Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-72806'

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72806](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72806). ### Summary `FilterViewByPublishAccess`, the filter `renderAttributeView` applies for Reader sessions drops rows using only the hidden/forbidden check and never checks the publish password. Its three sibling filters all check both tiers. As a result, a publish `RoleReader` (or the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`) who has not entered a document's password still receives every database/attribute-view row bound to that password-protected document, the primary cell (title/ID) and all column values. ### Details `FilterViewByPublishAccess` (`model/publish_access.go:290`) drops rows on the hidden/forbidden tier only: ```go // Table (line 311), Gallery (348), Kanban (385), all identical: if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) { row = nil // hidden/forbidden dropped, but password NEVER checked } ``` The three sibling filters all check both the hidden/forbidden tier and the password tier (`password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(...)`): - `FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess` (line 412) - `FilterBlockInfoByPublishAccess` (line 457) - `FilterContentByPublishAccess` (line 474) So the password (protected) tier is enforced everywhere except this AV/database-view filter. Table layout masks nothing; Gallery and Kanban mask only the cover, keeping the card and its non-cover values. Reachable via `renderAttributeView`, `getAttributeViewKeys`, and `renderSnapshotAttributeView`, all `CheckAuth`-only. ### Proof of Concept Reproduced on a live instance (publish mode on 6808, anonymous Reader, no password cookie), against a password-protected document with a database/AV row. | Check | Path | Result | |---|---|---| | Control | `getDoc(secretDoc)` | 🔒 placeholder, body withheld password gate works normally | | Test | `renderAttributeView(AV)` | row leaked : `blockID=…rk7jofz`, title `secret-db-row` | | Differential (`disable=true`) | same filter | 0 rows : hidden tier correctly enforced | | Differential (password set) | same filter | 1 row : password tier bypassed | Same filter, same document, same Reader: the hidden tier drops the row, the password tier leaks it isolating the omission. ### Impact An anonymous/Reader publish user who has not supplied a protected document's password receives all attribute-view/database rows bound to that document titles, block IDs, and column values defeating the publish-password control for database views. Confidentiality-only. The hidden/forbidden tier is unaffected (correctly enforced). ### Suggested fix Add the password check to the drop condition in all three layout branches (Table, Gallery, Kanban), mirroring the sibling filters: ```go if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(...) || !(password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) { row = nil } ```