A phishing campaign uses fake Calendly booking pages impersonating Meta Careers to steal Facebook and Google login credentials. Victims are tricked into selecting interview times, submitting personal data, and completing fake CAPTCHAs before being prompted to log into their accounts. The phishing kit captures credentials and bypasses two-factor authentication by relaying authentication codes in real-time. The fake pages include convincing replicas of legitimate login screens with fake address bars showing authentic URLs. Eleven domains with recruiting-related names are involved, and the infrastructure operates via Amazon API Gateway in Singapore. Code comments in Vietnamese suggest possible origins of the operation.
Mirage2FA is an active phishing-as-a-service toolkit built to steal Microsoft 365 credentials and authenticated sessions through Adversary-in-the-Middle attacks. Analysis shows 63.7% of identified victims are in the US, with Technology, Manufacturing, and Education among the most targeted industries. The operation generated thousands of compromise events between 2024 and 2026, including stolen session cookies, passwords, and SSO access. Once a Microsoft 365 session is hijacked, attackers gain access to corporate email, sensitive data, and trusted business accounts. The toolkit uses browser-based delivery through .htm, .xhtml, and .svg stagers, QR codes, JavaScript obfuscation, and WebSocket-based AiTM activity. Of 9,426 unique targeted email addresses, 4,532 were potentially compromised, representing approximately 48% success rate.
The UNC1151/Ghostwriter group is conducting high-intensity phishing campaigns targeting Gmail accounts of Polish citizens since March 2026. The campaigns primarily target individuals in political and public life, prominent positions, researchers, journalists, public administration and law enforcement employees, and their associates. Attackers use fraudulent emails impersonating Gmail administrators, claiming suspicious activity or policy violations to pressure victims into verifying their accounts. The phishing infrastructure captures login credentials and two-factor authentication codes through fake login panels. The group utilizes dedicated domains, Netlify subdomains, and compromised websites to host phishing pages. Campaigns run primarily on weekdays with new domains appearing almost daily, demonstrating persistent operational tempo against Polish targets.
A new Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) framework dubbed Salty 2FA has been discovered targeting industries in the US and EU. It uses a unique domain pattern combining .com subdomains with .ru domains and employs a multi-stage execution chain to resist detection. The kit can bypass multiple 2FA methods, including push, SMS, and voice. Victims span global industries such as finance, telecom, energy, consulting, logistics, and education. Static IOCs are unreliable for detection; instead, behavioral patterns must be identified. The framework shares traits with Storm-1575 but has distinct characteristics setting it apart from known threats like Tycoon2FA or EvilProxy. It demonstrates sophisticated capabilities in distributing phishing payloads, maintaining dynamic infrastructure, and managing complex communication between phishing pages and C2 servers.
