Threats affecting pkg:github/freedomofpress/securedrop-client

SecureDrop Client is a desktop app for journalists to securely communicate with sources and handle submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. Prior to version 1.3.1, a malicious SecureDrop Server could bypass securedrop-proxy's origin limitation by responding with cross-origin redirects. SecureDrop Server itself has multiple layers of built-in hardening, and is a dedicated physical machine exposed on the internet only via Tor hidden services for the Source and Journalist interfaces, and optionally via remote SSH access over another Tor hidden service. A newsroom's SecureDrop Workstation communicates only with its own dedicated SecureDrop Server. Version 1.3.1 fixes the issue.

SecureDrop Client is a desktop app for journalists to securely communicate with sources and handle submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. In versions 0.17.4 and below, a compromised SecureDrop Server can achieve code execution on the Client's virtual machine (sd-app) by exploiting improper filename validation in gzip archive extraction, which permits absolute paths and enables overwriting critical files like the SQLite database. Exploitation requires prior compromise of the dedicated SecureDrop Server, which itself is hardened and only accessible via Tor hidden services. Despite the high attack complexity, the vulnerability is rated High severity due to its significant impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of decrypted source submissions. This issue is similar to CVE-2025-24888 but occurs through a different code path, and a more robust fix has been implemented in the replacement SecureDrop Inbox codebase. The issue has been fixed in version 0.17.5.