CVE-2026-53505: Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS
Affects thumborSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 7.8.0 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 49% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 7.8.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 31 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade thumbor to 7.8.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PyPIthumbor | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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AI-suggested
A patch is available that enforces strict bounds on the 'proportion' filter parameter, limiting it to values between 0.0 and 1.0 as documented. Deployers should upgrade to Thumbor version 7.8.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that unsafe URLs are disabled and that signed URLs are tightly controlled to reduce exposure.
Description
### Summary Thumbor's `filters:proportion(<value>)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `<value>` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service. ### Details - Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py` - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum. - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`. - Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`). Documentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint. ### PoC #### Preconditions - The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`). - Either: - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service). #### Example request 1 (signed URL) The following request was used to reproduce the issue and causes severe resource exhaustion: `http://<host>:<port>/<url-sign>/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg` #### Example request 2 (/unsafe/) If `/unsafe/` is enabled: `http://<host>:<port>/unsafe/100x100/filters:proportion(10000)/example.jpg` ### Impact - Remote Denial of Service via CPU and/or memory exhaustion (and potentially process crash / OOM kill). - Exploitability depends on deployment: - If `/unsafe/` is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS. - If `/unsafe/` is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker can legitimately request signed URLs, or has access to signed URLs issued for other users/partners). If signed URLs are not exposed to untrusted parties, exploitability is reduced but the risk still applies to any party who can generate/use signed URLs. ### Suggested remediation - Enforce a strict bound on the `proportion` parameter (e.g., `0.0 < value <= 1.0` as documented), or define a safe maximum based on intended semantics.