The GhostAction campaign is a supply chain attack targeting GitHub developer accounts and repositories. It compromises user accounts to inject malicious GitHub Actions workflows that steal CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, and API keys. The campaign has affected about 1,900 GitHub accounts and over 30,000 repositories as of October 2026. GitHub has intervened to prevent the malicious workflows from running in recent waves of the attack.
An espionage campaign named CL-UNK-1211 targeted government and state-affiliated Linux infrastructure from October 2025 to April 2026. The attackers used AI-generated payloads with conversational annotations indicating involvement of large language models or automated AI agents. They deployed web shells, custom cross-platform backdoors including SysGoRAT malware, and open-source tools to maintain persistent access. The campaign involved extensive reconnaissance, database dumping, mailbox enumeration targeting social media accounts linked to government emails, and advanced defense evasion techniques such as disabling endpoint protections, erasing system logs, and planting deceptive red-team markers to disguise malicious activity as legitimate security assessments.
An AI-powered espionage campaign, tracked as CL-UNK-1211, targeted government and state-affiliated Linux infrastructure from October 2025 to April 2026. The attackers used AI-generated payloads, custom malware, web shells, and credential harvesting techniques to maintain persistent access and conduct reconnaissance. They deployed multiple web shells, modified PHP configurations for persistence, and used advanced anti-forensics methods including disabling endpoint protections and tampering with system logs. Credential theft was achieved through hijacked .bashrc files and PHP login page modifications. The campaign aimed to dump sensitive databases and exfiltrate government mailboxes to access social media accounts. The attackers combined open-source tools with custom cross-platform backdoors and employed AI to streamline payload creation. No specific patch or fix is mentioned.
A phishing campaign uses fake Calendly booking pages impersonating Meta Careers to steal Facebook and Google login credentials. Victims are tricked into selecting interview times, submitting personal data, and completing fake CAPTCHAs before being prompted to log into their accounts. The phishing kit captures credentials and bypasses two-factor authentication by relaying authentication codes in real-time. The fake pages include convincing replicas of legitimate login screens with fake address bars showing authentic URLs. Eleven domains with recruiting-related names are involved, and the infrastructure operates via Amazon API Gateway in Singapore. Code comments in Vietnamese suggest possible origins of the operation.
A global cybercriminal network responsible for over one billion phishing messages targeting more than 75,000 organizations across 150 countries has been disrupted by law enforcement and partners. The operation involved a Chinese-language cybercrime marketplace called YAM Store, which sold compromised Microsoft and Google accounts and infrastructure. Phishing kits such as CoGUI, Haozi, and Iron Man were used to conduct large-scale phishing campaigns, including device-code phishing to steal authentication tokens. Microsoft and allied agencies seized domains, deactivated accounts, and blocked domains to disrupt the infrastructure. The campaign targeted Microsoft 365 customers heavily and used sophisticated evasion techniques like geofencing and fake CAPTCHA gates. The takedown is ongoing with continued removal of malicious infrastructure.
A sophisticated phishing campaign targets YouTube content creators by impersonating well-known brands such as Hollyland, Nike, and Spotify. Attackers send personalized sponsorship emails referencing specific videos from the creators' channels, directing them to fake platforms that mimic legitimate campaign dashboards. The scam culminates in a Google sign-in prompt that either steals credentials directly or requests excessive permissions. Compromised accounts are then locked by changing recovery options and used to propagate further scams to followers. This modular campaign operates globally, with confirmed targeting in Peru, Japan, and English-speaking regions, using multiple domains with consistent design and functionality.
This report investigates alleged cyberattacks targeting Discord communities focused on powerscaling discussions, centering on the Noblesse server linked to creator ZetaSolos. The incidents include mass bans, automated disruptions, and retaliation claims such as doxxing and extortion against moderators. Broader allegations involve coordinated raids, mass-reporting campaigns, social engineering, account compromises, harassment, and extortion. The investigation compiles available evidence but notes that not all claims are independently verified. It highlights the security risks faced by online communities from compromised accounts and inadequate security practices. The report encourages server owners and moderators to secure accounts, review permissions, and preserve evidence. No specific software vulnerability or exploit code is detailed, and no patch or remediation status is provided.
The FakeGit malware campaign has resurfaced, distributing the SmartLoader malware through over 17,000 fake GitHub repositories. These repositories use convincing README files with download links to ZIP archives containing SmartLoader, which then delivers additional malware such as the StealC infostealer. The campaign leverages both throwaway and apparently legitimate developer accounts to maintain a large and persistent malicious repository fleet. Attempts to remove these repositories are ineffective due to the attackers' use of multiple backup copies and alternative download locations within GitHub. Users are advised to verify repository ownership and rely on official sources for software installations.
The FortiBleed campaign involves attackers compromising Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN appliances by using stolen or brute-forced credentials. Attackers create new accounts and delete or change existing ones and passwords to lock legitimate users out of their devices. The campaign has affected over 86,000 devices globally since June 2026. The FBI and US Secret Service have issued a joint advisory warning about these attacks and recommending remediation steps.
FortiBleed is an ongoing global campaign targeting internet-facing Fortinet FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways. It exploits reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA-256 password storage to harvest and crack authentication data at scale. Attackers scan for exposed SSL VPN portals, perform credential stuffing and password spraying, and crack stolen password hashes offline. After gaining access, they create new administrative accounts for persistence and conduct Active Directory enumeration to expand access. Organizations may experience account lockouts due to attacker actions. The campaign acts as an initial-access broker with links to ransomware affiliates INC/Lynx and Payload, representing a significant medium-severity threat requiring immediate defensive measures.
A sophisticated phishing campaign impersonates AI advertising products from major platforms using a Browser-in-the-Browser technique to steal credentials and bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) in real-time. The campaign targets advertising account managers and recruiters, leveraging a shared backend infrastructure and reusing code across multiple fake brands. It also includes refund scams and fake recruitment sites connected to the same infrastructure.
A recent campaign uses fake websites impersonating ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and Perplexity to steal advertising account credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) codes. These sites employ browser-in-browser attacks to deceive users into revealing sensitive login information. The campaign specifically targets ad account managers, aiming to compromise their accounts through credential theft and MFA bypass techniques.
The Underground malware campaign uses an Aotera/Tedy loader to inject a Vidar-class stealer into Windows processes. It targets cryptocurrency exchange accounts by injecting malicious scripts into Chrome and Edge sessions, enabling automatic theft via fake security overlays and email manipulation. The malware also includes a clipboard hijacker that replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses. Active since October 2023, the operation has stolen approximately $100,000 from 350-430 victims across 23 blockchain networks. Infection begins with lure archives containing trojanized files and includes anti-analysis checks against 67 monitoring tools. The campaign rapidly rotates Cloudflare-fronted domains to evade reputation-based detection.
Since January 2026, the Russian state threat actor Star Blizzard has enhanced its cyberespionage operations by adopting a new malware delivery technique called RedFlick, alongside large-scale phishing campaigns and use of compromised website accounts. These tactics improve detection evasion and target Ukrainian individuals and institutions, as well as international NGOs, Western think tanks, governments, and organizations linked to Ukraine support. Indicators include multiple malicious domains, file hashes, and an IP address associated with the campaign. No specific software vulnerabilities or CVEs are identified.
A sophisticated six-month campaign targeting quantitative and DeFi developers through malicious npm packages disguised as legitimate mathematics libraries. The operation employs encrypted loaders that trigger only when specific cryptographic operations are performed, specifically when solving linear equations with predetermined matrices. Command and control infrastructure uses Ethereum Sepolia testnet smart contracts as dead drops, alongside a secondary Slack channel, enabling encrypted tasking of compromised systems. The threat actors manufactured millions of fake downloads using GitHub Actions workers to establish false credibility. Fourteen smart contracts were deployed across five operator wallets, managing over 1,000 encrypted taskings to enrolled victims. The campaign demonstrates advanced operational security with disposable accounts, encrypted payloads sealed under ephemeral keys, and infection markers hidden in license files.
Rust-lang team members and popular crate owners have been targeted in a social engineering campaign involving video calls. Attackers impersonate recruiters or contractors to trick targets into installing malicious software or executing harmful code. This campaign is linked to previous incidents involving compromised Rust crates and is suspected to be associated with North Korean threat actors. Developers are advised to be cautious with unsolicited contacts, use trusted communication platforms, enable multi-factor authentication, and monitor accounts for suspicious activity.
The PolinRider campaign compromises developer GitHub accounts to inject malicious code into development versions of popular packages, including visanduma/nova-two-factor on Packagist. It targets multiple ecosystems such as npm, PyPI, Go modules, Packagist, and Chrome extensions by abusing Git-based collaboration workflows rather than directly compromising package registries. The attackers use advanced techniques like rewriting Git history, hiding payloads in configuration and font files, and triggering execution via IDE tasks. PHP projects are specifically targeted with obfuscated JavaScript executed through shell_exec calls. The campaign is attributed to North Korean actors focusing on cryptocurrency theft.
Telus, a major Canadian telecom provider, experienced a multi-month account breach campaign from February 2025 to June 2026. Attackers used stolen credentials to access subscriber personal data and billing records, including names, account numbers, phone numbers, billing addresses, email addresses, partial payment card numbers, subscription details, and payment history. The compromised information was used to attempt to convince customers to switch services and, in some cases, to make unauthorized changes to accounts. Telus reset affected credentials and implemented enhanced security monitoring. The Vancouver Police Department was notified, and identity theft protection services were offered to victims. The breach appears linked to credential stuffing or account takeover using credentials possibly obtained from third parties, though this is not confirmed by Telus.
Threat actors are leveraging generative AI to enhance financial fraud campaigns targeting enterprise organizations. Between August 3-5, over one million phishing emails were distributed through third-party infrastructure, primarily targeting US-based organizations (87.7%). The attacks employed sophisticated executive impersonation, specifically CEOs and CFOs, combined with fabricated ServiceNow invoices requesting ACH transfers of approximately $50,000. The campaign demonstrated multiple AI-assisted indicators including extensive HTML comments, structured section labeling, and uniform template construction. Attackers registered lookalike domains and created elaborate forwarded email threads between spoofed executives to establish legitimacy. The fraudulent invoices contained detailed branding, personalized recipient information, and specific payment instructions to attacker-controlled bank accounts. Multiple layered social engineering techniques were deployed to reduce recipient skepticism and convince acc...
Multiple cloud accounts have been compromised through passkey-themed social engineering campaigns since May 2026. Attackers impersonate IT helpdesk staff via phone calls or SMS, directing victims to phishing sites that mimic Microsoft sign-in pages. After obtaining credentials through adversary-in-the-middle or device code authentication flows, attackers establish persistence by adding unauthorized MFA methods. They then conduct extensive reconnaissance using Microsoft Graph API to map users, groups, permissions, and resources. The intrusion culminates in high-volume data collection from SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange using automated tools, with exfiltration occurring over hours or days at controlled rates to avoid detection.