Threats tagged 'brew-aider-cve-2026-112901'
1 threat
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-112901Pillow · Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity Medium6.9EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112901 ``` ============================================================================ ReDoS in XbmImagePlugin: 512-byte file stalls Image.open() for minutes Location: src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:58 in XbmImageFile._open() Commit: a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6 ============================================================================ ``` A crafted 512-byte file makes Pillow's `Image.open()` spend about six minutes of processor time on one core before it gives up with `UnidentifiedImageError`. Anyone who can hand bytes to an application that opens images with Pillow's default settings can trigger this, for example through an upload form, a thumbnailer, or a service that checks whether a blob is an image. A few such files sent at once can tie up a typical pool of worker processes. The cause is the `xbm_head` regular expression in `src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:32-40`, which `XbmImageFile._open()` (line 58) runs over the first 512 bytes of any stream whose prefix starts with `#define`. Several adjacent parts of the pattern can match the same characters. `[ \t]+` overlaps with `.*` in the width and height lines and with `[^_]*` in the optional hotspot lines, and `[\r\n]+` closing the hotspot group overlaps with the following `[\000-\377]*`. The header sets a run of k spaces after each `#define` and a run of k line terminators after `_y_hot`, then omits the `[]` after `_bits`. That forces Python's backtracking matcher to try every way of splitting those runs and rescan the remaining bytes each time. The cost grows roughly as k to the fifth power: k = 60 measured 375 s, while a well-formed XBM of the same size opens in about 40 ms. Because this happens before any format is identified, none of Pillow's size, pixel-count or decompression-bomb limits apply, and upload size limits do not help because the file is tiny. `ImageFile.Parser.feed()` repeats the cost on every chunk until the stream is identified. The only existing mitigation is passing a `formats=` allowlist that excludes `"XBM"`. The attached reproducer opens the same header with and without the trailing `[]`. The valid version opens as XBM in 52 ms. The broken version takes 0.1 s, 0.75 s, 3.0 s and 8.6 s at k = 10, 15, 20 and 25, and the slow k = 60 case is not run. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2021-25292 in `PdfParser`, but in a different plugin and reachable from plain `Image.open()`. ## Details `XbmImageFile._open()` identifies an XBM file by running the module-level regex `xbm_head` over the first 512 bytes of the stream. The pattern has several adjacent quantifier pairs that can consume the same characters, followed by a `[\000-\377]*_bits\[]` tail that rescans the rest of the buffer for every way of splitting them. A 512-byte input built to exercise all of them and then fail the final literal keeps `Image.open()` in `xbm_head.match()` for minutes before it raises `UnidentifiedImageError`. This 512-byte input (k = 60) takes 375 s of CPU in `Image.open(io.BytesIO(data))` with default settings, measured on the stock build at this commit: ```python k = 60 data = b"#define" + b" "*k + b"_width 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "*k + b"_height 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "*k + b"_x_hot 1\r" data += b"#define" + b" "*k + b"_y_hot 1" + b"\r"*k data += b"_bits" # no "[]": the final literal never matches data += b"A" * (512 - len(data)) # pad to the 512 bytes _open() reads ``` Calling `XbmImagePlugin.xbm_head.match(data)` directly gives the same picture: k = 10 → 0.11 s, k = 15 → 0.76 s, k = 20 → 3.0 s, k = 25 → 8.5 s, k = 30 → 19.9 s (roughly ×27 per doubling of k, i.e. about k^4.7). A well-formed 512-byte XBM matches in 10 µs and opens and loads through `Image.open()` in ~40 ms including plugin import; the same k = 60 header with `_bits[]` present matches in 5 µs. The regex, `src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:32`: ```python xbm_head = re.compile( rb"\s*#define[ \t]+.*_width[ \t]+(?P<width>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"#define[ \t]+.*_height[ \t]+(?P<height>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"(?P<hotspot>" b"#define[ \t]+[^_]*_x_hot[ \t]+(?P<xhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b"#define[ \t]+[^_]*_y_hot[ \t]+(?P<yhot>[0-9]+)[\r\n]+" b")?" rb"[\000-\377]*_bits\[]" ) ``` and the only call site, `src/PIL/XbmImagePlugin.py:58`: ```python def _open(self) -> None: … m = xbm_head.match(self.fp.read(512)) if not m: msg = "not a XBM file" raise SyntaxError(msg) ``` For a well-formed header (`#define im_width 8\n…static char im_bits[] = {`) each `[ \t]+` eats the single space, `.*`/`[^_]*` eat the identifier prefix, and `[\000-\377]*_bits\[]` finds the literal on its first backward scan, so the match is linear. The crafted header diverges at every one of those points: - `[ \t]+.*_width` and `[ \t]+.*_height`: the run of k spaces after `#define` can be split between `[ \t]+` and `.*` in k ways, all leading to the same continuation. Factor k each. (The choice of `\r` terminators is incidental: t | CVE Database V5 |
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