Threats affecting pkg:github/arnasdon/wacrm

WACRM is a self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp. In version 0.7.0 and earlier, WACRM flow and automation write routes authenticate account viewers but do not enforce the agent role before using a service-role database client that bypasses row-level security. In src/app/api/flows/[id]/route.ts, src/app/api/flows/[id]/activate/route.ts, and src/app/api/flows/route.ts, a viewer can create, edit, activate, or delete flows because membership-only checks are followed by service-role writes. In src/app/api/automations/route.ts and src/app/api/automations/engine/route.ts, a viewer can create active automations and trigger outbound WhatsApp actions without the role required by the underlying write policies. This can permit unauthorized workflow changes, destructive flow deletion, and outbound actions from a role intended to be read-only. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 03e851bea56dcf6bb21ff1b80ba531372bf3269f.

WACRM is a self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp. In version 0.7.0 and earlier, the profiles_update row-level security policy in supabase/migrations/017_account_sharing.sql permits authenticated users to modify their own account_role and account_id, allowing a viewer to self-promote or move into another tenant and then access or modify tenant resources. Separately, match_ai_knowledge_fts and match_ai_knowledge_semantic in supabase/migrations/030_ai_knowledge.sql run as SECURITY DEFINER, accept a caller-controlled p_account_id, and omit an is_account_member check, allowing an authenticated non-member to read another tenant's knowledge-base chunks. This vulnerability is fixed with commit e01f7ed37184f972ace8fb2da5c3e37e56a6050f.