.NET 8.0 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux has multiple security vulnerabilities including denial of service, privilege escalation, security feature bypass, local code execution, and network spoofing. These issues affect the .NET SDK and Runtime and have been addressed in updated versions 8.0.129 (SDK) and 8.0.29 (Runtime). The update resolves several critical security flaws such as HTTP/2 connection flooding causing out-of-memory conditions, authentication bypass, and deserialization of untrusted data leading to code execution.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.
Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
Workqueue: events_unbound
Call Trace:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 169:
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Freed by task 8:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.
Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().
Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
A vulnerability was found in zevorn rt-claw up to 0.2.0. Affected is the function claw_net_get/claw_net_post of the file claw/services/tools/net.c of the component http_request. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was found in zevorn rt-claw up to 0.2.0. The affected element is the function claw_net_get/claw_net_post of the file claw/services/tools/net.c of the component http_request. The manipulation of the argument url results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A sophisticated phishing campaign targeting Indian businesses and taxpayers leverages GST-related themes to distribute Remcos RAT through a multi-stage .NET framework. Threat actors impersonate Government of India GST communications using fraudulent refund notifications with convincing ARN references. The attack chain begins with a malicious RAR archive containing a .NET executable that employs bitmap-based payload concealment techniques. Through successive stages including Windows Health Optimizer Plus.dll and perfgurd.dll, the malware deploys Remcos RAT entirely in memory, establishing persistence via PowerShell scripts and registry modifications. Command-and-control infrastructure utilizes dynamic DNS services with randomized subdomains under aofmokighoig.hath.network. The deployed Remcos RAT enables remote command execution, keylogging, credential harvesting, file manipulation, and comprehensive system reconnaissance capabilities, representing a financially motivated cybercrime operation specifically t...
A previously unseen ransomware family named Spirals was deployed in a double extortion attack against an IT services company in South Asia in June 2026. The Rust-based payload demonstrated sophisticated capabilities including defense evasion, encryption, lateral movement, and privilege escalation. Attackers gained initial access through a compromised internet-facing IIS web server via an ASP.NET web shell, moving rapidly to deploy ransomware within 24 hours. They established persistence using multiple tunneling tools, disabled endpoint security, harvested credentials through SAM hive and LSASS dumps, and deployed reverse-SOCKS proxies for covert command-and-control. The ransomware was distributed across the network using PsExec, encrypting files with AES-128 keys and threatening data publication within six days. The skilled execution suggests potential for wider campaigns, though the threat actor remains unidentified.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (b035f137addcf0118c3d042ece322d0fdde054e4ed283317d3b2adb309e38689)
ai-pro-sdk@2.0.1 is advertised as a Vercel AI SDK provider for Claude via the Claude Agent SDK, but the published tarball ships no code: package.json declares main as./dist/index.js and files as dist/**/*, yet no dist/ directory is present, and the prepare script is a console.log no-op ('Build skipped...'). Alongside the expected @ai-sdk/provider and @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk entries, package.json declares a runtime dependency on data-blockv@^1.0.1, a package unrelated to the advertised purpose and not referenced anywhere in the tarball or README. The net effect of npm install ai-pro-sdk is resolution and installation of data-blockv into the installer's node_modules; because the host package has no functional code, its only on-install effect is to pull this unrelated transitive dependency. This matches the dropper-shell shape where the lure package's advertised functionality is a cover and the actual code-execution surface lives in a sibling dependency name that has no legitimate reason to be present.
## Source: ghsa-malware (451b890a986e88fce01d29473c9e9819a70d0c0429587998beb255f153c6dd5f)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
A sophisticated cyber campaign targets Indian government job seekers using fake recruitment advertisements for Senior Field Officer positions in the Cabinet Secretariat. The attack chain begins with a malicious ZIP archive containing a disguised LNK file, PowerShell script, and .NET executable. Attackers abuse the legitimate ControlR remote management tool for persistent access and deploy SheetAgent RAT, a custom .NET malware that uses Google Sheets as a command-and-control channel. The malware employs multiple persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks and startup folder entries, while incorporating extensive anti-analysis checks to detect virtualized environments. Infrastructure analysis reveals multiple web-based management panels and connections to APT36 based on targeting patterns and tradecraft similarities.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (a40ae433e9fa90bfbb449d343c281375329a44c0dacf080a91a0c1717579b679)
The package's main entry (pure.js) consists of a single behavior: it creates a <script> element pointing at https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/px8my/px.js (no version pin) and appends it to document.head. When the module is required/imported in any browser-like environment (browser bundling, jsdom, Electron renderer), this causes arbitrary JavaScript from the unrelated `px8my` npm package — at whatever version its owner most recently published — to execute in the host page context. The destination is a different publisher's package, the version is unpinned (so the executed bytes are author-mutable at any time by a third party), and there is no documented purpose for this loader behavior. Package metadata reinforces the loader/lure shape: empty author, empty description, no repository, default test script — a throwaway package whose only function is to pull in remote third-party code. An installer that bundles or loads pxpure8 ends up shipping whatever px8my publishes, including any future malicious version, into their own application's execution context.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (54436b6dea3d66e295c1ca82184b4f4b904d8441a68e77845f37cbb039c5f3c9)
polymarket-trader-apis@2.1.0 advertises itself as a Polymarket trading helper but its main entry is a remote code loader. The default-exported getPlugin fetches JSON from https://svganchordev.net/icons/108 and passes the response's `credits` field to `new Function('require','module','exports',...,'Promise', data.credits)`, then invokes it with `require`, `process`, `Buffer`, and other Node globals in scope — granting the remote operator arbitrary code execution in the caller's Node process. The code is wrapped in cover-story framing (an `IconProvider`/font-awesome CDN map referencing cloudflare/fastly/akamai and a `/ajax/libs/font-awesome/6.4.0/svgs/brands/` path) to make the loader appear to be an SVG icon fetcher, and the package keywords (`react`,`helper`,`svg`) contradict the stated Polymarket purpose. Declared dependencies (`@primno/dpapi`, `node-machine-id`, `better-sqlite3`, `sqlite3`) are consistent with second-stage credential/browser-database harvesting once the fetched payload executes. The remote endpoint is a non-first-party domain unrelated to Polymarket, the payload is opaque and author-mutable, and there is no integrity verification.
## Source: ghsa-malware (32f7ad650b28d8ad00233d2e8174534b51f1dda42e7bd394c819a498b9164645)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Multiple security vulnerabilities affecting the podman container management tool and related golang libraries have been addressed in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 update. These include denial of service, security bypass, revocation bypass, cross-site scripting, arbitrary code execution, and information disclosure issues. The update also fixes bugs related to file cleanup and rootless user command failures. The vulnerabilities impact podman and golang.org/x/crypto/ssh and golang.org/x/net/html components.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (5bb6b9a4e70c868e150f06160b187915bcdeb6c9c8f95095af4766dde92f96c5)
polytrade@2.4.1 advertises itself as a Polymarket API SDK, but the exported `getPlugin` function in index.js issues an HTTP request to https://svganchordev.net/icons/<token> and passes the response field `data.credits` to `new Function(...)` with `require`, `module`, `process`, `Buffer`, and `Promise` bound as arguments. Any caller of the exported API therefore executes attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges, fetched from a non-first-party, unpinned endpoint whose purpose does not correspond to the package's declared functionality. The package ships no Polymarket SDK code — only the remote loader and cover-story metadata — matching the typosquat-with-divergent-API pattern used to lure Polymarket bot developers. The tarball also includes an OpenSSH ed25519 private key (`gitlab`, `gitlab.pub` with comment `testm@DESKTOP-PO28IS1`), which appears to be accidental author inclusion and is noted separately.
## Source: ghsa-malware (1f6d9ad8459443d96933ca9fbd388fa9dc5c596691af976cc8e7fce4bdd2727a)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.