Threats tagged 'brew-safety-cve-2025-59420'

## Summary Authlib’s JWS verification accepts tokens that declare unknown critical header parameters (`crit`), violating RFC 7515 “must‑understand” semantics. An attacker can craft a signed token with a critical header (for example, `bork` or `cnf`) that strict verifiers reject but Authlib accepts. In mixed‑language fleets, this enables split‑brain verification and can lead to policy bypass, replay, or privilege escalation. ## Affected Component and Versions - Library: Authlib (JWS verification) - API: `authlib.jose.JsonWebSignature.deserialize_compact(...)` - Version tested: 1.6.3 - Configuration: Default; no allowlist or special handling for `crit` ## Details RFC 7515 (JWS) §4.1.11 defines `crit` as a “must‑understand” list: recipients MUST understand and enforce every header parameter listed in `crit`, otherwise they MUST reject the token. Security‑sensitive semantics such as token binding (e.g., `cnf` from RFC 7800) are often conveyed via `crit`. Observed behavior with Authlib 1.6.3: - When a compact JWS contains a protected header with `crit: ["cnf"]` and a `cnf` object, or `crit: ["bork"]` with an unknown parameter, Authlib verifies the signature and returns the payload without rejecting the token or enforcing semantics of the critical parameter. - By contrast, Java Nimbus JOSE+JWT (9.37.x) and Node `jose` v5 both reject such tokens by default when `crit` lists unknown names. Impact in heterogeneous fleets: - A strict ingress/gateway (Nimbus/Node) rejects a token, but a lenient Python microservice (Authlib) accepts the same token. This split‑brain acceptance bypasses intended security policies and can enable replay or privilege escalation if `crit` carries binding or policy information. ## Proof of Concept (PoC) This repository provides a multi‑runtime PoC demonstrating the issue across Python (Authlib), Node (`jose` v5), and Java (Nimbus). ### Prerequisites - Python 3.8+ - Node.js 18+ - Java 11+ with Maven ### Setup Enter the directory **authlib-crit-bypass-poc** & run following commands. ```bash make setup make tokens ``` ### Tokens minted - `tokens/unknown_crit.jwt` with protected header: `{ "alg": "HS256", "crit": ["bork"], "bork": "x" }` - `tokens/cnf_header.jwt` with protected header: `{ "alg": "HS256", "crit": ["cnf"], "cnf": {"jkt": "thumb-42"} }` ### Reproduction Run the cross‑runtime demo: ```bash make demo ``` Expected output for each token (strict verifiers reject; Authlib accepts): For `tokens/unknown_crit.jwt`: ``` Strict(Nimbus): REJECTED (unknown critical header: bork) Strict(Node jose): REJECTED (unrecognized crit) Lenient(Authlib): ACCEPTED -> payload={'sub': '123', 'role': 'user'} ``` For `tokens/cnf_header.jwt`: ``` Strict(Nimbus): REJECTED (unknown critical header: cnf) Strict(Node jose): REJECTED (unrecognized crit) Lenient(Authlib): ACCEPTED -> payload={'sub': '123', 'role': 'user'} ``` Environment notes: - Authlib version used: `1.6.3` (from PyPI) - Node `jose` version: `^5` - Nimbus JOSE+JWT version: `9.37.x` - HS256 secret is 32 bytes to satisfy strict verifiers: `0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef` ## Impact - Class: Violation of JWS `crit` “must‑understand” semantics; specification non‑compliance leading to authentication/authorization policy bypass. - Who is impacted: Any service that relies on `crit` to carry mandatory security semantics (e.g., token binding via `cnf`) or operates in a heterogeneous fleet with strict verifiers elsewhere. - Consequences: Split‑brain acceptance (gateway rejects while a backend accepts), replay, or privilege escalation if critical semantics are ignored. ## References - RFC 7515: JSON Web Signature (JWS), §4.1.11 `crit` - RFC 7800: Proof‑of‑Possession Key Semantics for JWTs (`cnf`)