Threat Intelligence Database

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, content/file.Store extraction of OCI layers marked with io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true can write outside the store working directory. The pushDir path through extractTarDirectory and ensureLinkPath validates symlink targets lexically, resolveRelToBase skips its parent-symlink walk for root-level entries, and writeFile follows a terminal symlink when opening a regular file. A malicious archive can therefore create a symlink chain whose lexical target remains inside the extraction root but whose resolved target is an attacker-selected absolute path, then overwrite that target with a same-named regular-file entry even when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite is false. Pulling an attacker-controlled artifact can create or overwrite any file writable by the process and may lead to code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.2.

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, the parseLink function in registry/remote/utils.go accepts an absolute URL from a registry-controlled Link response header without validating its scheme, host, or port. Tags, Referrers, and Repositories pagination operations then issue a GET request to the attacker-selected URL from the victim's network, allowing blind server-side request forgery against internal services. The response body is not returned to the attacker, but timing and error differences can reveal service reachability, and credentials may be attached when the credential store has an entry for the target host. Exploitation requires a victim to perform a pagination-based listing operation against a malicious registry. The maintainer identifies this report as a duplicate of GHSA-3hr5-mjrr-hfjh and states that remediation is consolidated in that earlier advisory. The consolidated issue is fixed in version 2.6.2.

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, registry/remote/repository.go in blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost follows a registry-controlled Location header during monolithic blob upload and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request, allowing a malicious registry to return a cross-host Location and receive the caller's credentials at an attacker-controlled endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, resolveWritePath() in content/file/file.go uses a lexical filepath.Rel check for workingDir and does not account for symlink traversal, so when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false an attacker-controlled blob title through ocispec.AnnotationTitle such as out/pwn.txt can follow a workingDir symlink out -> /some/outside/dir and cause pushFile() to create /some/outside/dir/pwn.txt outside workingDir. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, auth.Client follows the realm URL from a registry's WWW-Authenticate: Bearer challenge without validating the scheme or host, allowing a malicious or compromised registry to cause SSRF to internal networks such as http://169.254.169.254/, http://10.0.0.x/, and http://127.0.0.1/, or to downgrade a registry contacted over https:// to an http:// token endpoint in registry/remote/auth/client.go through Client.Do(), Client.fetchBearerToken(), fetchDistributionToken, and fetchOAuth2Token. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1.