OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 to before version 3.4.7, an attacker providing a crafted .exr file with HTJ2K compression and a channel width of 32768 can write controlled data beyond the output heap buffer in any application that decodes EXR images. The write primitive is 2 bytes per overflow iteration or 4 bytes (by another path), repeating for each additional pixel past the overflow point. In this context, a heap write overflow can lead to remote code execution on systems. This issue has been patched in version 3.4.7.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels, per-pixel totals are accumulated in vector<unsigned int> total_sizes for attacker-controlled large counts across many parts, total_sizes[ptr] wraps modulo 2^32. overall_sample_count is then derived from wrapped totals and used in samples[channel].resize(overall_sample_count). Decode pointer setup/consumption proceeds with true sample counts, and write operations in core unpack (generic_unpack_deep_pointers) overrun the undersized composite sample buffer. This vulnerability is fixed in v3.2.6, v3.3.8, and v3.4.6.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.6 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.4, a heap-buffer-overflow (OOB read) occurs in the `istream_nonparallel_read` function in `ImfContextInit.cpp` when parsing a malformed EXR file through a memory-mapped `IStream`. A signed integer subtraction produces a negative value that is implicitly converted to `size_t`, resulting in a massive length being passed to `memcpy`. Versions 3.3.7 and 3.4.5 contain a patch.
A vulnerability was found in AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenColorIO up to 2.5.0. This issue affects the function ConvertToRegularExpression of the file src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp. Performing a manipulation results in out-of-bounds read. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named ebdbb75123c9d5f4643e041314e2bc988a13f20d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The fix was added to the 2.5.1 milestone.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, there is a use-after-free in PyObject_StealAttrString of pyOpenEXR_old.cpp. The legacy adapter defines PyObject_StealAttrString that calls PyObject_GetAttrString to obtain a new reference, immediately decrefs it, and returns the pointer. Callers then pass this dangling pointer to APIs like PyLong_AsLong/PyFloat_AsDouble, resulting in a use-after-free. This is invoked in multiple places (e.g., reading PixelType.v, Box2i, V2f, etc.) Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 fix the issue.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.5 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, while fuzzing `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside `generic_unpack`. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory. The issue can result in undefined behavior and/or a potential crash/denial of service. Versions 3.3.6 and 3.4.3 fix the issue.
MaterialX is an open standard for the exchange of rich material and look-development content across applications and renderers. In version 1.39.2, nested imports of MaterialX files can lead to a crash via stack memory exhaustion, due to the lack of a limit on the "import chain" depth. When parsing file imports, recursion is used to process nested files; however, there is no limit imposed to the depth of files that can be parsed by the library. By building a sufficiently deep chain of MaterialX files one referencing the next, it is possible to crash the process using the MaterialX library via stack exhaustion. This is fixed in version 1.39.3.
MaterialX is an open standard for the exchange of rich material and look-development content across applications and renderers. In version 1.39.2, when parsing shader nodes in a MTLX file, the MaterialXCore code accesses a potentially null pointer, which can lead to crashes with maliciously crafted files. An attacker could intentionally crash a target program that uses MaterialX by sending a malicious MTLX file. This is fixed in version 1.39.3.
MaterialX is an open standard for the exchange of rich material and look-development content across applications and renderers. In version 1.39.2, when parsing shader nodes in a MTLX file, the MaterialXCore code accesses a potentially null pointer, which can lead to crashes with maliciously crafted files. An attacker could intentionally crash a target program that uses OpenEXR by sending a malicious MTLX file. This is fixed in version 1.39.3.
MaterialX is an open standard for the exchange of rich material and look-development content across applications and renderers. In versions 1.39.2 and below, when parsing an MTLX file with multiple nested nodegraph implementations, the MaterialX XML parsing logic can potentially crash due to stack exhaustion. An attacker could intentionally crash a target program that uses OpenEXR by sending a malicious MTLX file. This is fixed in version 1.39.3.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, applications trust unvalidated dataWindow size values from file headers, which can lead to excessive memory allocation and performance degradation when processing malicious files. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, when reading a deep scanline image with a large sample count in reduceMemory mode, it is possible to crash a target application with a NULL pointer dereference in a write operation. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. Version 3.3.2 is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow during a read operation due to bad pointer math when decompressing DWAA-packed scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.
OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.2 through 3.3.0, there is a heap-based buffer overflow during a write operation when decompressing ZIPS-packed deep scan-line EXR files with a maliciously forged chunk header. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.