Threats tagged 'brew-ggshield-cve-2026-112915'

`ReadWriteLock` and `AsyncReadWriteLock` (the SQLite-backed reader/writer lock) run `PRAGMA journal_mode=MEMORY` on a fresh connection for every acquire. That statement makes SQLite load the whole schema (the `sqlite_master` table, which lists every table and index with its `CREATE` text) of whatever file sits at the lock path. The caller's `timeout` reaches SQLite only as `busy_timeout`, which bounds waits for another connection's lock, not schema loading. The only content checks reject non-regular files and WAL mode (write-ahead log, an SQLite mode that keeps changes in a side file). A local user who can place or overwrite the file at a `ReadWriteLock`'s database path can therefore make every `acquire_read` / `acquire_write` of every process using that lock ignore its `timeout` and `blocking=False`. That position needs a non-sticky shared directory, or a database owned by the user running the lock (below: the lock user) that other users may write. One 37 KB crafted file stalls each acquire for as long as its author chooses while the process allocates about 1 GB. A second 28 KB layout makes the acquire of a free lock run without end, spinning at 100% CPU and ignoring Ctrl-C. The effect is availability only: the other user reads nothing and corrupts nothing. Affected versions are filelock 3.20.4 through 4.2.0. Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this in private as `ANT-2026-NFPRHMYJ` [medium, CWE-400]: ReadWriteLock: crafted lock database hangs acquire regardless of timeout. ## Severity **CVSS 3.1 `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` scores 5.5 (Medium).** `AV:L` (local): the other user needs an account on the same host. `PR:L` (low privileges): an ordinary account is enough. `AC:L` (low attack complexity): the other user plants one file; no race. `UI:N` (no user interaction). `A:H` (high availability impact): every acquire of every process using the lock runs for as long as that user chose, or does not return, with `timeout` and `blocking=False` ignored and `SIGINT` not delivered, so only killing the process ends it. `C:N` and `I:N` (no confidentiality or integrity impact): the other user reads nothing and corrupts nothing. `S:U` (scope unchanged). Classification from the external review: **conditional security**, an availability concern only when an untrusted actor can supply the database file (it needs a writable or replaceable database path). The scanner rated it medium. The review agrees with the mechanism and the precondition. ## Scope and preconditions - The other party is a different local account that can create or replace the file at the lock path. One way: the lock directory is writable by that account and not sticky (the sticky bit is a directory flag that lets only a file's owner remove or rename it), for example a group-writable project or cache directory. There the account can be the first to create the database, or rename the lock user's database aside and put the crafted one in its place. The other way: the lock user's own database is writable by that account (`0666`), which is the setup a lock shared between accounts needs. In a `1777` directory the scanner wrote the crafted file over such a database in place, and the lock user's next acquire hung. The lock user must be able to open the file read-write, so a file the other user creates is `0666`. - Sticky directories and kernel settings. In a sticky world-writable directory such as `/tmp`, Linux with `fs.protected_regular=2` (a kernel setting) refuses the lock user's `O_CREAT` open of a file owned by the other account with `EACCES`. A database owned by the other user does not work there. That does not cover a `0666` database owned by the lock user. The scanner did not test systems with `fs.protected_regular=0` (the kernel's own default). - Platform. Every platform runs the same statements. On Windows the documentation already requires a lock directory that untrusted users cannot write, so the shared-directory setup is outside what the project supports there. - Ancestor boundary. Protection against another local user is possible only while no other user can replace the lock's directory or any of its ancestors. That holds when each ancestor belongs to the user or root and is either not writable by others or sticky. ## Affected code At the scanned commit `b831496b0273`: [`_configure_and_begin` runs `PRAGMA busy_timeout=...; PRAGMA journal_mode=MEMORY;` on a fresh connection](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/blob/b831496b0273ecd11bf02b8d080ca8b673a538c1/src/filelock/_read_write.py#L814-L816), and for a read lock [`SELECT name FROM sqlite_master LIMIT 1` at line 832](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/blob/b831496b0273ecd11bf02b8d080ca8b673a538c1/src/filelock/_read_write.py#L832). The code in [`_do_acquire_inner` closes the previous connection and opens a new one on every acquire](https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/blob/b831496b0273ecd11bf02b8d080ca8b673a538c1/src/filelock/_read_write.py#L745-L754). The only content checks