Threats Tagged 'cve-2025-38499'

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns (CVE-2025-38499) * kernel: iommufd: Fix race during abort for file descriptors (CVE-2025-39966) * kernel: net: tun: Update napi->skb after XDP process (CVE-2025-39984) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns (CVE-2025-38499) * kernel: net: tun: Update napi->skb after XDP process (CVE-2025-39984) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo" may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to. clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter. There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually, but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above.