Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-43495'
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Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-43495'
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Multiple vulnerabilities affecting the Linux kernel have been identified, including use-after-free bugs and denial of service issues in various kernel components such as bonding driver, erofs filesystem, ALSA 6fire, ip6_tunnel, ipv6 routing, selinux overlayfs, and others. These vulnerabilities impact core Linux kernel functionality across several distributions including Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 and 10. Security updates addressing these issues have been released by Red Hat and require system reboot to take effect. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 05/21/2026, 22:00:00 UTC Added: 06/09/2026, 10:23:17 UTC |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 05/21/2026, 13:16:00 UTC Added: 07/17/2026, 10:22:18 UTC |
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