Since January 2026, the Russian state threat actor Star Blizzard has enhanced its cyberespionage operations by adopting a new malware delivery technique called RedFlick, alongside large-scale phishing campaigns and use of compromised website accounts. These tactics improve detection evasion and target Ukrainian individuals and institutions, as well as international NGOs, Western think tanks, governments, and organizations linked to Ukraine support. Indicators include multiple malicious domains, file hashes, and an IP address associated with the campaign. No specific software vulnerabilities or CVEs are identified.
Cotonti through 1.0.0 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in admin.users.php that allows attackers to delete user groups without token verification. Attackers can craft malicious links or pages that trick authenticated administrators into deleting custom groups and their associated permissions by riding the administrator's session.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash b16e15764b8bc06c5c3f9f19bc8b99fa48e7894aa5a6ccdad65da49bbf564793 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors three times between September 25 and October 8, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds to detect potential compromise.
Shadow IT refers to hardware, software, and services operating outside the visibility or approval of IT and security teams, creating security blind spots. Wazuh is an open source security platform that helps organizations reduce these visibility gaps by collecting detailed inventory data from monitored endpoints and correlating it with vulnerability and policy information. It supports agent-based and agentless monitoring, including for devices that cannot run agents. Wazuh provides centralized dashboards for visibility into unmanaged endpoints, unauthorized software, browser extensions, and services. It also enables detection and removal of unauthorized applications through custom rules and active response scripts. This approach addresses the limitations of network discovery scans, which only identify devices responding during scan windows, leaving many assets invisible. Overall, Wazuh helps organizations improve asset visibility and reduce risks associated with shadow IT.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 39be6853a8204ce6455a373a6ffb4cb4672d4a62d90be69f7d6eeb66cda10b96 was observed 12 times in attacker activity between September 18, 2026, and October 21, 2026. The file is associated with the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and is linked to attacker infrastructure in South Carolina. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload that could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds to detect potential compromise.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash eaf9adb4bb80316a3aafceabc0f2ed2aed7c76cf134b9b7c66226fc4f003aa97 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors in attacker activity between September 14, 2026, and October 14, 2026. The file is associated with the ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) and was seen originating from attacker infrastructure in China. This hash fingerprints a specific malicious payload, which could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and security feeds to detect potential compromise.
A flaw has been found in aircheng-org iWebShop-5 up to 5.15. This impacts an unknown function of the file controllers/admin.php of the component Authentication Storage. Executing a manipulation of the argument Password can lead to password hash with insufficient computational effort. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 8e06754e5e64bdf5f61dd604a5f12e9bc10f5502316b5379fb258f84a5d84702 was observed 10 times on September 7, 2026, by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). This hash corresponds to a specific malicious payload such as a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in the United States. No known exploits in the wild or vendor patches are applicable. Organizations should match this hash against their environments and security tools to detect potential compromise.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: remove fscache backend entirely EROFS over fscache was introduced to provide image lazy pulling functionality. After the feature landed, the fscache subsystem made netfs a new hard dependency, which is unexpected for a local filesystem and has an kernel-defined caching hierarchy which could be inflexible compared to the fanotify pre-content hooks. Therefore, this feature has been deprecated for almost two years. As EROFS file-backed mounts and fanotify pre-content hooks both upstream for a while and already providing equivalent functionality (erofs-utils has supported fanotify pre-content hooks), let's remove the fscache backend now. The main application of this feature is Nydus [1], and they plan to move to use fanotify pre-content hooks in the near future too. I hope this patch can be merged into Linux 7.2, which is also motivated by newly found implementation issues [2][3] that are not worth investigating given the deprecation and limited development resources. The associated fscache/cachefiles cleanup patch will follow separately through the vfs tree (netfs) later: it seems fine since the codebase is isolated by CONFIG_CACHEFILES_ONDEMAND. [1] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/blob/v2.1.0/docs/nydus-fscache.md [2] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/pull/1824 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260619135800.1594811-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
A previously undocumented Linux toolkit has been targeting South Korean automotive and media organizations with minimal detection since early 2025. The campaign employs a HAProxy instance called ted backdoor, compiled within the victim's existing HAProxy version 2.8.12, alongside trojanized versions of crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd. This sophisticated framework enables remote command execution, malicious script injection into web traffic, credential harvesting, and long-term surveillance. The ted backdoor uses HAProxy's native filter API and internal structures to intercept SSL-decrypted HTTP traffic while maintaining legitimate load balancing operations. Operating alongside are an SSH keylogger, a curl-based RAT with HAProxy health monitoring capabilities, and a deployment stager. The toolkit is attributed with medium confidence to DPRK APTs based on targeting patterns, simple XOR-based encryption schemes, custom substitution ciphers, and C2 infrastructure associated with APT37.
OpenLeash is a security tool designed to monitor and control autonomous AI agent actions by intercepting potentially risky commands. It blocks clearly dangerous actions and requests human approval when the intent of an action is uncertain. The tool acts as an authorization layer to ensure AI agents act securely and aligned with user intent, preventing unintended or harmful operations such as accidental data deletion. OpenLeash is configurable, allowing users to specify acceptable actions and thresholds for automatic approval or human intervention. While still under development, it is actively used by individuals and organizations to mitigate risks associated with AI agents operating with broad permissions but lacking human situational awareness.
A malicious file identified by the SHA-256 hash 3f3bf218089d1488617d37f8a5116bb2791eb39ce06a1b5bc9a4cdfe5e94dd39 was observed by OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors twice between August 31, 2026, and October 29, 2026. The file is associated with attacker activity involving the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). The malicious payload could be a dropper, web shell, miner, or post-exploitation tool. The attacker infrastructure was located in Germany. Organizations are advised to match this hash against files in their environments and threat intelligence feeds.
The OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors detected an attacker-controlled URL used as a command-and-control (C2) or out-of-band callback endpoint. This URL was observed twice on 2026-08-28 and is associated with the T1071 technique (Application Layer Protocol). The attacker infrastructure was identified in Turkey (TR). Organizations are advised to block and monitor this URL and search their proxy, web, and WAF logs for any requests to it.
In July 2026, over 100 internet-exposed water and wastewater systems in the United States were targeted in cyberattacks linked to Iranian threat actors. These attacks primarily exploited programmable logic controllers (PLCs) connected directly to cellular modems. While no significant disruptions were reported, the incidents raised concerns about the security of operational technology (OT) in critical infrastructure. CISA has issued guidance urging organizations to reduce internet exposure by inventorying internet-accessible systems, removing unnecessary exposures, changing default passwords, applying security updates, enforcing multifactor authentication, and routing remote access through secure gateways. The attacks highlight risks associated with leaving industrial control systems reachable via public internet or cellular connections. The affected states include at least Minnesota, Michigan, South Dakota, Georgia, New Jersey, and Alabama. CISA continues to recommend regular reassessments of network exposure and third-party connections to mitigate future risks.
CVE-2026-79654 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Red Hat Satellite 6.16 for RHEL 8 affecting the Katello Content View History API. Authenticated users with permission to view Content Views in one organization may access lifecycle history information of Content Views belonging to other organizations by supplying the identifier of those views. This leads to unauthorized disclosure of publication and promotion events, associated users, and timestamps. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 4.3, indicating medium severity. Red Hat has published an advisory for this issue and related vulnerabilities in Satellite 6.19, which includes security fixes. No explicit patch version for 6.16 is stated in the input data. The vendor advisory should be consulted for current remediation guidance.
Law enforcement agencies from 22 countries conducted a coordinated operation, dubbed Operation Jackal IV, targeting cybercrime networks linked to West African criminal groups, including the Black Axe syndicate. The operation resulted in 58 arrests and disruption of networks involved in romance scams, cryptocurrency and investment fraud, and business email compromise. Additional coordinated actions, such as Operation Red Card 2.0 and Operation First Light 2026, led to thousands of arrests and significant asset seizures globally. These criminal groups often use Crime-as-a-Service platforms and have been linked to coercion and extortion schemes involving minors. The operations demonstrate international collaboration to combat organized cyber-enabled financial crime and associated violent offenses.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (deb78208f7aa932298e92a8c241ed970296c567a273fc21013dd83bb7916e81b)
On `npm install`, package.json's preinstall hook runs index.js which harvests installer host identifiers — os.hostname(), os.userInfo() username, local IPv4 addresses, home directory, INIT_CWD, public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org / icanhazip.com / ifconfig.me), DNS resolver IP/subnet, and the parent project's package.json metadata (name, author, repository, homepage) — and transmits them to the hardcoded Interactsh-style callback host `da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcallbk1.oast.fun`. Exfiltration uses two channels: an HTTPS/HTTP POST to `/poc/<uuid>` on the callback host, and a hex-encoded DNS covert channel that splits the JSON payload into ≤60-character subdomain labels resolved against the callback host, designed to bypass egress filters that block outbound HTTP but permit DNS. The version number (999.9.12) and package name are consistent with a dependency-confusion probe.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (d7cde5bd15beab8488f3b3b6bde2f17fff6c148ef2d575613762f337bd1c8281)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fund-list-filter' @ 999.9.12 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (27ba065e8759299d381ed1c7abd5e7721037b4ea969a384a9e70cfb6bb799e17)
Package declares `scripts.preinstall`: `node index.js`, causing index.js to run automatically on `npm install`. The script collects hostname, username, home directory, INIT_CWD, local IPv4, public egress IP (via api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, ifconfig.me), DNS resolver IP and client subnet (via o-o.myaddr.l.google.com), and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected JSON is exfiltrated to the hardcoded callback host `da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcallbk1.oast.fun` (Interactsh/OAST) via DNS-chunked queries and HTTPS POST to `/poc/<uuid>`. The unscoped name is published at version 999.9.12 to defeat internal resolvers that fall back to the public npm registry, so any build referencing `fund-portfolio` without a private-registry pin will resolve to and execute this payload.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (ffad2f6c37441c2924e67b1d506d9c26dc9cb2fae325b74a596102ea5ed403bf)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'fund-portfolio' @ 999.9.12 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (ff42d765d0c2f6af53e4be5a9cf26ef34b3a36accf199acfb7d53af40b8dc2a6)
On npm install, the declared preinstall script runs index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, OS username, home directory, cwd (INIT_CWD of the consuming project), local IPv4 address, egress public IP (fetched from api.ipify.org, icanhazip.com, and ifconfig.me), DNS resolver information, and the parent project's package.json fields (name, author, repository, homepage). The collected data is transmitted to the hardcoded third-party callback host da51rv0hb2uc72tg4gvgdepinjcalbk1.oast.fun via both DNS queries (hex-chunked subdomain lookups) and HTTPS POST to /poc/<uuid>. The package name and version pattern are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal scope; the beacon fires automatically at install time without any caller opt-in. Although the author metadata self-labels this as an authorized proof-of-concept, the code performs the full exploitation shape (auto-exec on install, installer-identifier collection, egress to an attacker-controlled callback) against anyone who resolves this public name.
## Source: ossf-package-analysis (3ade0d327c85a937a9115a25153971f25b66eb6c838a6a82b171e054afc285c6)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'stillm4ddpocs-demo-gadget' @ 999.9.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.