Threats Tagged 'anydesk'

In late August, an organization was compromised by INC ransomware across at least 175 endpoints. The attack timeline spanned from early to late August with a 17-day gap, suggesting involvement of an initial access broker and a separate ransomware affiliate. Early August activity included scheduled tasks with randomized names and lateral movement via RDP using a compromised account. After the lull, attackers deployed AnyDesk for remote access, used Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver tactics to disable security controls, and executed ransomware via Impacket tools. Uniquely, two ransom notes were discovered: the standard INC-README.txt and a subsequent DATALEAK_PRESS_RELEASE.txt containing detailed stolen file listings, threatening to contact media, employees, and partners within 48 hours to increase pressure on victims.

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns targeting South Korean and Japanese entities in early 2026. The attacks used LNK malware distributed via OneDrive share links to establish scheduled tasks that periodically retrieved PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers. These scripts profiled infected systems, exfiltrated email data from Thunderbird and Outlook, and logged keystrokes. The threat actor leveraged legitimate remote control tools such as Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain persistent access. Additionally, a malicious Chrome extension with AI-generated code was used to steal Gmail data. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to hinder tracking efforts.

MediumCampaignJapanSouth Korea#spear phishing#chrome remote desktop#powershell

An Akira ransomware affiliate gained initial access through an exposed SonicWall VPN without multi-factor authentication via credential spraying. After compromising the domain controller, the attacker performed Active Directory enumeration, collected and exfiltrated data using WinRAR and s5cmd to cloud storage. The affiliate employed a novel evasion technique by rebooting the victim host into Safe Mode with Networking to disable EDR and antivirus protection. AnyDesk was installed as a persistent remote access mechanism. However, the Safe Mode environment caused the ransomware to fail due to out-of-virtual-memory errors, preventing encryption. Despite the encryption failure, the attacker had already exfiltrated credentials and file shares, enabling extortion through data leak threats. This marks the first observed instance of Akira affiliates using Safe Mode boot as an anti-EDR technique.

GodDamn ransomware represents the third iteration of ransomware developed by Hyadina, following Monster (2022) and Beast (2024). A recent attack in June 2026 demonstrates sophisticated tactics including AnyDesk for remote access, NirSoft-based credential harvesting tools, and the PoisonX kernel driver for defense evasion. PoisonX is a malicious driver signed by Microsoft that terminates security processes at the kernel level. Attackers used PsExec for lateral movement, deployed comprehensive credential theft toolkits comprising 14 different tools, and disabled endpoint defenses before encrypting files. The encrypted files were renamed with victim organization names as extensions. The four-day dwell period allowed attackers to stage payloads and conduct reconnaissance before triggering encryption across at least 10 hosts within the targeted organization.

A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeting Russian aerospace and aviation organizations has been identified, likely attributed to the Rare Werewolf threat group. The attack begins with fraudulent emails impersonating a legitimate Russian aerospace research institute, delivering password-protected archives containing malicious installers. The campaign employs living-off-the-land techniques, abusing legitimate tools including AnyDesk, Blat, WinRAR, and Tray Minimizer to establish persistent remote access. The attack chain deploys portable AnyDesk with unattended access configured using a predefined password, exfiltrates configuration data via SMTP to attacker-controlled infrastructure, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. The operators conceal their activities by minimizing the AnyDesk interface and removing forensic artifacts. This methodology aligns with previously documented Rare Werewolf campaigns targeting strategically important sectors across Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, par...

MediumCampaignRussiaBelarusKazakhstan#scheduled task persistence#remote access tool#aerospace targeting

TA4922 is a highly sophisticated Chinese-speaking threat actor demonstrating rapid operational tempo and continually evolving malware capabilities. Initially targeting East Asia, particularly Japan, the group has expanded globally to Europe and Africa. The actor deploys multiple malware families including Atlas RAT, RomulusLoader, SilentRunLoader, and ValleyRAT (Winos4.0), alongside legitimate remote management tools like AnyDesk and SyncFuture. Campaigns use localized lures themed around HR, payroll, tax, and invoicing, targeting hundreds to thousands of recipients per campaign. TA4922 conducts credential phishing, fraud operations including credit card theft, and attempts to shift communications to out-of-band channels like LINE, WhatsApp, and Microsoft Teams. The group leverages legitimate cloud hosting services and trusted software for delivery and persistence, combining advanced tradecraft with financially motivated objectives such as data theft, fraud, access resale, and persistent remote access.

MediumMalwareBritish Indian Ocean TerritoryGermanyIndia+7#romulusloader#atlas rat#ta4922

Trigona ransomware affiliates have developed and deployed a custom exfiltration tool named uploader_client.exe, observed in attacks during March 2026. This tool uses parallel data streams, connection rotation, and file filtering to evade detection and streamline data theft. Attackers disable endpoint protections at the kernel level using multiple utilities before exfiltration. Remote access and credential theft are facilitated by AnyDesk and tools like Mimikatz. This represents a more technically sophisticated approach than typical ransomware affiliate operations.

The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service program has rapidly expanded since mid-2025, claiming over 320 victims with 240 attacks occurring in early 2026. The service provides multi-platform lockers for Windows, Linux, NAS, BSD, and ESXi, enabling comprehensive coverage of corporate environments. During an incident response engagement, an affiliate deployed SystemBC proxy malware for covert tunneling and payload delivery. Analysis of the SystemBC command-and-control server revealed a botnet of over 1,570 victims, primarily corporate and organizational targets. The intrusion progressed from domain controller compromise through credential validation, remote execution via administrative shares, and deployment of Cobalt Strike payloads. Attackers disabled defenses, established persistence through scheduled tasks and services, and ultimately deployed ransomware via Group Policy. The operation demonstrates sophisticated lateral movement capabilities, defense evasion techniques, and integration of mature post-exploit...

NightSpire ransomware, first discovered in February 2025, presents a categorization challenge regarding whether it operates as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS). Analysis of two incidents from December 2025 and March 2026 reveals significant variations in tactics, techniques, and procedures between attacks. The March 2026 incident involved threat actors installing Chrome Remoting Desktop and AnyDesk for persistence, using Everything and 7Zip for data staging, MEGASync for exfiltration, and deploying VMWare Workstation and WPS Office. The attacker accessed systems via RDP days before detection. Comparison with the December 2025 incident shows evolution in the ransomware encryptor, including modified ransom note filenames and contents. These variations in TTPs and indicators suggest either operational evolution or involvement of multiple affiliates, demonstrating that ransomware indicators aren't consistent across campaigns.

Active since September 2025, Yurei is a double extortion ransomware campaign. The operators run their own Tor data leak site with a low number of victims listed at the time of writing. It is reportedly derived from Prince Ransomware, an open-source ransomware family written in Go. Check Point researchers noted that all samples were first submitted to VirusTotal from Morocco, and that one sample did not include a ticket ID, indicating that this could be a test build, possibly uploaded by the developer themselves. Yurei ransomware samples also contained a link to SatanLockv2, based on the presence of the PDB path string “D:\satanlockv2” present in the Yurei samples.

MediumCampaignMoroccoUnited StatesUnited Kingdom+7#yurei ransomware#netexec#netscan