Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host and Application (VA and SaaS deployments) mount host configuration and secret material under /var/www/efs_storage into many Docker containers with overly-permissive filesystem permissions. Files such as secrets.env, GPG-encrypted blobs in .secrets, MySQL client keys, and application session files are accessible from multiple containers. An attacker who controls or reaches any container can read or modify these artifacts, leading to credential theft, RCE via Laravel APP_KEY, Portainer takeover, and full compromise.
Just published a breakdown of RapperBot. Quick hits:
Uses DNS TXT records to hide rotating C2s.
Multi-arch payloads (MIPS, ARM, x86), stripped/encrypted, self-deleting.
Custom base56 + RC4-ish routine just to extract C2 IPs (decryptor included).
Infra shifts fast: scanners moving countries, repos/FTP/NFS hosting binaries.
Timeline lines up neatly with DOJ’s Operation PowerOFF takedown.
Full post: [https://www.bitsight.com/blog/rapperbot-infection-ddos-split-second](https://www.bitsight.com/blog/rapperbot-infection-ddos-split-second)
Curious if anyone’s still seeing RapperBot traffic after the takedown, or if it’s really gone quiet.
Nissan confirms design studio data breach claimed by Qilin ransomware
Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nissan-confirms-design-studio-data-breach-claimed-by-qilin-ransomware/
Pentest Trick: Out of sight, out of mind with Windows Long File Names
Source: https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/pentest-trick-out-of-sight-out-of-mind-long-filename.html
Improper handling of input variables lead to multiple path traversal vulnerabilities in the Admiror Gallery extension for Joomla in version branch 4.x.
In the System → Maintenance tool, the Logged Users tab surfaces sessionId data for all users via the Direct Web Remoting API (UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr) calls. While this is information that would and should be available to admins who possess "Sign In As" powers, admins who otherwise lack this privilege would still be able to utilize the session IDs to imitate other users.
While this is a very small attack vector that requires very high permissions to execute, its danger lies principally in obfuscating attribution; all Sign In As operations are attributed appropriately in the log files, and a malicious administrator could use this information to render their dealings untraceable — including those admins who have not been granted this ability — such as by using a session ID to generate an API token.
Fixed in: 24.07.12 / 23.01.20 LTS / 23.10.24v13 LTS / 24.04.24v5 LTS
This was the original found by researcher Zakaria Agharghar.2. Later, on October 20, 2025, another researcher (Chris O’Neill) found additional affected DWR Endpoints that are vulnerable to Information Disclosure, namely and in addition to the original found of "UserSessionAjax.getSessionList.dwr - Session ID exposure":
* UserAjax.getUsersList.dwr - Enumerate all users with IDs, names, emails
* RoleAjax.getUserRole.dwr - Get user role information
* RoleAjax.getRole.dwr - Get role details
* RoleAjax.getRolePermissions.dwr - View role permissions
* RoleAjax.isPermissionableInheriting.dwr - Check permission inheritance
* RoleAjax.getCurrentCascadePermissionsJobs.dwr - View permission cascade jobs
* ThreadMonitorTool.getThreads.dwr - Monitor system threads; and,
* CRITICAL - Privilege Escalation: RoleAjax.saveRolePermission.dwr - Modify role permissions
Overall CVSS for the above findings:
* CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
* Score: 9.1 (Critical)