A path traversal in LG webOS TV allows unauthenticated file downloads, leading to an authentication bypass for the secondscreen.gateway service, which could lead to a full device takeover.
Strategies for Analyzing Native Code in Android Applications: Combining Ghidra and Symbolic…
Source: https://revflash.medium.com/strategies-for-analyzing-native-code-in-android-applications-combining-ghidra-and-symbolic-aaef4c9555df
WSASS - Old But Gold, Dumping LSASS With Windows Error Reporting On Modern Windows 11
Source: https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html
With the recent npm/Node.js supply chain incident (phished maintainer, 18 packages briefly shipping crypto-stealing code), I wanted to share a small project:
**Typo squat Detective,** a 2-3 minute browser game to practice spotting look-alike domains.
It covers:
• Numbers ↔ letters (1 ↔ l, 0 ↔ o)
• Unicode homoglyphs (Cyrillic/Greek lookalikes)
• Punycode (`xn--`) tricks
Play it here: [https://typo.himanshuanand.com/](https://typo.himanshuanand.com/)
Curious to hear which tricks fooled you and if you would like more levels/brands.
Stealing the keys from the octopus: Exfiltrate Git Credentials in Argocd
Source: https://futuresight.club/posts/0x00_exfiltrate_git_credentials_argocd.html
A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes
Source: https://interseclab.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Internet-Coup_September2025.pdf
Department of War Doesn’t Defend its Web Streams From Hackers
Source: https://theintercept.com/2025/09/08/department-of-war-defense-stream-keys-hackers-livestream-hack-security/
Windows Defender's vulnerability: Break The Protective Shell Of Windows Defender With The Folder Redirect Technique
Source: https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Break-Protective-Shell-Windows-Defender-Folder-Redirect-Technique-Symlink.html
Struggling to get an existing handle of a browser's process which already has tthe Cookies file open and can't dump the cookies?
Extreme situations require extreme measures!
The Salesloft-Drift Breach: Analyzing the Biggest SaaS Breach of 2025
Source: https://www.reco.ai/blog/the-salesloft-drift-breach-analyzing-the-biggest-saas-breach-of-2025
Hi everyone,
I’ve been a victim of targeted cyberstalking for years and I need to share my experience to understand if what happened to me points to SS7 abuse alone, or if there had to be someone with privileged access inside Meta (WhatsApp).
Here are the facts:
• I used two numbers:
• One SIM only for data.
• A different number for WhatsApp, but the SIM itself was not in the phone (still active with the carrier, not blocked).
• I was never disconnected from my WhatsApp.
• This means my account was never fully cloned using SS7 (since that would disconnect me).
• Still, my stalkers somehow knew all the new contacts I talked to on WhatsApp, including people I met on Tinder.
• They didn’t know those numbers beforehand.
• So simple correlation at the carrier level seems impossible.
• My suspicion:
1. They were using SS7 for surveillance (location, SMS interception, monitoring my SIM’s traffic patterns).
2. At the same time, they had access to WhatsApp metadata (number A ↔ number B, timestamps).
• This would explain how they knew all my new contacts, without prior knowledge of their numbers.
• Important detail:
• I always had 2FA (PIN) enabled.
• I even tested registering my number on another phone, intercepted the SMS, but without the PIN the session never completed.
• Despite that, I once saw real messages appear on the second phone — which left me wondering about some kind of “silent pre-login” bug.
⸻
My questions for the community:
1. Is it technically possible to access WhatsApp metadata (who talks to who) without insider or official Meta access?
2. Could SS7 + carrier-level monitoring alone explain how they mapped all my new contacts?
3. Have there been documented cases of “silent pre-login” where WhatsApp sessions were duplicated without disconnecting the victim?
4. From a defense standpoint, am I correct that moving to Signal (with usernames) and Session fully mitigates this kind of metadata exposure?
⸻
I’d really appreciate insights from anyone who works with telecom security, SS7, or has deep knowledge of WhatsApp’s metadata handling.
Thanks for reading.
