Threats affecting pkg:github/q00/ouroboros

Ouroboros is a local-first runtime for AI coding agents that records their actions and applies user-defined policies to constrain behavior. Versions prior to 0.42.1 have an incomplete denylist. Several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, with no review step). The CVE-2026-47211 fix added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution, but it did not account for all keys. The backend config-home and MCP/plugin roots bypass the approval gate by pointing the nested agent, MCP servers, and plugin roster at attacker config. Other variables re-enable blocked local transports, replace sub-agent prompts, switch backends, and lower tool approval classes, further weakening the approval gate. This issue has been fixed in version 0.42.1.

Ouroboros is a local-first runtime for AI coding agents that records their actions and applies user-defined policies to constrain behavior. In versions prior to 0.39.0, if a user clones a malicious repository and runs Ouroboros commands within that directory, it can lead to arbitrary code execution and potential system takeover. The vulnerability stems from Ouroboros loading the .env file from the current working directory. Execution-affecting environment variables such as OUROBOROS_CLI_PATH, OPENCODE_CLI_PATH, and other backend selectors are accepted directly from this local .env. An attacker can include a malicious script in the repository and point the CLI path variable to it (e.g., OUROBOROS_CLI_PATH=./malicious_script.sh). When the user executes a command like ouroboros init or any command that instantiates the adapter, the malicious script is executed instead of the intended CLI. This issue has been fixed in version 0.39.0.