Threats Tagged 'brew-virtualfish-cve-2026-102938'
1 threat
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-102938virtualenv · CRLF Injection Medium5.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102938 ### Summary `pyvenv.cfg` is a line-based format with no escape syntax. `PyEnvCfg.write()` wrote values verbatim, while `PyEnvCfg._read_values()` parses the file with `str.splitlines()`. A value containing a line boundary therefore became additional configuration lines, and because reading is last-wins, the injected keys replaced any key written earlier in the file. ### Impact The `prompt` value is the reachable input: it is set by `--prompt`, by the `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` environment variable, or from the config file, and `write()` emits `prompt` before `home`. A crafted prompt can therefore set `home` in the generated `pyvenv.cfg`: ```console $ virtualenv --prompt $'x"\nhome = /attacker/path\nprompt = "z' venv $ grep '^home' venv/pyvenv.cfg home = /attacker/path ``` `home` is what tooling reads to locate the base interpreter, so a consumer that trusts it can be pointed elsewhere. `implementation`, `version_info`, `version`, `executable`, `command` and `virtualenv` are also written before `prompt` and can be replaced the same way. This requires the prompt to come from somewhere other than the person running the command, for example a CI job templating a branch name into it, tooling deriving an environment name from user-supplied data, or an inherited `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT`. Where the operator supplies the prompt directly they already control the command line, and the effect is corruption rather than privilege gain: the value is truncated at the boundary and read back with a dangling quote. ### Details The boundary set is the one `str.splitlines()` recognizes, which is wider than `\n`: `\r`, `\v`, `\f`, the file, group and record separators, `U+0085`, `U+2028` and `U+2029` were all written through unchanged and all split the line when read back. ### Patches `PyEnvCfg.write()` now collapses those boundaries to spaces as it serializes each line, so it cannot emit a structurally invalid file regardless of what a caller places in `content`. ### Workarounds Do not pass externally influenced data as the virtualenv prompt. Strip line boundaries from any value before using it as `--prompt` or `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT`. | CVE Database V5 |
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