Threat database

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions prior to 3.25.5, Roo-Code fails to properly handle process substitution and single ampersand characters in the command parsing logic for auto-execute commands. If a user has enabled auto-approved execution for a command such as ls, an attacker who can submit crafted prompts to the agent may inject arbitrary commands to be executed alongside the intended command. Exploitation requires attacker access to submit prompts and for the user to have enabled auto-approved command execution, which is disabled by default. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The issue is fixed in version 3.25.5.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.23.18 and below, RooCode does not validate line breaks (\n) in its command input, allowing potential bypass of the allow-list mechanism. The project appears to lack parsing or validation logic to prevent multi-line command injection. When commands are evaluated for execution, only the first line or token may be considered, enabling attackers to smuggle additional commands in subsequent lines. This is fixed in version 3.23.19.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. Prior to 3.22.6, if the victim had "Write" auto-approved, an attacker with the ability to submit prompts to the agent could write to VS Code settings files and trigger code execution. There were multiple ways to achieve that. One example is with the php.validate.executablePath setting which lets you set the path for the php executable for syntax validation. The attacker could have written the path to an arbitrary command there and then created a php file to trigger it. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.22.6.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the `.roo/mcp.json` file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the `.roo/` folder.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. Prior to version 3.20.3, there was an issue where the Roo Code agent's `search_files` tool did not respect the setting to disable reads outside of the VS Code workspace. This means that an attacker who was able to inject a prompt into the agent could potentially read a sensitive file and then write the information to a JSON schema. Users have the option to disable schema fetching in VS Code, but the feature is enabled by default. For users with this feature enabled, writing to the schema would trigger a network request without the user having a chance to deny. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent. Version 3.20.3 fixed the issue where `search_files` did not respect the setting to limit it to the workspace. This reduces the scope of the damage if an attacker is able to take control of the agent through prompt injection or another vector.