Threat Intelligence Database

mchange-commons-java versions prior to 0.6.0 contain a vulnerability in the JNDI ObjectFactory implementation that allows construction and initialization of arbitrary JavaBean-style objects. This can lead to unsafe behaviors such as triggering HTTP requests from trusted domains or deserialization of malicious objects. Versions prior to 0.5.0 additionally deserialize unexpected Java objects from BinaryRefAddress elements, enabling potential exploitation via known deserialization gadget chains. The vulnerabilities are addressed by disabling unsafe deserialization features and imposing class whitelisting in versions 0.5.0 and 0.6.0.

mchange-commons-java, a library that provides Java utilities, includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted `jaxax.naming.Reference` or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code. Implementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to `false`, `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened. Mirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java's JNDI functionality is gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values starting in version 0.4.0. No known workarounds are available. Versions prior to 0.4.0 should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs.