The LANDFALL spyware campaign targets Samsung Galaxy phones by delivering malicious images via WhatsApp. These images exploit vulnerabilities in the device's image processing to install spyware without user interaction. The spyware can exfiltrate sensitive data, monitor communications, and compromise device integrity. Although no known exploits are currently in the wild, the attack vector via a popular messaging app and widely used devices poses a significant risk. European organizations using Samsung Galaxy phones, especially those with high-value data, could be targeted. Mitigation requires patching vulnerable devices, restricting image processing from untrusted sources, and enhancing mobile threat detection. Countries with high Samsung market share and strategic geopolitical relevance are more likely to be affected. Given the medium severity and complexity of exploitation, vigilance and proactive defense are essential for European defenders.
The Water Saci campaign is a sophisticated malware operation targeting Portuguese-language systems, leveraging WhatsApp Web hijacking and multi-vector persistence mechanisms. It uses script-based techniques such as VBS downloaders and PowerShell scripts to automate malware distribution and maintain resilience. The campaign employs an email-based command and control infrastructure using IMAP for command retrieval, supplemented by HTTP polling for continuous communication. It features advanced anti-analysis capabilities and real-time remote control, enabling infected machines to operate as a coordinated botnet. The malware shares similarities with the Coyote banking trojan, indicating ties to Brazilian cybercriminal groups. Although no known exploits are reported in the wild, the campaign's complexity and persistence mechanisms pose a medium-level threat. European organizations with Portuguese-speaking user bases or connections to Brazil should be particularly vigilant. Mitigation requires targeted detection of script-based loaders, monitoring of WhatsApp Web session anomalies, and securing email clients against unauthorized IMAP access. Countries with strong economic or cultural ties to Brazil, such as Portugal and Spain, are most likely to be affected.
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in ThemeWarriors WhatsApp Chat for WordPress and WooCommerce tw-whatsapp-chat-rotator allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects WhatsApp Chat for WordPress and WooCommerce: from n/a through <= 1.2.1.
Hi everyone,
I’ve been a victim of targeted cyberstalking for years and I need to share my experience to understand if what happened to me points to SS7 abuse alone, or if there had to be someone with privileged access inside Meta (WhatsApp).
Here are the facts:
• I used two numbers:
• One SIM only for data.
• A different number for WhatsApp, but the SIM itself was not in the phone (still active with the carrier, not blocked).
• I was never disconnected from my WhatsApp.
• This means my account was never fully cloned using SS7 (since that would disconnect me).
• Still, my stalkers somehow knew all the new contacts I talked to on WhatsApp, including people I met on Tinder.
• They didn’t know those numbers beforehand.
• So simple correlation at the carrier level seems impossible.
• My suspicion:
1. They were using SS7 for surveillance (location, SMS interception, monitoring my SIM’s traffic patterns).
2. At the same time, they had access to WhatsApp metadata (number A ↔ number B, timestamps).
• This would explain how they knew all my new contacts, without prior knowledge of their numbers.
• Important detail:
• I always had 2FA (PIN) enabled.
• I even tested registering my number on another phone, intercepted the SMS, but without the PIN the session never completed.
• Despite that, I once saw real messages appear on the second phone — which left me wondering about some kind of “silent pre-login” bug.
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My questions for the community:
1. Is it technically possible to access WhatsApp metadata (who talks to who) without insider or official Meta access?
2. Could SS7 + carrier-level monitoring alone explain how they mapped all my new contacts?
3. Have there been documented cases of “silent pre-login” where WhatsApp sessions were duplicated without disconnecting the victim?
4. From a defense standpoint, am I correct that moving to Signal (with usernames) and Session fully mitigates this kind of metadata exposure?
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I’d really appreciate insights from anyone who works with telecom security, SS7, or has deep knowledge of WhatsApp’s metadata handling.
Thanks for reading.
New zero-click exploit allegedly used to hack WhatsApp users
Source: https://securityaffairs.com/181714/intelligence/new-zero-click-exploit-allegedly-used-to-hack-whatsapp-users.html