Threat Intelligence Database

### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections (`network.listen_addr` is set, which is the default). ### Summary The P2P codec's `Codec::decode()` method calls `src.reserve(body_len + HEADER_LEN)` after parsing a 24-byte protocol header, using the attacker-claimed `body_len` field. This reserves up to `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN` (~2 MiB) of virtual buffer capacity per connection before any body bytes arrive and before the handshake completes. However, `BytesMut::reserve()` sets virtual capacity without committing physical memory pages. The operating system does not allocate physical RAM until bytes are actually written into the buffer. Since the attacker never sends body bytes, the reserved capacity remains uncommitted. Reproduction of the reporter's PoC (256 threads, 30 seconds of sustained connections) showed negligible RSS impact on the Zebra process. Zebra's existing mitigations further constrain the practical attack surface: per-IP connection limits (`max_connections_per_ip = 1`), a per-connection accept rate of approximately one per second, and a 3-second handshake timeout that cleans up idle connections. ### Details At `zebra-network/src/protocol/external/codec.rs:406`, after parsing the 24-byte header and validating the network magic and body length against `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN`, the codec calls `src.reserve(body_len + HEADER_LEN)`. The codec is constructed on the bare TCP stream before `negotiate_version()` runs, so the reservation is reachable from any TCP peer that can send 24 bytes. No legitimate Zcash handshake message (`version`, `verack`) is anywhere close to 2 MiB. The codec makes no distinction between pre-handshake and post-handshake message types when sizing the reservation. ### Patches The fix defers large buffer reservations until after the handshake completes, or caps the per-message reservation for pre-handshake messages to what `version`/`verack` actually require. ### Workarounds No workaround is needed. The existing per-IP rate limiting, handshake timeout, and connection limits effectively mitigate the practical impact. ### Impact Minimal. The reservation affects virtual address space only, not physical memory. Zebra's existing connection-management mitigations (per-IP limits, accept rate, handshake timeout) further constrain the attack. The code path is worth cleaning up for defense-in-depth but does not produce a measurable denial-of-service effect. ### Credit Reported by `@ouicate` via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node listens on the default `[::]` address on a Linux host (the standard deployment configuration — `net.ipv6.bindv6only=0` is the default on all common Linux distributions). 3. Your node is synced near the chain tip (the expected production state for any node participating in the network). ### Summary An address normalization mismatch between the handshake path and the mempool misbehavior path causes a deterministic assertion panic when a peer connects via IPv4 to a dual-stack IPv6 listener and then triggers a mempool misbehavior penalty. The handshake path canonicalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to plain IPv4 when storing the peer in the address book via `MetaAddr::new_connected`. The mempool misbehavior path forwards the raw transient socket address (IPv4-mapped IPv6 form) when sending `MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior` to the address book. The address book looks up the canonical IPv4 entry but then asserts that the previous entry's address matches the change's address. The mismatch between the canonical IPv4 address and the raw IPv4-mapped IPv6 address triggers the assertion, and `panic = "abort"` terminates the process. ### Details On Linux with `net.ipv6.bindv6only=0`, an IPv4 connection accepted by a `[::]` listener is represented internally as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 socket address (e.g., `::ffff:127.0.0.1:8233`). Zebra's `canonical_peer_addr` helper converts these to plain IPv4 (e.g., `127.0.0.1:8233`). The handshake path uses `MetaAddr::new_connected`, which canonicalizes the address before storing in the address book. However, inbound inventory registration uses `connected_addr.get_transient_addr()`, preserving the raw IPv4-mapped form. When the mempool later downloads an invalid transaction from this peer and generates a misbehavior penalty, the raw transient address is forwarded through the misbehavior channel to `MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior`, which does not canonicalize. After the 30-second misbehavior batch flush, `AddressBook::update` retrieves the canonical IPv4 entry but `MetaAddrChange::apply_to_meta_addr` asserts that `previous.addr == self.addr()`, which fails because one is IPv4 and the other is IPv4-mapped IPv6. The attacker needs only to complete a P2P handshake over IPv4 to a dual-stack listener and advertise an invalid mempool transaction (such as a coinbase transaction). The assertion fires after the 30-second misbehavior batch flush. ### Patches Patched in Zebra 4.5.0. The fix canonicalizes the address in the misbehavior update path via a new `MetaAddr::new_misbehavior` constructor that applies `canonical_peer_addr` before creating the `UpdateMisbehavior` change. ### Workarounds Configuring `listen_addr` to an IPv4-only address (e.g., `0.0.0.0:8233`) avoids the IPv4-mapped IPv6 representation and prevents this specific assertion. Alternatively, setting `net.ipv6.bindv6only=1` on Linux prevents dual-stack acceptance. ### Impact A remote unauthenticated peer can deterministically crash any synced Zebra node running the default Linux dual-stack configuration with a single invalid mempool transaction advertisement, followed by a 30-second wait. The attack requires no mining capability, no RPC access, no funds, and no special privileges. The crash can be repeated after each restart, causing persistent downtime. Linux dual-stack sockets and mempool activation are the default production state, not special preconditions. ### Credit Reported by `@Haxatron`.