Search: fcc-inc.com
5 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has banned imports of new foreign-made humanoid robots and power inverters, primarily targeting Chinese manufacturers, citing national security and cybersecurity risks. The ban includes advanced humanoid robots, quadruped robots, and power inverters used in renewable energy and data centers. This move aims to secure critical U.S. supply chains and reduce dependency on foreign technology perceived as a risk. Existing devices and previously approved models are not affected. China has criticized the ban as protectionism and pledged to defend its companies. The ban may impact U.S.-China technology collaborations but is unlikely to slow China's domestic humanoid robot development significantly. | SecurityWeek | ||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming number of applications from potential employees. The website claims IRIS C2 is in the business of acquiring “zero-day exploits, individual primitives, partial chains, and full capabilities across all major platforms. Payouts range from $10,000 to $7 million depending on target, reliability, and operational value.” The government contracting portal g2exchange.com reports that irisc2[.]com is operated by a business based in Virginia called Calvexa Group LLC . The “contact” link on the website for Calvexa Group — calvexagroup[.]com — forwards visitors to irisc2[.]com. G2Exchange shows that while Calvexa Group LLC is registered as a federal contractor, it does not appear to be working on any direct government contracts. A search on the Arlington, Va. address listed in the incorporation records for Calvexa Group LLC finds the property is occupied by Jack Burkman , the 60-year-old founder and managing partner of the lobbying firm Burkman & Associates . When approached with questions about IRIS C2, Burkman referred further inquiries to his longtime associate, 28-year-old Jacob Wohl . Jack Burkman (left) and Jacob Wohl, at a press conference in August 2020. Image: Wikipedia. Burkman and Wohl have a storied history of creating fake intelligence companies and using them to spread false claims about and frame public figures, including fabricated sexual assault claims against then FBI director Robert Mueller , and Pete Buttigieg , then mayor of South Bend, Indiana and a Democratic candidate for the presidency. In 2019, Burkman and Wohl held press conferences falsely alleging extramarital affairs by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and then-2020 presidential candidate Kamala Harris . In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Wohl and Burkman were prosecuted by multiple U.S. states for making thousands of robocalls to residents of battleground states and disseminating false claims about mail-in ballots. They were indicted in Cleveland on 15 felony counts of orchestrating a robocall scheme aimed at suppressing the black vote in Detroit, and were sentenced in late 2025 to probation after their appeals to dismiss the charges were rejected. In 2022, Wohl and Burkman both pleaded guilty to a single felony charge of telecommunications fraud in Ohio, and sentenced to a fine, probation, and community service. In March 2023, a judge in a New York civil case ruled that Wohl and Burkman had violated federal and state civil rights laws, and the two agreed to pay a $1 million settlement. In June 2023, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a $5.1 million fine against Wohl and Burkman for their robocall campaigns, at the time the largest fine ever sought by the FCC under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Jacob “Jay” Wo… | Krebs on Security | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The FCC has banned foreign-made drones and key components due to national security concerns, highlighting risks associated with supply chain and hardware backdoors. While this is a regulatory action rather than a direct technical vulnerability, it reflects significant concerns about potential espionage or sabotage via drone technology. European organizations using similar foreign-made drones or components may face increased scrutiny or supply chain risks. The ban underscores the importance of securing hardware supply chains and verifying the integrity of drone components. Mitigation involves adopting trusted suppliers, conducting thorough hardware security assessments, and monitoring regulatory developments. Countries with high drone usage in critical infrastructure or defense sectors, such as Germany, France, and the UK, are most likely to be affected. The threat severity is assessed as medium due to indirect impact and lack of direct exploitation evidence. Defenders should prioritize supply chain risk management and maintain awareness of geopolitical developments affecting drone technology security. | Reddit InfoSec News | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The FCC has rolled back cybersecurity regulations for telecommunications providers, reducing mandated security requirements despite ongoing risks from state-sponsored hacking. This regulatory rollback potentially weakens the security posture of critical telecom infrastructure, which is a vital component of national and international communications. European organizations relying on transatlantic telecom services or interconnected networks may face increased risks due to diminished security standards in US-based telcos. The rollback does not represent a direct vulnerability or exploit but increases systemic risk by lowering baseline protections against sophisticated cyber threats. Mitigation requires European entities to independently enforce stringent security controls and closely monitor telecom service providers' security practices. Countries with strong transatlantic telecom links and high-value targets in finance, government, and critical infrastructure sectors are most at risk. Given the indirect nature of the threat, the suggested severity is medium, reflecting increased exposure but no immediate exploit. Defenders should prioritize supply chain risk management and enhance network monitoring to compensate for reduced regulatory oversight in the US telecom sector. | Reddit InfoSec News | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit InfoSec News The FCC is considering voting to eliminate existing telecom cybersecurity requirements, citing concerns over their effectiveness and legality. This regulatory rollback could weaken mandated security controls for telecommunications providers in the United States. Although this is not a direct technical vulnerability or exploit, the removal of these requirements may increase risks related to telecom infrastructure security. European organizations relying on transatlantic telecom services or interconnected networks could face indirect impacts due to potential degradation in US telecom security standards. The threat is primarily regulatory and policy-driven rather than a direct cyberattack. Mitigation involves monitoring regulatory developments, engaging with policymakers, and reinforcing internal telecom security measures independent of external mandates. Countries with strong telecom ties to the US or significant telecom infrastructure, such as the UK, Germany, and France, may be more affected. Given the indirect nature and absence of active exploits, the severity is assessed as medium. Defenders should focus on proactive risk management and maintaining robust security controls regardless of regulatory changes. | Reddit InfoSec News |
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