affected package versions, rotate exposed credentials, and not rely on publisher verification badges as safety indicators.
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
TeamPCP is a sophisticated supply chain malware campaign active across three package ecosystems: npm (@antv), PyPI (Microsoft's durabletask SDK), and Visual Studio Marketplace (Nx Console VS Code extension). The campaign used harvested credentials to publish trojanized packages that executed malicious payloads upon import or install, including credential theft, lateral movement inside GitHub, and destructive Linux disk wiping. The campaign exfiltrated approximately 3,800 GitHub internal repositories and impacted downstream victims such as OpenAI, Grafana Labs, and Mistral AI. The malicious durabletask SDK versions 1.4.1 to 1.4.3 were live briefly on PyPI and contained a payload that steals cloud credentials and propagates via AWS SSM and Kubernetes exec. The npm wave involved 639 malicious package versions across 323 packages, some displaying forged Sigstore verification badges. The operator released the Shai-Hulud framework source code publicly, enabling copycat attacks and complicating detection. Microsoft has publicly responded, but CISA has not added the main CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Defenders should audit installs, rotate credentials, and avoid trusting publisher badges alone.
Potential Impact
The campaign resulted in significant exfiltration of internal GitHub repositories and compromise of developer and CI/CD credentials. It affected major organizations downstream, including OpenAI, Grafana Labs, and Mistral AI. The trojanized Microsoft durabletask SDK introduced a Linux disk wiper payload, extending the campaign's destructive capabilities. The npm ecosystem compromise harvested a wide range of credentials including cloud provider tokens, SSH keys, and password vaults. The public release of the attack framework source code increases the risk of further attacks by copycat operators. The campaign undermines trust in verified-publisher badges and package provenance mechanisms.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or advisory from CISA is currently available for the main CVE-2026-45321; patch status is not yet confirmed—check vendor advisories for updates. Microsoft has publicly acknowledged the campaign and removed trojanized package versions from PyPI and Visual Studio Marketplace. Defenders should inventory and remove Nx Console VS Code extension v18.95.0 installed during the May 18, 2026 window, durabletask SDK versions 1.4.1 through 1.4.3 installed on May 19, 2026, and @antv npm packages from the May 19 wave. Rotate all exposed developer, CI/CD, and cloud credentials including GitHub PATs, npm tokens, AWS, GCP, Azure keys, and password vault credentials. Do not rely on Visual Studio Marketplace verified-publisher badges or npm Sigstore verification badges as safety signals. Pin exact package versions and verify lockfile hashes against known-good baselines. Inspect developer endpoints for persistence artifacts in ~/.claude/settings.json and .vscode/tasks.json. Audit Kubernetes and AWS SSM session histories for anomalous activity related to affected packages. Monitor for official advisories or updates from Microsoft, GitHub, and security agencies.
Technical Details
- Article Source
- {"url":"https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/33014","fetched":true,"fetchedAt":"2026-05-25T13:40:02.595Z","wordCount":1963}
Threat ID: 6a145132a5ae1af1aaa329d1
Added to database: 5/25/2026, 1:40:02 PM
Last enriched: 5/25/2026, 1:40:22 PM
Last updated: 5/25/2026, 2:41:49 PM
Views: 3
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