Threat Intelligence Database

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0.

Code Injection vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows unauthenticated remote code execution via unsanitized attribute value interpolation in HEEx template generation. The psb-assign WebSocket event handler in 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.PlaygroundPreviewLive':handle_event/3 accepts arbitrary attribute names and values from unauthenticated clients. These values are passed to 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Helpers.ExtraAssignsHelpers':handle_set_variation_assign/3, which stores them verbatim. When rendering, 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Rendering.ComponentRenderer':attributes_markup/1 interpolates binary attribute values directly into a HEEx template string as name="<val>" without escaping double quotes or HEEx expression delimiters. An attacker can supply a value containing a closing quote followed by a HEEx expression block (e.g.foo" injected={EXPR} bar="), which causes EXPR to be treated as an inline Elixir expression. The resulting template is compiled via EEx.compile_string/2 and executed via Code.eval_quoted_with_env/3 with full Kernel imports and no sandbox, giving the attacker arbitrary code execution on the server. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.5.0 before 1.1.0.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via BEAM atom table exhaustion. Multiple LiveView event handlers convert user-supplied event parameter strings to atoms using String.to_atom/1 without validation: 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':handle_set_variation_assign/3 interns every key of the psb-assign params map; 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':handle_toggle_variation_assign/3 interns the "attr" value from psb-toggle events; 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':to_variation_id/2 interns elements of "variation_id"; and 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers':to_value/4 interns raw string values for attributes declared as :atom or :boolean. BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker-controlled string is a permanent allocation. Once the atom table ceiling (~1,048,576 atoms) is reached, the entire BEAM node aborts, taking down all applications running on it. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.2.0 before 1.1.0.