This is the first update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, "When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon" (v3.0, March 25, 2026). That report covers the full campaign from the February 28 initial access through the March 24 LiteLLM PyPI compromise. This update covers developments since publication.
The holdings company says hackers stole names, Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers from its environment. The post Hightower Holding Data Breach Impacts 130,000 appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The state-sponsored threat actor deployed kernel implants and passive backdoors enabling long-term, high-level espionage. The post Chinese Hackers Caught Deep Within Telecom Backbone Infrastructure appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Insikt Group identified five distinct clusters using the ClickFix social engineering technique for initial access. These clusters impersonate various services like Intuit QuickBooks and Booking.com, demonstrating operational variance but similar core techniques. ClickFix manipulates victims into executing malicious commands within native system tools, bypassing traditional security controls. The methodology has become a standardized template for cybercriminals and APT groups. Campaigns target diverse sectors and use sophisticated obfuscation and living-off-the-land tactics. Defenders are advised to implement aggressive behavioral hardening and user awareness training to mitigate these threats.
How Trivy and CheckMarx open-source solutions became the starting point for a massive TeamPCP attack on other applications, and what organizations using them should do.
The cybersecurity firm said the personal information of hundreds of employees was stolen in the hacker attack targeting Navia. The post HackerOne Employee Data Exposed in Massive Navia Breach appeared first on SecurityWeek .
I have written about how to&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;use IP KVMs securely, and recently, researchers at Eclypsium published yet another report on IP KVM vulnerabilities.&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;But there is another issue I haven&#;x26;#;39;t mentioned yet with IP KVMs: rogue IP KVMs. IP KVMs are often used by criminals. For example, North Koreans used KVMs to connect remotely to laptops sent to them by their employers. The laptops were located in the US, and the North Korean workers used IP KVMs to remotely connect to them. IP KVMs could also be used to access office PCs, either to enable undetected "work from home"&#;x26;#;xc2;&#;x26;#;xa0;or by threat actors who use them to gain remote access after installing the device on site.
The latest M-Trends report is based on insights from over 500,000 hours of Mandiant incident response investigations in 2025. The post M-Trends 2026: Initial Access Handoff Shrinks From Hours to 22 Seconds appeared first on SecurityWeek .
The semiconductor company says hackers deployed file-encrypting ransomware on the network of a subsidiary in Singapore. The post Chip Services Firm Trio-Tech Says Subsidiary Hit by Ransomware appeared first on SecurityWeek .
Attack volumes are back to pre-disruption levels, and the adversary tactics have remained unchanged. The post Tycoon 2FA Fully Operational Despite Law Enforcement Takedown appeared first on SecurityWeek .
VoidStealer is an emerging infostealer that employs a novel debugger-based Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) bypass technique. This method leverages hardware breakpoints to extract the v20_master_key directly from browser memory, requiring neither privilege escalation nor code injection. The technique involves attaching to the browser process as a debugger, setting breakpoints at strategic locations, and extracting the key when it's briefly present in plaintext. This approach offers a lower detection footprint compared to alternative bypass methods. The blog post dissects the technique step-by-step, from locating the target address for breakpoint placement to extracting the key. It also provides detection strategies for defenders, focusing on monitoring debugger attachments and suspicious browser memory reads.
This analysis delves into the Beast ransomware, a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that emerged in June 2024 as a successor to Monster ransomware. The investigation focuses on a Beast ransomware server detected in March 2026, revealing the operators' toolkit and attack methodology. The toolkit includes various tools for reconnaissance, network mapping, credential theft, persistence, lateral movement, exfiltration, and impact. Notable findings include the presence of both Windows and Linux versions of Beast ransomware, indicating targeting of workstations and Linux servers on VMware ESXi hypervisors. The report highlights the importance of proactive collection of internet telemetry in identifying ransomware operators' toolkits before they can be used against targets.
This analysis explores the ecosystem of EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) killers, tools used by ransomware attackers to disrupt security solutions before deploying encryptors. The research, based on almost 90 EDR killers tracked in the wild, reveals that these tools are fundamental in modern ransomware operations. Affiliates, not operators, typically choose EDR killers, leading to greater tooling diversity in larger affiliate pools. The same vulnerable driver can appear in unrelated tools, and tools can switch between drivers, making driver-based attribution unreliable. The landscape includes forked proofs of concept, professional implementations, and commercial offerings. While Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique dominates, custom scripts, anti-rootkits, and driverless approaches are also utilized. The analysis emphasizes the importance of looking beyond drivers to understand the full scope of EDR killer ecosystem and its implications for cybersecurity.
The threat group ShinyHunters has adopted a new tactic of subdomain impersonation for initial access, moving away from newly registered lookalike domains. They are utilizing mobile-first lures and outsourcing spam services to scale their operations. The group is likely reusing previously stolen CRM and ERP data to drive social engineering attacks. Their approach involves phone-guided adversary-in-the-middle phishing to capture credentials and authenticated sessions. ShinyHunters is also scaling vishing operations through paid contractors and specialized harassment services. This evolution in tactics allows for rapid identity-to-SaaS compromise without deploying malware, making traditional domain-based monitoring less effective.
The information was stolen from a marketing tool after an employee fell victim to a targeted phone phishing attack. The post Security Firm Aura Discloses Data Breach Impacting 900,000 Records appeared first on SecurityWeek .
A newly discovered loader called SILENTCONNECT is being used in active campaigns to silently install ScreenConnect, a remote monitoring and management tool, on victim machines. The infection chain begins with users being redirected to a Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA page disguised as a digital invitation. Upon clicking, a VBScript file is downloaded, which retrieves and executes C# source code in memory using PowerShell. SILENTCONNECT employs various evasion techniques, including PEB masquerading and UAC bypass. The campaigns leverage trusted hosting providers like Google Drive and Cloudflare, and abuse living-off-the-land binaries. The loader has been active since March 2025 and poses a significant threat due to its stealthy nature and effectiveness.
With exploitation of vulnerabilities taking just days, preemptive security must be the new model for defenders. The post The Collapse of Predictive Security in the Age of Machine-Speed Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek .
