A new cybercriminal group, Nasir Security, believed to be associated with Iran, is targeting energy organizations in the Middle East. They focus on attacking supply chain vendors involved in engineering, safety, and construction. The group emerged in October 2025 and has claimed attacks on various energy sector companies, including Dubai Petroleum, CC Energy Development, and Al-Safi Oil Company. However, their claims are likely exaggerated, and the actual breaches appear to be of third-party contractors. The group's tactics include business email compromise, spear phishing, and exploiting public-facing applications. Their activities are seen as part of a broader Iranian strategy to conduct cyberattacks and spread misinformation during ongoing geopolitical conflicts.
Handala Hack, an online persona operated by Void Manticore, is affiliated with Iranian intelligence services. The group, known for destructive wiping attacks and hack-and-leak operations, has targeted organizations in Israel, Albania, and the US. Their tactics include supply chain attacks, credential theft, and manual intrusions. The group deploys multiple wiping methods simultaneously, including custom malware, PowerShell scripts, and disk encryption. Recent activities show expanded targeting and some new techniques, such as using NetBird for tunneling and AI-assisted wiping scripts. Despite some operational security lapses, Handala continues to pose a significant threat, primarily through hands-on, opportunistic attacks.
A significant joint offensive by the US and Israel has triggered a multi-vector retaliatory campaign from Iran, leading to an escalation in cyberattacks. Iran's limited internet connectivity is likely hindering state-aligned threat actors' ability to coordinate sophisticated attacks. Hacktivist groups are targeting perceived adversaries, while other nation-state actors may exploit the situation. Observed activities include phishing campaigns, DDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and wiper attacks. Multiple Iranian state-aligned personas and collectives have claimed responsibility for various disruptive operations. Pro-Russian hacktivist groups have also been active, targeting Israeli systems and infrastructure. The situation remains fluid, and organizations are advised to implement multi-layered defenses and focus on foundational security hygiene.
A malicious npm package named "ambar-src" reached 50,000 downloads in days before being removed from the registry. It uses a preinstall script to execute malicious code during installation, targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. The package employs detection evasion techniques and deploys powerful open-source malware variants. It abuses npm's preinstall script hook to trigger the payload without explicit invocation. The malware fetches additional payloads from remote servers and uses Yandex Cloud for command and control. Affected systems should be considered fully compromised, requiring immediate incident response actions. The attack highlights the speed at which supply chain risks can propagate and confirms that npm install is a high-risk action.
Between June and December 2025, state-sponsored threat group Lotus Blossom compromised the hosting infrastructure for Notepad++, allowing them to intercept and redirect update traffic. This enabled selective targeting of users primarily in Southeast Asian government, telecommunications and critical infrastructure sectors. Two infection chains were identified - one using Lua script injection to deliver Cobalt Strike and another using DLL side-loading for a Chrysalis backdoor. The campaign affected additional sectors across South America, US, Europe and Southeast Asia including cloud hosting, energy, financial, government, manufacturing and software development. The attack exploited insufficient verification in older versions of the Notepad++ updater to serve malicious installers to targeted victims.
A supply chain attack targeted the eScan antivirus software, distributing malware through the update server. The attack, detected on January 20, involved a malicious Reload.exe file that initiated a multi-stage infection chain. This malware prevented further antivirus updates, ensured persistence through scheduled tasks, and communicated with control servers to download additional payloads. Attackers gained unauthorized access to a regional update server, deploying a malicious file with a fake digital signature.eScan developers quickly isolated the affected infrastructure and reset access credentials. Users are advised to check for infection signs, use a provided removal utility, and block known malware control server addresses. Kaspersky's security solutions successfully detect the malware used in this attack.
A North Korean malware was discovered in an Upwork cryptocurrency project, leading to a five-day investigation into active Lazarus Group infrastructure. The malware utilized three infection mechanisms: VSCode auto-execution, backend RCE via Function Constructor, and cookie payload delivery. The infrastructure included Vercel-hosted Stage 1 C2 servers and dedicated Stage 2 C2 servers. A timing oracle allowed for token enumeration, revealing three active campaigns. The payload chain consisted of various modules for data extraction, RAT functionality, and cryptocurrency mining. The investigation uncovered sophisticated persistence mechanisms, masquerading techniques, and a custom binary protocol. Real-time defensive responses from the operators were observed during reconnaissance. The infrastructure blended legitimate-looking development projects with malicious activities for cover.
A vulnerability in legacy Python packages arises from bootstrap scripts that fetch and execute installation code from the domain python-distribute.org, which is no longer controlled by the original maintainers and is available for takeover. This can lead to arbitrary code execution if an attacker acquires the domain and serves malicious scripts. Affected packages include tornado, pypiserver, and others. The issue is due to the use of hardcoded domains in bootstrap scripts for the obsolete 'distribute' package. No exploits have been observed in the wild, but the risk is significant given the trust in PyPI packages and the potential for supply chain compromise.
Shai-Hulud V2 is an advanced malware campaign targeting the npm software supply chain, compromising over 700 npm packages and creating more than 27,000 malicious GitHub repositories. It introduces sophisticated techniques including pre-install phase execution, persistent backdoors via self-hosted GitHub Actions runners, credential harvesting and recycling across victims, and a destructive failsafe mechanism. The malware exfiltrates data through GitHub and propagates within the npm ecosystem, also exploiting Azure DevOps build agents. This supply chain attack enables persistent remote code execution and widespread credential theft without requiring user interaction. European organizations relying on npm packages and GitHub Actions for CI/CD pipelines face significant risks of data breaches, system compromise, and operational disruption. Mitigation requires enhanced supply chain security practices, strict GitHub Actions runner controls, credential hygiene, and proactive monitoring for anomalous activity. Countries with strong software development sectors and high npm usage, such as Germany, France, the UK, and the Netherlands, are particularly vulnerable. Given its broad impact and advanced persistence mechanisms, the threat severity is assessed as high.
The Shai-hulud 2.0 campaign is an advanced malware operation targeting cloud platforms (AWS, GCP, Azure) and developer ecosystems by stealing credentials and secrets. It automates backdooring of NPM packages maintained by victims, enabling rapid supply chain propagation. The malware abuses GitHub Actions workflows for command-and-control and secret exfiltration, leveraging cloud secret management services and destructive failsafes to maintain stealth and persistence. This campaign threatens the confidentiality and integrity of cloud and developer environments, potentially impacting thousands of downstream users. It requires no known exploits in the wild but uses sophisticated tactics to evade detection. European organizations relying heavily on cloud services and open-source development are at risk, especially those with significant use of NPM packages and GitHub repositories. The threat severity is assessed as high due to the broad impact on supply chains and credential theft without requiring user interaction. Immediate mitigation includes securing cloud credentials, auditing GitHub workflows, and monitoring supply chain dependencies for unauthorized changes.
APT24, a Chinese threat actor, has conducted a three-year cyber espionage campaign using BADAUDIO, a highly obfuscated first-stage downloader. The group has evolved from broad strategic web compromises to more sophisticated tactics, including supply chain attacks and targeted phishing. They compromised a Taiwanese digital marketing firm, affecting over 1,000 domains. APT24 uses advanced techniques like control flow flattening, fingerprinting, and covert data exfiltration. The malware integrates with Cobalt Strike Beacon and employs DLL Search Order Hijacking for execution. The campaign demonstrates the actor's persistent and adaptive capabilities, highlighting the growing sophistication of Chinese cyber threats.
Cybercriminals are targeting trucking and logistics companies to steal cargo freight through elaborate attack chains. They compromise companies and use their access to bid on cargo shipments, which they then steal and sell. The threat actors typically deliver remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools as a first-stage payload. This cyber-enabled theft is part of a multi-million-dollar criminal enterprise that has increased due to digital transformation. The attackers use tactics such as compromising load boards, email thread hijacking, and direct targeting via email campaigns. They deliver RMM tools like ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, and PDQ Connect, which grant full control of compromised machines. The activity has been observed since at least June 2025, with nearly two dozen campaigns in the last two months alone.
Airstalk is a newly discovered Windows-based malware family used by a suspected nation-state actor, CL-STA-1009, in supply chain attacks targeting business process outsourcing companies. It exists in PowerShell and . NET variants, with the latter exhibiting advanced features such as multi-threaded command-and-control (C2) protocols, versioning, and signed binaries. The malware abuses the AirWatch API for mobile device management to covertly communicate with its C2 infrastructure. It exfiltrates sensitive browser data including cookies, history, and bookmarks, enabling extensive data theft. Its evasion techniques and adaptive behavior make it particularly dangerous in third-party vendor environments. No known public exploits exist yet, but the threat poses a medium severity risk with potential for significant impact on confidentiality and operational security. European organizations relying on outsourcing and mobile device management solutions are at elevated risk, especially in countries with strong BPO sectors. Mitigation requires enhanced supply chain security, monitoring of AirWatch API usage, and behavioral detection of anomalous PowerShell and . NET activities.
A widespread software supply chain attack targeting the Node Package Manager (npm) ecosystem has been discovered, involving a novel self-replicating worm called "Shai-Hulud". The worm has compromised over 180 software packages, including widely used libraries. It operates by harvesting credentials, exfiltrating data, and automatically propagating itself through compromised developer accounts. The attack likely originated from a phishing campaign spoofing npm. The malware scans for sensitive credentials, including npm tokens and cloud service API keys, and publicly exposes them on GitHub. This attack represents a significant evolution in supply chain threats, potentially leading to cloud service compromises, data theft, and lateral movement within networks.
This intelligence analysis examines a widespread Request for Quote (RFQ) scam that exploits Net financing options to steal high-value electronics and goods. The scammers pose as procurement agents for legitimate companies, using stolen information and lookalike domains to appear credible. They request quotes for specific items and inquire about Net 15/30/45-day financing. Once credit is approved, they provide shipping addresses, often using freight forwarding services or residential addresses. The scammers utilize a network of shipping services, warehouses, and money mules to facilitate their operations. Key characteristics of the scam include urgent financing requests, suspicious delivery addresses, and the use of free email accounts. Mitigation efforts included domain takedowns and intercepting fraudulent shipments.
A new campaign exploiting GitHub to distribute malicious Python code disguised as legitimate hacking tools has been uncovered. The operation, attributed to the group known as Banana Squad, used 67 repositories hosting trojanized files that mimicked benign open-source projects. The attackers exploited GitHub's interface to conceal backdoor code using long space strings, making the malicious content invisible in normal view. Each GitHub account typically hosted one repository, likely fake and created solely to deliver malicious content. Hidden code within the Python files used encoding methods to obscure payload delivery functions. The campaign reflects a shift in open-source software supply chain attacks, with attackers now leveraging more covert tactics to target platforms like GitHub. Developers are advised to verify repositories, avoid reliance on single-repository accounts, and monitor for suspicious domains.
A newly identified threat actor, Water Curse, is exploiting GitHub to deliver weaponized repositories containing multistage malware. The group has been linked to at least 76 GitHub accounts, targeting cybersecurity professionals, game developers, and DevOps teams. Their malware enables data exfiltration, remote access, and long-term persistence on infected systems. The attack begins with trojanized open-source tools, progresses through complex infection chains using obfuscated scripts, and culminates in extensive system reconnaissance and data theft. Water Curse employs anti-debugging techniques, privilege escalation methods, and persistence mechanisms to maintain control over affected systems. The campaign poses a significant supply chain risk, especially to those relying on open-source tooling from GitHub.
