Threats tagged 'brew-cf2tf-cve-2026-114145'

### Summary `create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo's own `.git` directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of ".git/hooks" is accepted by the pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory, and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable `.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`, but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution. ### Details The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk. This breaks the "validate before mutation" invariant that commit 43a43cd8 ("Validate submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation") set out to enforce. Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check only reaches the ".git" alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk: git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add) 599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # accepts ".git/hooks" 673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into <worktree>/.git/hooks 714: index.add([sm], write=True) # strict check only triggers here git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items) 732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path) # rejects ".git", too late _to_relative_path only blocks `..`/absolute/out-of-tree paths; `.git` aliases are rejected only by _validate_repo_path, which was added in 3.2.0 (commit a75aedf3) and runs at the index boundary. The ValueError it raises at line 732 does not roll back what _clone_repo already wrote. Version-dependent behavior: - 3.2.0 .. tip bda18e08: _validate_repo_path raises ValueError at index.add, but the hook is already on disk and is not removed (incorrect order of validation vs. clone). - 3.1.x (e.g. 3.1.59): _validate_repo_path does not exist and _to_relative_path does not reject `.git`; create_submodule(path=".git/hooks", ...) returns with no error at all and the hook is planted silently. ### Proof of concept Setup: evilsub/ : a git repo whose ROOT contains an executable file named post-checkout (the payload) victim/ : a git repo with at least 1 commit and a second branch, whose .git/hooks has NO sample hooks (the state of a minimal/CI checkout, or `git init` with an empty template dir, or GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR/init.templateDir empty) import git, os.path as osp try: git.Repo("victim").create_submodule(name="x", path=".git/hooks", url=osp.abspath("evilsub")) except ValueError: pass # 3.2.0+: ".git" is rejected, but only AFTER the clone, so the plant already happened. # 3.1.x: no exception is raised at all; the call succeeds and still plants the hook. #### victim/.git/hooks/post-checkout now exists, mode 0755, attacker-controlled, on every #### affected version. Any later checkout runs it: #### git -C victim checkout <other-branch> -> the hook runs -> code execution Verified live: - tip bda18e08 (3.2.0 + 3 commits): create_submodule raised ValueError from git/index/base.py:732, yet .git/hooks/post-checkout was present and executable, and `git checkout` executed it. - 3.1.59: create_submodule returned with no error; .git/hooks/post-checkout was planted and executed by `git checkout`. ### Impact Arbitrary code execution. A library/app that creates a submodule from an attacker-influenced `path` ends up with an attacker-controlled executable in `.git/hooks`, which git runs on ordinary later operations. This affects any service that derives a submodule checkout path from untrusted data, e.g. one that ingests a submodule spec (name/path/url) from a user-supplied manifest or API request and feeds `path` into create_submodule. On 3.2.0+ the library's own validation is the thing that fails: it correctly rejects the `.git` path, but only after the submodule has already been cloned into place, so an app that traps the ValueError reasonably believes the unsafe path was blocked. Preconditions (hence AC:H): (1) the app passes an attacker-influenced submodule `path`; (2) the target hook name is free in `.git/hooks`, true for minimal/CI/container checkouts and whenever init.templateDir/GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR is empty. With the default sample hooks present, `git clone` refuses the non-empty destination and no plant occurs. Affected: all tested versions from 3.1.x (3.1.59) through the current tip bda18e08 (3.2.0 + 3 commits). 3.1.x plants silently; 3.2.0+ plants despite raising ValueError.