Threat Intelligence Database

MeshCentral 1.1.21 contains a cross-site WebSocket hijacking protection bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack authenticated administrator sessions by exploiting an unconditional early return in the CheckWebServerOriginName() function within webserver.js when self-signed certificates are in use. Attackers can open cross-origin WebSocket connections to any of the twelve WebSocket endpoints, send crafted action commands to exfiltrate the server sessionKey used to sign session cookies, forge session tokens as arbitrary users, and gain full remote control of all managed devices governed by the MeshCentral instance.

forge-jsx4 is a remote access trojan (RAT) published to the public npm registry by the account rafael_silva ([email protected]). Versions 1.0.122 and 1.0.123 were published on June 21-22, 2026 as a reconstitution of the forge-jsx / forge-jsxy campaign, reusing the same command-and-control infrastructure and encryption after the earlier packages were taken down. The malware executes through a postinstall hook chain ("node scripts/postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs && node scripts/ensure-dist.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-bootstrap.mjs && node scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs"), which runs automatically on npm install and skips CI environments to evade analysis. Once running it deploys a full RAT: system-wide keylogging via uiohook-napi, clipboard monitoring, .env file scanning, shell history collection, host inventory enumeration, desktop screenshot capture via jimp, and a WebSocket filesystem backdoor with remote file access. It scans the filesystem for cryptocurrency material (BIP39 mnemonics validated via checksum, Ed25519 Solana keypairs via tweetnacl, range-checked secp256k1 keys) and harvests browser-extension wallet databases across 21+ Chromium browsers (MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby). It establishes durable persistence outside node_modules (e.g. ~/.local/share/cfgmgr/.forge-jsxy/ on Linux, with macOS/Windows equivalents) plus autostart services (systemd user unit forge-js-worker.service, macOS LaunchAgent com.forgejs.worker.plist, Windows Task Scheduler ForgeJSWorker / HKCU Run key), so it survives npm uninstall, and supports relay-pushed auto-upgrades. Collected data is exfiltrated to a hardcoded C2 at 204.10.194.247 (WebSocket relay ws://204.10.194.247:9877, HTTP API http://204.10.194.247:8765, session password "secret"), to Discord bot webhooks (screenshots via ephemeral URLs), and to Hugging Face Hub repositories via the @huggingface/hub SDK. The payload uses an XOR-obfuscated AES-256-GCM key shared across all campaign waves. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (54ce6747205bbecab342f78d9558861a02c1e21a213d795237b788cb3552a3c0) Package ships several files with patterns that warrant human inspection: a `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` invoked at install time, a `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` module with POST/ping/base64 patterns, a `dist/relayServer.js`, a `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` that fetches from huggingface.co, and a `dist/hfCredentials.js` with base64 decode operations. The combination of an install-time agent script plus a relay/upload module plus a credentials helper is the kind of composition that can hide an installer-side data flow, but the package name (`forge-jsx4`) and the file naming suggest a developer-tool / agent / Hugging Face integration where many of these patterns may be legitimate (HF API endpoints, content-scanning helpers, build artifact relay). Without traced-code corroboration of where the postinstall agent points, what discordRelayUpload actually transmits, and whose credentials hfCredentials handles, the intent cannot be confirmed. Routing to human review so a maintainer can verify whether the postinstall script performs an outbound fetch to an attacker-controlled destination, whether discordRelayUpload silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data, and whether the embedded base64 blobs decode to executable payloads or to legitimate configuration.

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c7d67bcaf42f4ef050a6b824dfbc2f711d6820f7b3b1140d211110f390e512fa) The package ships several files whose names and contents suggest a non-trivial install-time and runtime footprint: a postinstall script (scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs) that performs network I/O including a ping/GET against an identifier-bearing endpoint, a relay server (dist/relayServer.js) with multiple ping invocations, a Discord relay upload module (dist/discordRelayUpload.js) combining base64 decoding with POST calls, a Hugging Face credentials module (dist/hfCredentials.js) using base64-decoded values, and a secret-scan startup audit (dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js) that fetches huggingface.co endpoints. The combination of a postinstall agent, a Discord upload path, base64-encoded data in deployment defaults, and credential/secret handling is consistent with either (a) a legitimate ML/agent tooling package that talks to Hugging Face and uses Discord for notifications, or (b) a credential-relay/exfiltration tool. The evidence available here is keyword-level pattern matches without traced execution paths, so intent cannot be determined from this data alone. A human reviewer should inspect scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs to confirm what runs on `npm install`, dist/discordRelayUpload.js to confirm whether installer-side data is shipped to Discord, and dist/hfCredentials.js to confirm whose credentials are read. ## Source: ghsa-malware (95b8b8f54c9c2a4fa965e4a7fe7ea9c8f8ef1b5bcdd4cc1da7354d0ce2e8842f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

zredis-typed is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' ([email protected]). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of zredis-typed (1.0.127) exists; all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a1853a45bcb561f96e0e7c0dec7f96e640ae53be62e65158880812ff104c9e41, SHA-1: b74170f2d850bfd8d0a9d750af88a03ba2c42e61. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (330bc399769c68aa2a7f09a635bb038680c88c855268cc3643759492ebd96de9) The package name presents as a typed Redis client, but the tarball ships a multi-file exfiltration payload unrelated to any Redis functionality. `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` performs host reconnaissance (ping) and POSTs base64-encoded content to remote endpoints. `dist/relayServer.js` similarly runs ping-based host probing. `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` fetches attacker-controlled URLs on huggingface.co (used here as a data/staging endpoint), and `dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js` performs credential/secret scanning with base64 encoding of results. `dist/hfCredentials.js` handles third-party (Hugging Face) credential material via base64 decode. `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` and `scripts/encode-deployment.mjs` encode/decode deployment payloads via base64. `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` is registered as an install-time agent that performs outbound GET requests and host ping — running automatically on `npm install`. The combination of postinstall-time network activity, host reconnaissance, filesystem secret scanning, base64-encoded payload handling, Discord-labeled relay upload, and hardcoded remote fetch endpoints is unambiguous credential/data exfiltration disguised as a Redis type package. Nothing in the shipped modules implements a Redis client. The traced content also tripped the safety filter on downstream analysis, corroborating the malware shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73b8d51428450de7f67cb29aa402a94aefd62bdcf03e4f0eee43c554576eec2e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed,

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (560c3d47344d4da5dffac230236b5248d2f1856c221ffac7ff72d4e3b197957b) Package [email protected] is a credential/secret harvester disguised behind a benign-sounding name. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs is a lifecycle-triggered agent that runs on `npm install` and performs host reconnaissance (ping/GET, id enumeration). dist/discordRelayUpload.js is an exfiltration channel that POSTs collected data using base64-encoded payloads to remote endpoints (Discord relay pattern). dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js and dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js implement a secret-scanning pipeline that harvests credentials from the installer's filesystem and transmits results to hardcoded huggingface.co endpoints via fetch(). dist/hfCredentials.js carries base64-encoded credential material used to authenticate the exfil channel. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs contain base64-encoded configuration/payload data used by the agent. dist/relayServer.js implements a persistent relay component. The combination of an auto-executed postinstall agent + on-host secret scanning + base64-obfuscated payloads + hardcoded outbound POST/fetch to attacker-controlled relay endpoints satisfies the active-attack fingerprint for installer-side credential theft. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1deba1d29d0eb3668c5ca30605d3bb8578f3427835bd947c263c67b8728456ca) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.