Search: af-whatsapp.com
45 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General DarkCore is a remote access trojan (RAT) that steals credentials and hijacks user sessions by reusing stolen session cookies to access services like Gmail and WhatsApp. It routes traffic through victims' IPs to mimic legitimate activity and includes hidden virtual network computing (HVNC) for stealthy desktop access. Distributed via PDF-themed shortcuts that deliver decoy documents alongside malware, DarkCore communicates with its command-and-control servers over TCP and can load additional modules dynamically. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The kevinx-baileys npm package, a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library, contains malicious code that silently subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to specific WhatsApp Channels without user consent. This behavior occurs via code in lib/Socket/newsletter.js that sends follow queries using the victim's authenticated session. Versions 1.2.0, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2 are affected. Installing this package may fully compromise the host computer, risking exposure of stored secrets and keys. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @raffnotdev/baileys is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to specific WhatsApp Channels without user consent. This behavior occurs when the socket connects, sending follow queries using the victim's authenticated session. The package compromises the host system, potentially exposing all stored secrets and keys. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @axo_cuy/baileyss is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to specific WhatsApp Channels without user consent. This subscription occurs automatically shortly after the socket connection is established, using the victim's authenticated session. The malicious behavior is present in versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 3.0.1, and 4.0.0. The package effectively compromises any system it is installed on, potentially exposing all stored secrets and keys. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The xzvbailss npm package is a malicious fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that silently subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to specific WhatsApp Channels without user consent. It uses the victim's authenticated session to send follow queries to predefined channels, compromising user privacy and control. Installation of this package indicates a full system compromise, and all secrets and keys on the affected machine should be rotated immediately. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity DarkCore is a newly discovered Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that facilitates credential theft, hidden desktop access, and session hijacking through a dedicated browser. It reuses stolen session cookies to access services like Gmail, WhatsApp, and MediaFire, routing traffic through victims' IP addresses to appear legitimate. The malware is distributed with a deceptive PDF-themed shortcut that downloads both a decoy document and a malicious executable. Operators can control infected machines via hidden virtual network computing (HVNC) and extend functionality through additional modules. The RAT communicates with a hardcoded command and control server and disguises itself using legitimate Windows process names. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @sairidev/baileys-new version 0.3.21 contains malicious code that silently subscribes the victim's WhatsApp account to attacker-controlled channels without user consent. The malicious action leverages the authenticated WhatsApp session of the installer by injecting covert subscription commands into the WhatsApp socket connection. The targeted channels are obfuscated or dynamically fetched, allowing attackers to change targets after installation. The malicious code does not steal credentials, maintain persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The luoxy-baileys npm package, a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library, contains malicious code that automatically subscribes the user's authenticated WhatsApp account to certain WhatsApp Channels (newsletters) chosen by the publisher. This auto-subscription occurs without explicit user consent, triggered 90 seconds after a WhatsApp connection is established. The list of channels to follow is partially hardcoded and partially fetched at runtime from a publisher-controlled GitHub URL, allowing dynamic modification of subscribed channels. The package does not exfiltrate credentials or install persistent backdoors, but it covertly inflates the publisher's channel subscriber counts. This behavior is enabled by default and undocumented except for a comparison table in the README. A user can opt out by setting a configuration flag to false. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: @kelvdra/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.6-rc.1, 1.0.6, 1.0.5-rc.3. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a) package.json in @kelvdra/baileys@1.0.6-rc.4 declares the dependency `libsignal` as `github:Kelvdra/libsignal` with no version, tag, or commit SHA. On `npm install`, npm resolves this specifier to the current tip of the referenced repository's default branch and installs whatever bytes it returns, running any lifecycle scripts contained within them, with no integrity check. The dependency source is not the npm registry and not a pinned commit, so the code that lands on the installer's machine can change at any moment without any change to this package. Control of that GitHub account or repository translates directly into install-time code execution on every installer of this package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: @bottino/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.14, 1.0.13, 1.0.12, 1.0.11, 1.0.10, 1.0.9, 1.0.8, 1.0.7, 1.0.6, 1.0.5, 1.0.2, 1.0.1. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (571d52cf3274d95d4824667269921b2e0ad1478fe9f324a74fab0ba377bb9a26) This fork of Baileys overrides `requestPairingCode` so that when the caller does not supply an explicit `pairKey`, `authState.creds.pairingCode` is set to the fixed literal string `BYPAKI64`. That value is then used as the KDF input for the WhatsApp companion-device link-code encryption via `derivePairingCodeKey(authState.creds.pairingCode, salt)`. Because the pairing code is a known constant baked into the package, anyone who knows the target phone number of the installer's WhatsApp account can complete the companion-device pair flow from a device they control and obtain persistent access to the installer's WhatsApp session (read/send messages, contacts, media) — a full account takeover backdoor against any application built on this library. Additionally, on socket connect the code auto-subscribes the installer's WhatsApp account to a hardcoded newsletter JID `120363418582531215@newsletter` and persists a `basedbysam` flag so the covert subscribe runs once per credential store; this covert action uses the installer's WhatsApp identity without disclosure. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | Medium6.9GCVE Database OpenClaw CLI is vulnerable to local file exfiltration via injection of MEDIA: directives in MCP tool result content. A malicious or compromised MCP tool server can specify arbitrary file paths within allowed directories such as the OS temporary directory, causing OpenClaw to read and send those files to external messaging channels like Discord, Slack, Telegram, and WhatsApp without user awareness. This vulnerability affects all OpenClaw versions up to and including 2026.7.1. The flaw arises from unvalidated extraction of MEDIA: tokens, an overly broad default allowlist including os.tmpdir(), and delivery of file contents to external channels. Secondary attack vectors include fallback on image content paths and support for file:// URI schemes. The impact includes theft of sensitive temporary files and silent exfiltration to attacker-controlled channels. A patch is available to remediate this issue. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Signal has also made a security announcement: an automatic key verification feature to complement its safety number system. The post WhatsApp Unveils New Scam Alert Feature appeared first on SecurityWeek . | SecurityWeek | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database @dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node is a malicious npm package that performs supply-chain tampering by overwriting a dependency's source code to inject remote-controlled code. Upon import, it patches the @whiskeysockets/baileys library to silently make the host's authenticated WhatsApp session auto-follow attacker-chosen channels. The injected code fetches a mutable JSON from a personal GitHub repository, allowing the attacker to arbitrarily control newsletter operations on compromised systems. The package forcibly terminates the host process shortly after installation, and the tampering is persistent and idempotent. Systems with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database npm/@dreamguyxeon/baileyx is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork with the same undisclosed remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow as related DGXeon packages. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after session setup it waits 120 seconds, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and silently FOLLOWs listed newsletter JIDs. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket), not install. It also fetches Baileys version metadata from DGXeon13/dgxeon-soket and aliases libsignal to npm:@dgxeon13/libsignal-node@1.0.0 (a separate package that patches @whiskeysockets/baileys). Independently corroborated by LPM Firewall's public malicious report for 2.0.0. Related OSV entries: dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252), baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 5.0.0: 0dffc5f0c8fd53b520c26de8788e6eafb1d939070a698e39f9f9853f42e6f7db. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c1b873d1c35283cbabd9bc82c8bffa55d3151abec85a75522ed8565c93d0546a) This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that contains an undocumented runtime hijack of the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 102-122), when the consumer creates a WhatsApp socket — the package's main advertised function — a 120-second setTimeout fires, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and for each newsletter ID in that list issues a QueryIds.FOLLOW request under the user's authenticated session. The list is hosted on a mutable `main` branch under the package author's GitHub account, so the author can rotate the targeted channels at any time post-publication without republishing the package. The behavior is not mentioned in the README and is not gated by any user prompt or configuration. The main entrypoint lib/index.js is additionally wrapped in a custom base91 string-table decoder with anti-debugger `debugger` statements and `eval("this")`, concealing the bootstrap edges from casual review. The package also aliases the security-critical `libsignal` dependency to the same author's scope (`npm:@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.0`), placing crypto primitives under the same trust boundary as the silent-relay code. Installer harm: any consumer who connects this fork to their WhatsApp account has their identity used to silently follow channels of the author's choosing, with the target list mutable indefinitely. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database npm/my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork that embeds undisclosed, remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow behavior. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after a session is established the code waits 120 seconds, fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp newsletter JIDs from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (attacker-controlled; observed contents include newsletter JIDs), and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(..., QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry with errors swallowed. There is no caller opt-in. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket / normal socket path), not install: preinstall only checks Node >= 20. The package also depends on libsignal via the npm alias npm:@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.1 (separate malicious patcher reported alongside this entry). Related DGXeon campaign packages already in OSV include dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252) and baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 1.0.3: 1332d396a2251692c2654fca52620a433a880551500a567ade040e8f01440e68. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (481bdecc52b4f32afcfd2e6755ef8c74191cc0010714a0403aa93d1bd958369b) my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp library fork whose `makeWASocket` newsletter socket schedules an undocumented setTimeout (120s after socket creation) that fetches a remote JSON list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json and unconditionally force-follows every channel ID in that list via `newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW)` (lib/Socket/newsletter.js lines 100-122). The fetched list is hosted on a mutable branch under the package author's GitHub account and can be changed at any time without republishing the package. There is no opt-in, no documentation, and no user prompt. Any developer who uses this library to power a WhatsApp bot will have their authenticated WhatsApp account silently issue FOLLOW commands to whatever channel IDs the author chooses to publish — abusing the installer's WhatsApp identity for the author's social-graph manipulation. The behavior matches the package name `my-auto-follow` but is never disclosed to the consumer. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @astralcore/aura-wb is a WhatsApp bot that contains malicious code which exfiltrates sensitive WhatsApp session credentials to a hardcoded, author-controlled MongoDB Atlas cluster. The package writes full WhatsApp credentials and signal keys to this shared database, allowing the author or anyone with access to the database to fully control the installer's WhatsApp account. Additionally, the package polls the shared database to receive commands that can manipulate the installer's WhatsApp session to follow, react to, or read arbitrary channels. The package also sends host environment information to a hardcoded Telegram chat ID, providing the author with deployment notifications. A Google Tenor API key is embedded as well. The affected versions are 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.4. No patch or remediation information is provided. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-67595webreinvent vaahcms · Embedded Malicious Code Critical9.2EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-67595 VaahCMS versions 2.0.0 through 2.3.4 contain a malicious obfuscated JavaScript payload embedded in the Blade template responsible for rendering security OTP emails, allowing remote attackers to execute unauthorized code in any browser that renders the affected email template with JavaScript enabled. The payload establishes a WebSocket connection to a hardcoded command-and-control endpoint, installs a password-field keylogger using MutationObserver to capture dynamically added inputs, scrapes WhatsApp Web DOM content, and accepts remote commands to redirect or overwrite the rendered page. EPSS 0.8%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-46555verygoodplugins whatsapp-mcp · Path Traversal High7.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46555 WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched — sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @fhkry/x-baileys is a malicious fork impersonating the original Baileys WhatsApp library. It contains covert code that, after 120 seconds of socket creation, fetches a remote JSON file with base64-encoded WhatsApp newsletter IDs and silently subscribes the user's WhatsApp account to these newsletters. Additionally, it automatically joins attacker-controlled WhatsApp groups without user consent. The attacker can update the lists remotely, enabling dynamic control over the compromised accounts. The package falsely claims the original author and misleads users about its origin. Installation of this package compromises the user's WhatsApp identity and potentially the host system. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @sauruslord/libsignal version 2.0.2 impersonates the legitimate libsignal-node package but contains malicious code. Upon requiring the package, it waits one second, then overwrites a file in the installer's @whiskeysockets/baileys dependency with attacker-controlled code. This code abuses the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to auto-follow an attacker-controlled newsletter channel without user consent. The package also terminates the host application shortly after import. The original overwritten file is destroyed with no backup restoration. Any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised. | GCVE Database |
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