Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-64320'

A security update for the SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7 RT kernel addresses multiple security vulnerabilities across various kernel components, including hardware monitoring, Bluetooth, SCSI, networking, tracing, and more. These fixes resolve issues such as null pointer dereferences, memory leaks, use-after-free, out-of-bounds reads/writes, race conditions, and other kernel-level bugs. The update mitigates a broad range of potential security risks by correcting these defects.

A buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2025-68347) was identified and fixed in the Linux kernel ALSA firewire-motu driver affecting the hwdep_read() function for DSP events. The flaw allowed writing more bytes to a user buffer than requested if the buffer was smaller than the event header size. Red Hat released a security update for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.6 and related variants to address this issue. The update clamps the copy size to the user-requested length, preventing the overflow. The fix is part of a broader kernel security update addressing multiple vulnerabilities. A system reboot is required after applying the update for the fix to take effect.

This Red Hat Security Advisory addresses multiple vulnerabilities and bugs in the Linux kernel packages for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 and related products. The update includes fixes for several security issues such as use-after-free, out-of-bounds reads, heap overflows, race conditions, and arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities. The advisory also contains bug fixes and enhancements for various kernel subsystems. Red Hat rates the security impact as Important and recommends applying the update promptly, requiring a system reboot for changes to take effect.

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling (CVE-2026-52924) * kernel: scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode (CVE-2026-63886) * kernel: netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not force CLOSE on invalid-seq RST without direction check (CVE-2026-63913) * kernel: i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length (CVE-2026-64191) * kernel: netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize (CVE-2026-64189) * kernel: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page (CVE-2026-64320) * kernel: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F3A keymap to the GPIO count (CVE-2026-64277) * kernel: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count (CVE-2026-64276) Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * ss core dumped when there is an SCTP session [rhel-8.10.z] (JIRA:RHEL-212400) * SELinux TCP/MPTCP connect check bypass via TCP Fast Open [rhel-8.10.z] (JIRA:RHEL-222800) * [RHEL-RT] usb_hub_wq items may run on isolated+nohz_full cores (JIRA:RHEL-178088) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.