Operation Zero is a Russian exploit broker operation sanctioned by the US government after acquiring eight zero-day exploits from a jailed US defense contractor executive. These zero-days represent previously unknown vulnerabilities that could be weaponized for cyberattacks. Although no known exploits are currently observed in the wild, the potential for future exploitation remains significant. The broker's access to multiple zero-days increases the risk of targeted attacks against critical infrastructure and government entities. This threat highlights insider risks and the illicit trade of advanced cyber capabilities. Organizations should be vigilant for suspicious activity and prioritize threat intelligence sharing. The medium severity reflects the current absence of active exploitation but acknowledges the high potential impact if weaponized. Countries with strategic interests in US-Russia relations and high technology adoption are most at risk. Immediate mitigation involves enhancing monitoring, patch management, and insider threat detection. Defenders must prepare for possible future exploitation campaigns leveraging these zero-days.
A European financial institution involved in regional development and reconstruction initiatives was targeted by a social engineering attack attributed to the Russia-aligned Mercenary Akula. The attack used a spoofed Ukrainian judicial domain to deliver an email containing a link to a remote access payload. The target was a senior legal and policy advisor involved in procurement. The attack employed a multi-stage extraction process and deployed the Remote Manipulator System, a legitimate remote administration tool. This incident suggests the adversary may be expanding beyond primarily Ukraine-based targeting, potentially probing Ukraine-supporting institutions in Western Europe. The attack aligns with Mercenary Akula's established tactics, including localized social engineering, multi-stage payload delivery, and the use of signed remote administration tools.
Oleksandr Didenko sold the stolen identities of US citizens, allowing North Koreans to get hired using freelance work platforms. The post Ukrainian Gets 5 Years in US Prison for Aiding North Korean IT Fraud appeared first on SecurityWeek .
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 23rd February, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES France’s Ministry of Economy has disclosed a data breach resulted from an unauthorized access to the national bank account registry FICOBA, impacting information tied to 1.2 million accounts. Exposed data includes names, […] The post 23rd February – Threat Intelligence Report appeared first on Check Point Research .
This article explores the misuse of QR codes in phishing attacks, focusing on three key areas: QR codes with URL shorteners concealing malicious destinations, in-app deep links used to steal credentials and control victims' apps, and QR codes bypassing app store security via direct malicious app downloads. The research reveals an average of 11,000 daily detections of malicious QR codes, with financial services being the most targeted industry. Attackers are leveraging QR code shorteners, in-app deep links, and direct downloads to evade security controls and exploit users' trust in QR codes. The article highlights specific attack scenarios, including account takeovers through messaging apps and distribution of suspicious gambling apps.
A new hacking group called Punishing Owl has emerged, targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Their first attack on December 12, 2025, compromised a Russian state security agency, leaking internal documents. The group used DNS manipulation, created fake subdomains, and sent phishing emails to the victim's partners. They employed a PowerShell stealer called ZipWhisper to exfiltrate browser data. Punishing Owl's attacks are politically motivated and focus exclusively on Russian targets, including government agencies, scientific institutions, and IT organizations. The group has established a presence on cybercriminal forums and social media, likely operating from Kazakhstan. Experts predict this group will continue to be a persistent threat in the Russian cyberspace.
The attacks targeting Europe were analyzed by Ukraine’s CERT-UA and the cybersecurity company Zscaler. The post Russia’s APT28 Rapidly Weaponizes Newly Patched Office Vulnerability appeared first on SecurityWeek .
ESET researchers provide technical details on a recent data destruction incident affecting a Polish energy company. They identified new data-wiping malware named DynoWiper, attributed to the Russia-aligned threat group Sandworm with medium confidence. The tactics, techniques, and procedures observed during the DynoWiper incident resemble those seen earlier in an incident involving the ZOV wiper in Ukraine. Sandworm has a history of destructive cyberattacks, targeting various entities including energy providers. The DynoWiper samples focus on the IT environment, with no observed functionality targeting OT industrial components. The attackers deployed additional tools and attempted to use a SOCKS5 proxy. The incident represents a rare case of a Russia-aligned threat actor deploying destructive malware against an energy company in Poland.
Sandworm/Electrum hackers targeted communication and control systems at 30 sites. The post ICS Devices Bricked Following Russia-Linked Intrusion Into Polish Power Grid appeared first on SecurityWeek .
10 years after disrupting the Ukrainian power grid, the APT targeted Poland with data-wiping malware. The post Russian Sandworm Hackers Blamed for Cyberattack on Polish Power Grid appeared first on SecurityWeek .
In late 2025, Poland's energy system was targeted by a major cyberattack, now attributed to the Russia-aligned APT group Sandworm by ESET Research. The attack involved data-wiping malware named DynoWiper, detected as Win32/KillFiles.NMO. While the full impact is still under investigation, researchers noted the attack's timing coincided with the 10th anniversary of Sandworm's 2015 attack on Ukraine's power grid. Sandworm continues to target critical infrastructure, particularly in Ukraine, with regular wiper attacks. The group's history of disruptive cyberattacks and the similarities in tactics, techniques, and procedures led to a medium-confidence attribution of this latest incident to Sandworm.
Turla's Kazuar v3 loader employs sophisticated techniques to evade detection. It uses a VBScript to drop files and execute a native loader, which bypasses security measures and leverages COM for stealth. The loader utilizes control flow redirection, patchless ETW and AMSI bypasses, and COM integration to decrypt and execute three Kazuar v3 payloads (KERNEL, WORKER, BRIDGE) in memory. The attack chain is designed to be resilient and stealthy, exploiting trusted system processes to avoid detection. The malware uses modular architecture and COM subsystem integration to maintain a low profile while carrying out its malicious activities.
A ransomware attack targeted the Romanian Water Authority, causing approximately 1000 systems to be taken offline. This incident disrupted critical water management infrastructure, highlighting the vulnerability of essential public services to cyber extortion. The attack was reported recently and has medium severity based on initial assessments. No specific ransomware variant or exploit details have been disclosed, and there is no evidence of known exploits in the wild related to this incident. The disruption of water services can impact public health and safety, making timely mitigation crucial. European organizations managing critical infrastructure should be vigilant against similar ransomware threats. Romania is directly affected, with potential spillover risks to neighboring countries with interconnected infrastructure. Mitigation should focus on robust backup strategies, network segmentation, and incident response readiness. The threat severity is assessed as high due to the critical nature of the affected systems and the scale of disruption despite limited technical details. Defenders must prioritize protecting operational technology environments and ensure rapid recovery capabilities.
Between June 2024 and April 2025, a sustained credential-harvesting campaign targeting UKR.NET users was identified, attributed to the Russian state-sponsored threat group BlueDelta. The group deployed multiple credential-harvesting pages themed as UKR.NET login portals, leveraging free web services and proxy tunneling platforms to collect user credentials. BlueDelta distributed PDF lures with embedded links to evade detection. The campaign demonstrates the group's adaptability and persistent focus on Ukrainian user credentials for intelligence purposes. Infrastructure changes, including the transition to ngrok and Serveo, reflect responses to takedown efforts. The activity highlights the GRU's continued interest in compromising Ukrainian credentials amid ongoing conflict.
Deliberate internet shutdowns refer to intentional disruptions of internet connectivity by governments or other actors to control information flow, suppress dissent, or manage crises. These shutdowns can severely impact communication, business operations, and access to critical services. While not a traditional software vulnerability or malware threat, they represent a significant cybersecurity and societal risk. European organizations may face operational disruptions, data access issues, and challenges in maintaining service availability during such shutdowns. Mitigation requires strategic planning including alternative communication channels, decentralized infrastructure, and legal advocacy. Countries with high digital dependency and geopolitical tensions are more vulnerable. Given the medium severity rating, the impact is significant but context-dependent, often involving state-level decisions rather than technical exploits. Defenders should focus on resilience and preparedness rather than patching or technical fixes.
The ForumTroll APT group has launched a new targeted phishing campaign against Russian political scientists, exploiting plagiarism reports as bait. The attackers used sophisticated techniques, including a well-prepared domain and personalized emails, to deliver the Tuoni framework malware. This campaign follows their spring attacks, which targeted organizations using zero-day vulnerabilities. The fall campaign relied on social engineering, using emails posing as a scientific library to trick victims into downloading malicious archives. The final payload was delivered through a PowerShell script and established persistence using COM Hijacking. Despite being less technically sophisticated than the spring campaign, this operation demonstrates the group's continued focus on Russian and Belarusian targets.
European authorities have dismantled a call center fraud ring operating in Ukraine that targeted European victims. This criminal operation used call centers to conduct fraudulent activities, likely involving social engineering and financial scams. While no specific technical vulnerabilities or exploits are detailed, the disruption of this organized crime group highlights ongoing risks from call center fraud schemes. The threat primarily impacts European organizations and individuals susceptible to social engineering attacks. The operation's takedown reduces immediate risk but underscores the need for vigilance against similar fraud tactics. Ukrainian-based fraud rings have historically targeted European countries due to geographic proximity and language capabilities. The threat does not involve software vulnerabilities but represents a significant social engineering and financial fraud risk. European entities should enhance awareness and detection of call center fraud attempts. Countries with strong economic ties and large populations are more likely to be targeted.
DDoSia, a participatory DDoS tool created by Russian hacktivists in 2022, is operated by the pro-Russian group NoName057(16). It relies on volunteers to contribute network resources for attacks, primarily targeting Ukraine, European allies, and NATO states. Censys has monitored DDoSia since mid-2025, observing an average of 6 control servers with short lifespans. The tool uses a multi-layered control infrastructure, with systems typically hosted on VPS providers. Despite law enforcement disruption in July 2025, DDoSia quickly reconstituted and resumed operations. The infrastructure is characterized by rapid changes, with most servers active for less than 24 hours. Attacks focus on government, military, transportation, public utilities, financial, and tourism sectors.
A Russian APT group has been conducting targeted phishing campaigns against government entities in the Baltic and Balkan regions since at least 2023. The attackers use spoofed email attachments mimicking official documents to trick victims into submitting credentials on sophisticated fake login pages. These phishing pages feature blurred backgrounds and complex password validation, yet stolen credentials are exfiltrated regardless of password strength. The campaign specifically targets countries including Moldova, Ukraine, Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Spain, and Bulgaria. The stolen credentials are sent to third-party services, enabling potential unauthorized access to sensitive government systems. This ongoing campaign poses a medium-level threat due to its targeted nature and potential for credential theft leading to further compromise. Defenders should focus on phishing awareness, email filtering, and credential monitoring to mitigate risks. The threat is particularly relevant to European government organizations in the affected regions due to geopolitical tensions and strategic importance.
